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Final Report 
Research grant from the National Institute on Aging, (R01-AG06162, 
"Short Term Change in Memory and Metamemory in the Elderly." 
Christopher Hertzog, Principal Investigator. 12/1/84 - 06/30/89. 
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III. Summary of Research Plan and Findings  
General background 
The general aim of the research grant was to conduct 
studies of the construct validity of two metamemory 
questionnaires in adult populations, while in the process 
relating multiple dimensions of metamemory to memory 
performance. Metamemory may be defined as knowledge, 
beliefs, and cognitions individuals have about memory. 
Metamemory is thought to play an important role in 
determining individuals' behavior in memory demanding 
situations, including laboratory memory studies. 
Gerontologists have studied metamemory in order to 
understand how knowledge of memory processes and strategies, 
beliefs about one's own ability to remember, and awareness 
of the status of information held in memory may contribute 
•to effective use of memory by older adults. 
At the time the grant proposal was written, there was a 
great deal of confusion in the literature regarding the 
nature of metamemory, whether there were age differences in 
different kinds of metamemory, and the role metamemory 
played in the functioning of older persons. Much of the 
confusion seemed to involve disparate, and perhaps 
inadequate, methods for measuring multiple aspects of 
metamemory. The proposed research was designed to address 
the issue of the construct validity of several methods for 
measuring metamemory, while at the same time tackling 
important substantive questions regarding metamemory, 
memory, and aging. A number of specific research questions 
were enumerated in the original and competing continuation 
grant proposals, which can be most succinctly summarized in 
the context of reviewing major findings from the project. 
Design and Samples 
In order to achieve the specific aims, several data 
collections were undertaken: 
A. 1985 Annville cross-sectional study. In 1985 447 adults, 
ages 20 to 78, were drawn from the Lebanon Valley, PA, 
recion, most of whom were members of a family health 
practice in Annville, PA. These individuals were 
administered a two-session battery that included (1) two 
metamemory questionnaires, (2) measures of mood states, (3) 
a depression screening measure, (4) measures of locus of 
control and self-efficacy, (5) a personality inventory, (6) 
a vocabulary test, and (7) a memory test, consisting of 
three trials of free recall of words and three trials of 
free recall of texts. About half the subjects received a 
version of the memory test obtaining performance 
predictions, a common method of measuring metamemory. 
B. 1987 Annville sequential study. In 1987 we retested 240 
of the original 1985 participants on the same set of 
measures, although there were tWo changes: (1) all 
participants made performance predictions, and (2) a new 
text was employed. We also added a new cross-sectional 
sample of 335 adults in the same 20-80 age range. 
C. Cornwall P-technique study. In 1986 we began a small 
panel study, in which 7 elderly women from a retirement 
community participated weekly for a period of up to two 
years. The women filled out metamemory questionnaires, mood 
state scales, and the depression scale, and then performed 
on a computerized recognition memory task and a text memory 
task. 
D. 1989 Atlanta study. In the summer of 1989 we tested 158 
university students and 188 adults, ages 45-75, using 
metamemory questionnaires, measures of mood state, and free 
recall of words. The study featured a more elaborate 
performance prediction paradigm, replicating and extending 
the procedures used in the Annville studies. 
Summary of Findings  
One of the major questions was whether we could resolve 
the inconsistencies in the literature regarding age 
differences in metamemory. Our first publication (Hultsch, 
Hertzog, & Dixon, 1985) outlined our hypothesis that 
measures of metamemory that tapped beliefs about one's own 
memory ability, and changes in memory ability during 
adulthood, were most likely to show age differences. We 
argued that these measures tapped a construct of memory 
self-efficacy, and that increased age was associated with 
lower memory self-efficacy. Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg, & 
Hultsch, 1987) reanalyzed data collected by Dixon and 
Hultsch on one metamemory questionnaire: the Metamemory in 
Adulthood (MIA) instrument. Hertzog et al. (1987) used 
confirmatory factor analysis to show that there were higher 
order factors in the MIA, and that the strongest higher-
order factor had loadings consistent with the argument that 
it was a memory self-efficacy factor. 
Our first analysis of data from the Annville study was 
an examination of age differences in metamemory scales, 
using the MIA and the Memory Functioning Questionnaire 
(MFQ), another widely used metamemory questionnaire 
(Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987). The study also analyzed 
data from a sample of Victoria, British Columbia, residents, 
collected using the same design as the Annville study (data 
collection was funded by a Canadian research grant to D. F. 
Hultsch). Our principal finding was that age differences 
were only observed on measures thought to have the highest 
relationship to memory self-efficacy: MIA Capacity, MIA 
Change, and MIA Locus. The proportion of variance accounted 
for by age was modest, and differed across the two samples. 
Differences were largest when University of Victoria 
students were compared to a sample of Victoria adults (ages 
55 - 78); however, we did observe significant cross-
sectional age effects for these variables in the Annville 
sample as well. Polynomial regression analyses showed that 
these effects were linear across the 20 - 78 age range. 
However, we found no age differences within the adult 
Victoria sample across the 55 - 78 age range. Age 
differences on the MFQ were small and nonsignificant in the 
Annville sample, despite the fact that the main scale of the 
MFQ, the Frequency of Forgetting scale, appears to be highly 
similar to the MIA Capacity scale. The complex pattern of 
results confirmed our expectation that memory self-efficacy 
was the principal source of age differences in metamemory, 
but also showed that (1) age differences were most likely 
when young college students are compared to older adults, 
and (2) depend 'upon the type of questionnaire measure 
employed. 
We then examined the convergent validity of the two 
metamemory questionnaires (Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1989). 
Our confirmatory factor analyses showed that the MIA and MFQ 
did have strong convergent validity in measuring memory 
self-efficacy, strategy use, and perceived change in memory 
self-efficacy. Memory self-efficacy factors from both 
scales correlated about .9 in old and young samples. We 
also found that the factor loadings were age-invariant, 
although there was a major age-related increase in the 
correlation between perceived change and memory self-
efficacy. Moreover, we found that memory self-efficacy had 
a very low correlation with declarative knowledge about 
memory functioning (measured by the MIA Task scale) and low 
correlations with self-reported use of memory strategies in 
everyday life. 
A set of analyses currently being written up for 
publication clarified the mystery of why the MIA and MFQ 
could show strong convergent validity and yet show divergent 
patterns of age differences. The MFQ measures of perceived 
problems with memory, emphasizing forgetting, correlate more 
highly with measures of depression, anxiety, and well-being 
(as well as the higher-order factor of psychological 
distress). In our cross-sectional samples, as with other 
community samples, older persons report lower levels of 
depression and negative affect than do younger adults 
(Hertzog, Van Alstine, Usala, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1990). So 
lower levels of self-reported negative affect in the old 
offset lower perceived self-efficacy in memory, eliminating 
age differences in self-reported memory problems. In order 
to conduct these analyses, we found it necessary to do 
extensive preliminary analyses of the item factor structure 
of the affective state, depression, and control measures, 
some of which we published because of their relevance to 
issues of measuring affect in elderly samples (Hertzog, Van 
Alstine, Usala, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1990; Usala & Hertzog, 
1989). Hertzog (1989) also published a book chapter using 
these results to illustrate issues associated with 
comparative item factor analysis. 
Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch (1990) reported results from 
the 1985 Annville sample relating metamemory questionnaires 
to memory task performance predictions. Predictions have 
traditionally been used as a measure of knowledge about 
memory functioning and awareness of the contents of one's 
own memory. Individuals higher in self-knowledge should, 
according to traditional approaches, have more accurate 
predictions of their memory performance. Our analyses 
showed that initial performance predictions are determined 
principally by memory self-efficacy, as measured by the MIA 
and MFQ, and that these predictions are actually not very 
accurate (correlations of the first prediction and 
subsequent recall performance are about .2 in the Hertzog et 
al. (1990) report and in the 1987 and 1989 studies). Our 
multiple trial paradigm then showed, consistent with other 
studies, that accuracy of predictions improved after task 
experience, and we used structural equation models to show 
that this shift in correlations was best modeled as an 
effect of previous performance on the next prediction. We 
did find, however, a greater accuracy in prediction of 
initial text recall performance than for word recall 
performance, which might suggest that adults have more 
accurate beliefs about their text recall abilities. The 
results of this study supported the view of performance 
predictions as task-specific self-efficacy beliefs that are 
sensitive to age and determined initially by more general 
self-efficacy beliefs, as measured by metamemory 
questionnaires. 
These memory self-efficacy beliefs are not necessarily 
accurate. There are major problems in establishing valid 
criteria for accuracy, of course, and it is by no means 
clear that the best benchmark for accuracy of memory self-
efficacy beliefs are correlations of individual differences 
in beliefs with individual differences in laboratory memory 
tasks. Our data show that these correlations are typically 
relatively low in adult samples (usually between .2 and .3). 
Hertzog, Dixon, and Hultsch (in press) summarize these 
findings. In the context of our construct validity studies, 
one can argue that the questionnaires do validly measure 
memory self-efficacy beliefs and other beliefs about memory, 
but that these beliefs have relatively low predictive 
validity for performance on measures of free recall (words 
and texts). Task-specific performance predictions may have 
slightly better predictive validity, but these too are 
generally low unless and until individuals have direct 
experience with the task. 
Our first analyses of the longitudinal data generated 
by the 1987 data collection were reported by Hertzog, 
Mobley, Saylor, Hultsch, and Dixon (1989) and by Usala & 
Hertzog (1990). We find that memory self-efficacy beliefs 
are highly stable over a two-year period, both in terms of 
mean levels and individual differences. Longitudinal 
correlations for the memory self-efficacy measures are as 
high or higher than the longitudinal correlations for free 
recall performance. However, not all self-report measures 
show this kind of stability in our sample. Usala and 
Hertzog (1990, unpublished) showed that the same subjects 
produce self-ratings of trait and state anxiety that have 
differential stability: trait anxiety self-ratings are as 
highly stable as are metamemory beliefs, but state anxiety 
measures show much lower stability of individual 
differences. It appears, then, that memory self-efficacy 
beliefs are consistent and enduring. 
In a different vein, we are analyzing data from the 
Cornwall p-technique study. The first manuscript produced 
from this study examined intraindividual change and 
intraindividual variability in text recall performance 
(Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990, unpublished). We found 
substantial amounts of variability in performance, which has 
important implications for assessment of older persons with 
text recall measures (as with the Wechsler Memory Scale's 
Logical Memory subtest). 
In summary, the major finding of the present study is 
that memory self-efficacy beliefs can be reliably and 
validly measured by questionnaires, that these beliefs 
determine performance predictions, and that the beliefs are 
stable over long periods of time. Nevertheless, the beliefs 
are not necessarily accurate. Future research should be 
directed at understanding the positive and negative impact 
that memory beliefs have on memory-related behaviors, 
determining the extent to which beliefs can be (or should 
be) modified by intervention designs, and the degree to 
which suboptimal use of strategies in memory performance 
situations are determined by negative memory self-efficacy 
beliefs. 
IV. Oncroina Analyses  
Although this is a "final" report, analyses of the data 
produced by the project are ongoing. We have, despite hard 
work, only begun to mine the wealth of the existing data 
sets. For example, data from the 1989 study are being 
reported in a master's thesis by a Georgia Tech student, and 
will be combined with analyses of data from the 1987 study 
to report further results on the relations between memory 
self-efficacy and memory performance predictions. We are 
now conducting dynamic factor analyses of the mood variables 
from the Cornwall study, in order to relate intraindividual 
flux in mood to intraindividual variability in memory task 
performance. Future manuscripts will be provided to NIA as 
they are produced. 
V. Appendix: Selected Publications 
Experimental Aging Research, Volume 13, Number 2, 1987, ISSN 0734-0664 
°1987 Beech Hill Enterprises Inc. 
On the Differentiation of Memory Beliefs 
from Memory Knowledge: The Factor Structure 
of the Metamemory in Adulthood Scale' 
CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG 2 , ROGER A. DIXON 3 , 
JOHN E. SCHULENBERG 4 , AND DAVID F. HurrscH 3 
This study was designed to test the hypothesis that there are multiple factors of metamemory present in the Metamemory in 
Adulthood (MIA) questionnaire. Data on seven MIA scales from six separate studies of memory/metamemory relationships 
(total N= 750) were combined to yield two half-samples for cross-validation purposes. The samples were partitioned into young, 
middle-aged, and old groups. A multiple group confirmatory factor analysis was then conducted on the data, using the first 
half sample to develop a model and the second half sample to validate it. Although the models did not fully cross-validate, 
both analyses indicated that there are at least two higher-order factors in the MIA. The first involves beliefs about self-efficacy 
in using memory. The second factor combines knowledge about memory and affect concerning memory (e.g., achievement 
motivation). The analyses also indicated that the factor loadings for the second factor, tentatively labelled Knowledge, were 
invariant across the three age groups, but that there were age differences in the Self-Efficacy Beliefs factor loadings. The dif-
ferences were localized to age-related increases in the loadings for the MIA Change and Locus scales. The two factor solution 
has potential for resolving conflicting results in the literature regarding age differences in both metamemory and 
metamemory/memory.performance relationships. 
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The construct of metamemory the knowledge and beliefs 
one has about memory functioning (one's own and others') — 
has been a focus of a growing body of research in cognitive 
gerontology [7; 12]. Although the nature of knowledge and 
beliefs regarding memory functioning are undoubtedly of in-
terest in their own right, one important reason for the current 
emphasis on studying metamemory and aging is that 
metamemory may have an influence on memory-related 
behaviors of adults. Whether a person remembers an incident, 
a face, or a fact may be partly determined by what s/he knows 
or believes must be done to remember accurately. Moreover, 
a person's system of self-beliefs about memory, including 
whether s/he expects to be able to remember a given piece of 
information, may influence how s/he will behave in a given 
memory-demanding situation. 
Psychologists interested in metamemory have conceptualized 
it primarily in terms of veridical knowledge—that is, the ac-
curacy of one's knowledge about how one's own memory func-
tions. Critical questions for studies deriving from this point of 
view have been whether and when an individual is capable of 
accurately monitoring and assessing his or her own memory pro-
cesses. Developmental psychologists interested in metamemory 
have sought to identify the emergence of a child's awareness  
of memory functioning [3; 11]. The emphasis on accuracy of 
knowledge about memory has led to a set of operational defini-
tions of metamemory that includes recall prediction accuracy, 
accuracy of memory monitoring, accuracy of information about 
memory strategies, and level of general knowledge regarding 
memory processes and functions (e.g., optimal mnemonic 
strategies) [6]. 
In addition to veridical knowledge about memory, other in-
vestigators, including ourselves, have examined a related but 
different aspect of metamemory: the subjective belief system 
of an individual regarding his or her own memory. We argue 
that, independent of both knowledge of how memory functions 
and concurrent awareness of memory functioning (as studied 
in memory monitoring paradigms, [6]), an individual also has 
a set of beliefs about his or her own memory capacities in some 
universe of environmental settings [5; 8; 9; 10]. These beliefs 
may be accurate or inaccurate, but irrespective of their validi-
ty, they may profoundly influence the cognitive behaviors and 
affective states of an individual. That is, beliefs about aspects 
of one's memory (e.g., skills, proclivities, reliability, weaknesses, 
developmental changes) may influence memory performance 
in the absence of veridical memory knowledge—or even, con-
ceivably, when such knowledge is available but contrary to one's 
'This project was supported by a research grant (7 RO1 AG06162) from the National Institute on Aging. The first author was also supported by 
a Research Career Development Award (1 K04 AG00290) from the National Institute on Aging. Address correspondence to C. Hertzog at the 
School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0170. 
'From the School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. 
'From the Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, CANADA. 





Descriptive Charactistics of Participants 
Sample and Variable 
Age Group 
Young Middle-Age Old Total N 
EXPLORATORY SAMPLE 
Sample 1 
Sample Size n = 60 n = 60 N= 120 
Mean Age 22.9 66.9 
Mean Years of Education 13.0 12.4 
Mean Vocabulary 14.1 16.2 
(ETS V-1) 
Sample 2 
Sample Size n = 36 n = 36 n=36 N= 108 
Mean Age 32.3 48.5 68.5 
Mean Years of Education 13.7 13.6 13.3 
Mean Vocabulary 10.0 11.3 10.3 
(ETS Advanced) 
Sample 3 
Sample Size n = 50 = 50 n = 50 N= 150 
Mean Age 32.0 49.5 68.9 
Mean Years of Education 13.6 12.8 10.9 




Sample Size n=60 n = 60 n = 60 N=180 
Mean Age 23.10 44.17 66.83 
Mean Years of Education 13.82 12.45 12.72 
Mean Vocabulary 7.64 7.75 10.32 
-(ETS V-1) 
Sample 5 
Sample Size n = 24 = 24 n=24 N= 72 
Mean Age 20.50 44.71 68.55 
Mean Years of Education 12.87 11.92 12.37 
Mean Vocabulary 6.70 6.32 9.97 
(ETS Advanced) 
Sample 6 
Sample Size n = 60 n = 60 N=120 
Mean Age 28.71 67.20 
Mean Years of Education 13.28 12.11 
Mean Vocabulary 8.70 8.71 
(ETS Advanced) 
beliefs. Whereas most research in metamemory and aging has 
addressed questions pertaining to the relationships between 
memory knowledge and memory performance, there is relatively 
little research pertaining to memory beliefs and their influences 
on memory performance [8]. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between these two aspects of 
metamemory may serve to explain some of the discrepant results 
in the literature on metamemory in adulthood. That is, it is at 
least evident that different operational definitions of the con-
struct yield different patterns of adult age differences in 
metamemory [5; 8]. Age differences are often found in 
performance-based indicators of metamemory (e.g., spon-
taneous use of effective acquisition strategies) but not with other 
methods of assessing metamemory such as some tasks tapping 
memory monitoring or general knowledge, beliefs, or opinions 
about memory functions [4; 17; 18; 19]. 
Dixon and Hultsch [10] developed a metamemory question-
naire, the Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) scale, for the pur-
pose of measuring multiple, selected aspects of memory 
knowledge, memory beliefs, and memory-related affect in older 
populations. One motivation for development of the MIA was 
the need for psychometrically sound metamemory question-
naires [7; 12; 13]. The MIA has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties and to yield significant prediction of 
adult individual differences in text recall [9; 10]. 
A review of extant metamemory instruments suggested to us 
that there may be three higher-order metamemory factors 
operating to a greater or lesser degree in most metatmemory 
instruments: general memory knowledge, beliefs about memory 
self-efficacy, and memory-related affect [14]. To determine the 
theoretical merit and empirical utility of the delineation of 
metamemory into memory knowledge, memory beliefs, and 




The Eight Dimensions of the Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) Instrument 
Dimension Description Sample Item 
   
1. Strategy 	Knowledge of one's remembering abilities such 
that performance in given instances is potentially 
improved; reported use of mnemonics, strategies, 
and memory aids. ( + = high use) 
2. Task 	Knowledge of basic memory processes, especially 
as evidenced by how most people perform. 
( + = high knowledge) 
3. Capacity 	Perception of memory capacities as evidenced by 
predictive report of performance on given tasks. 
( + = high capacity) 
4. Change 
	
	Perception of memory abilities as generally stable 
or subject to long-term decline (+ = stability) 
5. Activity 	Regularity with which respondent seeks and engages 
in activities that might support cognitive per-
formance. (+ = high regularity) 
6. Anxiety 	Rating of influence of anxiety and stress on 
performance. (+ = high anxiety) 
7. Achievement Perceived importance of having a good memory and 
and performing well on memory tasks ( + = high -
achievement) 
8. Locus 	Perceived personal control over remembering abilities 
(+ = internality) 
Do you write appointments on a calendar to 
help remember them? 
For most people, facts that are interesting are 
easier to remember than facts that are not. 
I am good at remembering names. 
The older I get the harder it is to remember 
things clearly. 
How often do you read newspapers? 
I do not get flustered when I am put on the 
spot to remember new things. 
It is important that I am very accurate when 
remembering names of people. 
It's up to me to keep my remembering 
abilties from deteriorating. 
(Source: Dixon & Hultsch 1983 BM 
memory-related affect, two related steps are required. First, 
evidence concerning the validity of a differentiated representa-
tion of metamemory must be examined. Second, the differen-
tial prediction of memory performance by multiple dimensions 
of metamemory must be evaluated. 
In the present study, we are concerned with the first of these 
two steps. Dixon and Hultsch [10] used item factor analysis to 
identify the eight MIA scales. In this paper we report the results 
of factor analyses designed to determine whether these MIA 
scales form higher-order metamemory factors that correspond 
to the knowledge, self-efficacy, and affect dimensions. In par-
ticular, our chief interest was to investigate whether a "subjec-
tive" memory beliefs factor could be differentiated from a 
memory knowledge factor. A secondary goal was to find out 




This study is an analysis of data collected by Dixon and 
Hultsch as part of a series of studies on metamemory and 
memory performance. The recruitment procedures and popula-
tion characteristics are described in greater detail in Dixon and 
Hultsch [10]. Briefly, participants were paid volunteers from 
a small city in central Pennsylvania. They were white, 
predominantly female, community dwelling adults who general-
ly reported themselves to be in good to excellent health. The 
participants were drawn from six different studies. Their mean 
ages, educational status, and vocabulary scores are given in 
Table 1. In this analysis, the partipants were divided into two 
half-samples for cross-validation purposes— an exploratory half 
and a validation half (see Table 1). 
Materials 
We analyzed data from the Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) 
scale, a self-report instrument using a modified Likert-type 
response format. In the MIA, individuals are asked to rate on 
a five-point scale statements either describing themselves and 
their memory or indicating knowledge of general memory pro-
cesses. The MIA consists of eight subscales: (1) Strategy—use 
of memory strategies; (2) Task — knowledge of memory tasks 
and processes; (3) Capacity—assessment of one's own memory 
capacities; (4) Change—perceptions of change in one's own 
memory functioning; (5) Activity—activities supportive of 
memory; (6) Anxiety—state anxiety regarding memory perfor-
mance; (7) Achievement—achievement motivation with respect 
to memory; and (8) Locus — perceptions of control in memory-
demanding situations (see Table 2). Items for each of these fac-
tors were either adapted from previous metamemory instruments 
[19] or were developed by Dixon and Hultsch as part of the 
original instrument development study [10]. Additional infor-
mation on the nature of the scales may be found there. 
As our purpose was to analyze the factor structure of the MIA 
subscales, we restricted our interest to the covariance matrices 
among seven of the MIA subscales. Activity was dropped from 
the analysis because it is not a homogenous scale, as judged 
by low internal consistency reliability estimates [10]. Moreover, 
activity seems to measure behaviors that are determinants and 





Given the relative lack of knowledge regarding metamemory 
factor structure, we opted to conduct exploratory analyses on 
the factor structure of the MIA. A point of departure was our 
hypothesis that there are three separate domains of 
Metamemory: Self-efficacy-beliefs, Knowledge, and Affect [14]. 
However, as the MIA was not developed for the purpose of 
measuring higher-order factors, it was an open question as to 
whether the MIA scales would factor in this way. 
Therefore, factor analysis on the exploratory half-sample used 
a mixture of unrestricted and restricted factor analysis tech-
niques. First, we conducted unrestricted maximum likelihood 
factor analyses that were used to assess the number of factors 
in each age group. Second, we used the LISREL VI program 
[16] to perform two sets of restricted factor analyses. The first 
set determined the optimal factor structure for the older adults, 
while the second set assessed the invariance of factor structure 
across the three age groups in a simulataneous factor analysis 
[15; 16]. Unstandardized (covariance metric) models were 
estimated, but final results were rescaled into a quasi-
standardized metric recommended by Joreskog [15]. This reseal-
ing is not an option in LISREL VI, but was obtained by use 
of a SAS PROC MATRIX program written by the first author. 
Although some concern has been raised about this scaling in 
structural equation models [1], it is an appropriate scaling in 
multiple groups factor analysis when factor loadings are con-
strained equal [15]. We also calculated a relative goodness-of-
fit index (GFI) that indicates how well a model fits a set of data, 
independent of the sample size. This index, analogous to the 
Bentler-Bonett normed fit index, was calculated from the 
LISREL fitting function of each model by (F„-F,J/F„, where 
F, is the fitting function for the model of interest and F. is a 
null model of simultaneous no association in all age groups [2]. 
This index is a multiple groups generalization of the Bender-
Bonett normed fit index [2]. 
RESULTS 
Exploratory Sample Analyses 
The results of the preliminary factor analysis on the ex-
ploratory half-sample supported our hypothesis that the 
covariance structure of the MIA subscales could not be ade-
quately fit by either one or two factors. Multiple factors were 
necessary to fit the covariance structure of all age groups. A 
plot of the eigenvalues suggested three factors in each age group, 
an impression reinforced by the X' goodness of fit tests for the 
unrestricted solutions. 
The simultaneous LISREL analysis of the three age groups 
from the exploratory sample specified a highly restricted fac-
tor model composed of the hypothesized three factors in the 
MIA: Self-Efficacy Beliefs, Knowledge, and Affect. Specifically, 
the Knowledge factor was defined by Strategy and Taik, the 
Self-Efficacy Beliefs factor was formed by Capacity and 
Change, and the Affect factor was composed of Achievement, 
Locus, and Anxiety. This model was ultimately abandoned due 
to its inadequate fit to the data. In particular, the Affect fac-
tor was ill-defined. Subsequent models specified two factors, 
Knowledge and Self-Efficacy Beliefs, with an additional residual 
covariance between Achievement and Anxiety. In addition, the 
Locus, Achievement, and Anxiety scales appeared to relate to 
both the Knowledge and Self-Efficacy factors. A two factor 
model incorporating these modifications fit the data reasonably 
well (12 = 62.58, df= 24, p<.001, GFI = .924). 
We then tested the equality of factor pattern matrices across 
FINAL FACTOR MODEL 
(EXPLORATION SAMPLE) 
e 
FIGURE 1. F'nal Model for metamemory factors in the 
exploratory, half-sample. Straight arrows denote factor 
loadings, regressing variables (rectangles) on circles (fac-
tors); is the factor covariance between Self-Efficacy 
Belief and Knowledge; is the residual covariance be-
tween Anxiety and Achievement. 
the three age groups. There was a significant loss of fit in the 
model constraining the factor loadings for Knowledge and Self-
Efficacy Beliefs to be equal over all three groups (e= 104.37, 
df= 40; change in x2 = 41.79, df= 16, p<.001). This outcome 
indicated that the hypothesis of equal factor loadings should 
be rejected. A third model showed this lack of fit to be specific 
to nonequivalent factor loadings on the Self-Efficacy Beliefs 
factor. A model specifying equal factor pattern weights on 
Knowledge, but not Self-Efficacy Beliefs, fit about as well as 
the model with no equality constraints (e =73.34, df= 32, 
GFI = .910; difference in X' = 10.76, df= 8, n.s.). A final model 
deleted two nonsignificant residual covariances in the old group 
that had been added in exploratory model building. Although 
this final model still had significant lack of fit (12 = 75.72, 
df= 34, p<.001), it was considered to be an adequate final 
model, in part becuase of its .907 GFI. 
Figure 1 shows the specification for the final exploratory 
model. Table 3 provides the rescaled results from each age group 
for the final model. Most of the age differences in factor 
loadings may be attributed to the loadings of Change and Locus 
on Self-Efficacy Beliefs, which were higher in the old group. 
The correlation of Knowledge and Self-Efficacy Beliefs was 
small and negative in the young and middle-aged groups, and 
larger and negative in the old group. This indicates that high 
levels of Knowledge were associated with lower levels of Self-
Efficacy Beliefs. 
Validation Sample Analysis 
Although an identically specified model fit the validation half-
sample relatively well (x2 = 73.73, df= 34, p<.001, GFI = .886), 
shifts in relative magnitudes of certain loadings (especially 
Achievement on Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Knowledge) were 
found. Moreover, the residuals and LISREL modification in- 
105 FACTOR STRUCTURE OF METAMEMORY 
TABLE 3 
Rescaled Two Factor Model (Exloratory Sample) 
Factor Loadings and Conununalities 
Knowledge Self-Efficacy H2* 
Old Group 
Strategy .605 0 .290 
Task .499 0 .240 
Capacity 0 .804 .520 
Change 0 1.131 .981 
Anxiety .232 - .502 .423 
Achievement .608 .463 .324 
Locus .460 .914 .482 
Middle-Aged Group 
Strategy .605 0 .644 
Task .499 0 .320 
Capacity 0 .804 .759 
Change 0 .750 .529 
Anxiety .232 - .540 .460 
Achievement .608 .226 .427 
Locus .460 .416 .377 
Young Group 
Strategy .605 0 .314 
Task .499 0 .202 
Capacity 0 .804 .748 
Change 0 .384 .224 
Anxiety .232 - .454 .282 
Achievement .608 .438 .329 
Locus .460 .619 .497 
Factor correlations: Old, - .581; Middle-Aged, - .174; Young, - .229. 
Note: Resealed estimates are as follows: factor loadings, on average, 
are standardized regression coefficients [15], communalities are pro- 
portions of common variance in each age group. 
*Communalities 
dices indicated that the fit of the model could be improved. This 
outcome was perhaps unsurprising, given that the sample 
covariance matrices differed significantly between the ex-
ploratory and validation half-samples. An alternative model was 
developed in exploratory fashion. In the final version, Task 
loaded on Self-Efficacy Beliefs, Capacity loaded on Knowledge, 
and Achievement loaded only on Knowledge. The factor 
loadings for Knowledge were still constrained equal across the 
three age groups. This alternative model for the validation sam-
ple fit quite well (X 2 = 38.76, df = 37, n.s., GFI = .940). 
Table 4 gives the rescaled solution for the validation half-
sample. Although there are obvious similarities in the solutions, 
the differences in the factor loadings, as well as the different 
sign of the factor correlations, leads us to conclude that the 
model did not fully replicate across half-samples. In the valida-
tion analysis, nonsignificant positive correlations were found 
between Knowledge and Self-Efficacy Beliefs. Although this 
outcome buttresses the distinction between the two factors, it 
is inconsistent with the results from the exploratory half-sample. 
DISCUSSION 
Our contention that multiple factors could be differentiated 
from the seven MIA subscales was supported by this analysis. 
Most strongly supported was our hypothesis that a dimension 
of self-efficacy beliefs regarding memory functioning can be 
TABLE 4 
Rescaled Two Factor Model (Validation Sample) 
Factor Loadings and Communalities 
Knowledge Self-Efficacy H2 * 
Old Group 
Strategy .543 0 .264 
Task .343 .287 .276 
Capacity .308 .558 .410 
Change 0 .739 .626 
Anxiety .548 - .723 .630 
Achievement .744 0 .591 
Locus .376 .667 .524 
Middle-Aged Group 
Strategy .543 0 .270 
Task .343 .164 .259 
Capacity .308 .558 .412 
Change 0 .943 .644 
Anxiety .548 - .700 .680 
Achievement .744 0 .584 
Locus .376 .544 .368 
Young Group 
Strategy .543 0 .345 
Task .343 .273 .321 
Capacity .308 .558 .571 
Change 0 .635 .418 
Anxiety .548 - .776 .730 
Achievement .744 0 .512 
Locus .376 .272 .394 
Factor correlations: Old, .071; Middle-Aged, .107; Young, .373. 
Note: Resealed estimates are as follows: factor loadings, on average, 
are standardized regression coefficients [15], communalities are pro-
portions of common variance in each age group. 
*Communalities 
identified and differentiated from knowledge of how memory 
functions. In all three age groups we identified a Self-Efficacy 
Beliefs factor that had very small correlations with the 
Knowledge factor. Thus multiple factors do seem to be present 
in the MIA. 
Although these findings are informative, they must be viewed 
as tentative given the differences between the exploratory and 
validation half-samples. In both analyses we found strong sup-
port for the distinction between Knowledge and Self-Efficacy 
factors in the MIA. However, there were differences in the fac-
tor correlation between these two half-samples that we cannot 
explain at this time. A possible explanation involves individual 
differences in the accuracy of Self-Efficacy Beliefs; i.e., the 
degree to which Knowledge and Beliefs correlate in subgroups 
of individuals. With these data, however, we cannot determine 
whether the six samples differ in variables that might predict 
degree of concordance between memory knowledge and memory 
beliefs. 
The results of the analysis in both half-samples did not sup-
port our original hypothesis that there is a separate Affect 
dimension present in the MIA. This hypothesis seemed to be 
supported, to a small degree, by the residual covariance between 
Anxiety and Achievement in the exploratory sample analysis. 
However, this relationship was not replicated in the validation 
sample, where instead the Achievement and Anxiety measures 
had strong loadings on the factor labelled Knowledge. 
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This pattern in the validation half-sample suggests that our 
second factor may be an amalgam of Knowledge and Affect 
rather than a pure Knowledge factor. In both half-samples, 
Achievement and Anxiety had substantial loadings on this fac-
tor. However, a content analysis of Anxiety scale items sug-
gests another alternative consistent with the interpretation of 
the factor as knowledge about memory. The Anxiety items ap-
pear to be clearly divisible into two sets: (1) questions regard-
ing how anxious the respondent is in memory-demanding situa-
tions, and (2) knowledge about how high levels of anxiety in-
hibit memory functioning. A question for future research is 
whether the strong loadings of affect scales on the Knowledge 
factor are differentially a function of selected items arguably 
reflective of Knowledge regarding affect-cognition relationships. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the interpretation of this fac-
tor as knowledge about memory may be contraindicated in 
subsequent work. 
Tests of the equality of factor loadings for the two factors 
showed reliable age differences in the weights associated with 
the Self-Efficacy Beliefs dimension. Change and Locus relate 
more highly to this factor in the old than in the young. This 
qualitative difference in factor structure is intriguing and sug-
gests some caution is in order when interpreting mean group 
differences on these scales. In particular, the substantial age 
differences in the loading of the Change scale suggest that there 
may be differences in the construct measured when young ver-
sus old persons are asked to judge whether their memory has 
improved (or declined) over a period of time (e.g., 10 years). 
Clearly, perceptions of change are more highly associated with 
anxiety about memory and perceptions of reduced control over 
memory in the elderly than in younger adults. 
The distinction between Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Knowledge 
may help to explain some of the discrepant findings in the 
metamemory literature. Inconsistency across studies in the pat-
tern of age differences in metatmemory measures may not reflect 
inconsistency in some global metamemory construct; instead, 
these differences may reflect differences in the degree to which 
different operational definitions of metamemory measure 
Knowledge, Self-Efficacy Beliefs, or some combination of the 
two. With references to the Dixon and Hultsch [10] data on 
age differences in the MIA scales, it appears that age differences 
in Self-Efficacy Beliefs may be more common (and more pro-
nounced) than age differences in Knowledge. With the excep-
tion of Task, the MIA scales yielding significant age differences 
emphasize evaluation of self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., Capacity, 
Change, and Locus). 
A possible explanation of these results goes as follows. Older 
persons are relatively familiar with how their own memory func-
tions. Nevertheless, perhaps because they are (1) often less able 
to monitor specific on-line demands of memory tasks, (2) often 
unable to spontaneously produce and effectively utilize acquis-
tion strategies in laboratory settings, and (3) sensitized to the 
potential negative implications of memory failures in real life, 
they may believe themselves to be less competent in memory 
than younger adults. This account argues, then, that older per-
sons are on average similar to young persons in familiarity with 
how memory functions, but perceive themselves as being less 
competent in memory than younger adults. 
The question arises as to whether these subjective perceptions 
of self-efficacy are, at the level of the individual person, ac-
curate or inaccurate [5; 8; 20]. Given the modest correlations 
between metamemory and memory performance reported in the 
literature [6; 9], and the finding here that the correlation be-
tween Knowledge and Self-Efficacy Beliefs is relatively low 
in the older groups, we argue that these perceptions of low 
memory self-efficacy by older persons are not necessarily ac- 
curate. Negative self-efficacy beliefs may mediate phenomena 
such as older persons' frequent failure to employ mnemonic 
strategies even though they are aware that such strategies can 
improve performance. 
Research exploring a model for the development of negative 
self-efficacy beliefs should be given high priority [5]. As a next 
step, however, replication of the differentiated factor structure 
of metamemory is necessary. Given the differences we en-
countered in cross-validation, it is evident that additional 
research is needed to demonstrate conclusively the differentia-
tion of these two metamemory factors. We are currently analyz-
ing data from a large scale validation study of the MIA and 
Gilewski and Zelinski's metamemory questionnaire [12] that 
should provide more definitive answers. 
For now, there is sufficient empirical support for cautioning 
researchers on metamemory in adulthood to consider the ex-
istence of multiple dimensions of metamemory when inter-
preting or designing research. At least we should refrain from 
generalizing to a global metamemory construct on the basis of 
theoretically undifferentiated operational definitions. If further 
confirmation of the distinction between memory self-efficacy 
beliefs and memory knowledge is obtained, then studies 
simultaneously measuring these constructs and examining their 
differential relationships to both memory performance and 
memory-related behaviors will be of paramount importance. 
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ON POOLING COVARIANCE MATRICES FOR 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS I 
CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG2 
Department of Individual and Family Studies 
The Pennsylvania State University 
It is often useful to analyze a covariance matrix pooled over 
multiple groups. This note shows that the pooled covariance 
matrix cannot in general be calculated from the weighted average 
of the separate covariance matrices for the multiple groups. The 
correct equation for calculating the pooled covariance matrix 
adjusts for group differences in sample means. 
THE covariance structures techniques developed by Joreskog and 
others (e.g., Bentler and Weeks, 1979; Joreskog, 1971; Joreskog and 
Sorbom, 1979) have popularized simultaneous factor analysis in 
multiple populations. Such analyses require the use of covariance 
matrices rather than correlation matrices, given the expectation 
that, in general, only raw score (unstandardized) factor pattern 
matrices can be expected to replicate across populations (Meredith, 
1964). Although these techniques require the analysis of separate 
sample covariance matrices for each population, there are occasions 
when the pooled covariance matrix taken across populations is of 
interest. For example, JOreskog (1971) suggested using the pooled 
sample covariance matrix to test the viability of the common factor 
model prior to engaging in simultaneous analysis in the multiple 
groups. Another use of the pooled covariance matrix is when 
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simultaneous factor analysis has demonstrated that the factor pat 
tern matrix may in fact be considered invariant across multiple 
populations. In such cases it may be argued that the populations 
were selected from a parent population for which the same common 
factor model holds (Meredith, 1964). Under this argument, it may be 
considered desirable to estimate the factor pattern parameters of the 
parent population in the pooled sample. Finally, multiple group 
analysis is often used for cross-validation of a factor model in 
multiple, random samples from a single population. If the factor 
model has been successfully cross-validated, it is appropriate to 
pool the sample data and re-estimate the model using all the data. 
Usually the original raw data are available to the investigator, and 
the pooled covariance matrix can be calculated directly. However, 
when the analysis uses covariance matrices obtained indirectly from 
an archival source, then a pooled covariance matrix must be 
calculated from the separate covariance matrices of each group. 
This note shows that such pooling cannot in general be achieved by 
averaging the covariance matrices (even when such averaging takes 
into account unequal sample sizes). Instead, the pooled covariance 
matrix can only be obtained by taking into account group differences 
in the means of the variables. 
The problem for pooling the covariance matrices is that each 
group's covariance matrix is based upon the cross-products correct-
ed by the group mean, not the pooled (grand) mean. To explicate 
this point, let us assume that data have been collected on a set of 
variables x = x i , . . . , xp for g = 1, ... , G separate groups. In the 
gth group, we define the pooled sample mean of the pth variable as 
= 1  
P N 	p 
where ip(g) is the sample mean in the gth group, Mg ) is the sample 
size in the gth group, and N is the total sample size. The pooled 
sample covariance matrix, S, has as its p x gth element the 
covariance of xp and xq : 
1 
Spq 
N — 1 	
(xp - p)(Xq xq) 
 
For ease of exposition, let us consider a single (generalized) element 
of S. The covariance matrix in each group, S (g) , corrects each 
element of the covariance matrix to the corresponding group means: 
spp(g) =  	(x - .tp lg))(x, - ki ,g)) 
Mg) - (I) 
CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG 	 351 
Sincc 
( xo 	= 	— . 1 g 1 ) + (A- (g) — 
it c,tn he seen that the cress-products for the pooled covariance 
	
mdtrix 	caiculated in the gth group, are: 
— 	 — . „) ][(x„ — .t,(K) + (.C„cgi — x-,)] 
(2) 
Equation 2) clearly shows that the cross-products for the pooled 
ea arianee matrix differ from the cross-products for the group 
covi,riance matrix as a function of the difference between the sample 
2foup mean and the pooled sample mean. 
The nrecedine expression can be used to derive the correction 
factor needed for estimating the pooled covariance matrix. Since 
- 	- 	= E 	- .t- g igi)tt--„(g) - 	) = 0 
expansion of Equation (2) yields the following equation for the 
dusted cross-products in the gth group: 
= 	(x, —.ip — -t/ g) ) + Vg) [(4 (g) — S-p)()TV" ) — -tqil (3) 
It can he seen from this equation that the sample covariance element 
must he corrected to the deviation of the group mean from the 
pooled mean. weighted by the group sample size. 
The pooled covariance element is obtained by summing the 
adju,ted cross-products over all G groups and dividing by N — 1. 
It is more convenient to express the correction formula for the 
entire matrix. S. in matrix algebra. The pooled covariance matrix is 
properi ■, calculated as 
— 1)S"•) + IN"[(P ) — .i-)(f(g) 	)1} 	(4) 
— 
\.N. here 	is ap>ri column vector of sample means in the gth group 
k a p 	1 vector of pooled means. 3 
As can he seen from Equation (4), the averaged covariance 
rick: Ls. equal the pooled covariance matrix when there are no 
sample differences in means. Conversely, if there are large group 
differences in sample means then the difference between the aver- 
• .; 	 ola SAS PROC MATRIX program implementing Equation (4) is 
,c.diLLHe L:pyri requcq. 
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aged covariance matrix and the pooled covariance matrix may 
become substantial. Two implications of the preceding are: (1) the 
pooled covariance matrix, if needed, is not properly calculated from 
just the weighted average of the sample covariance matrices; and (2) 
archival reports of group covariance matrices should also include 
the group means so that a pooled matrix could be calculated without 
recovering the original data. Obviously, one is well-advised to 
calculate a pooled covariance matrix directly from the raw data. 
Otherwise, the sample covariance matrices and sample means for 
the multiple groups must be input into Equation (4) to calculate the 
proper pooled covariance matrix indirectly. 
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Age Differences in Metamemory: Resolving the Inconsistencies* 
David F. Hultsch, University of Victoria 
Christopher Hertzog, Georgia Institute of Technology 
Roger A. Dixon, University of Victoria 
ABSTRACT Research examining adult age differences in individuals' self-reports 
about their memory has found somewhat inconsistent results. This paper reports 
findings from a cross-validation study of two questionnaires designed to measure 
knowledge, affects, and beliefs about memory in two large samples. The results 
suggest that there are significant age and sex differences in such perceptions. 
Compared with younger adults, older adults consistently report less memory 
capacity. more decline in memory functioning, and believe they have less control 
over their memory ability. Women report more strategy use and greater anxiety 
associated with memory than men. The results are discussed within the context of 
other methodological and substantive issues related to metamemory research. 
RESUME Cet article rapporte des resultats obtenus a partir d'une etude de validation 
croisee de deux questionnaires construits pour mesurer Ia connaissance, les affects et 
les croyances sur Ia memoire chez deux grander populations. Les resultats suggerent 
qu'il existe des differences significatives quant au sexe et a rage pour de telles 
perceptions. Par comparaison aux adultes plus jeunes, les plus vieux rapportent de 
fawn consistente une baisse de leur capacity mnesique, un declin dans le 
fonctionnement de leur memoire et ils croient a la perte de controle sur leur habilete 
mnesique. Les femmes rapportent plus d'utilisation de strategies et plus d'anxidte 
associee a la memoire que les hommes. Les resultats sont discutes dans le cadre 
d'autres questions methodologiques et substantives relides aux recherches sur Ia 
metamemo ire . 
The ways in which people exhibit understanding of their own functioning is a 
fundamental issue for several areas of psychology. In cognitive psychology. this 
issue is reflected in research on such "meta" behaviours as metamemory. Broadly 
defined, metamemory refers to individuals' understanding of their own memory 
functioning. As originally proposed by Flavell and his colleagues (Flavell. 1971; 
FIavell & Wellman. 1977), emphasis was placed on two classes of knowledge: ( a) 
knowledge of the memory demand characteristics of particular tasks or situations, 
and (b) knowledge of potentially employable strategies relevant to a given task or 
situation. More recently, the concept has been expanded by researchers interested 
in aging to include individuals' beliefs about their own memory abilities, and 
affects and motivations that may be related to memory functioning (Dixon & 
*This research was supported by Research Grant 492-84-002 from the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada to David Hultsch. and Research Grant AG06162 from the Natibnal Institute of 
Aging to Christopher Hertzog. Dr. Hertzog's work is also supported by a Research Career Development 
Award from the National Institute on Aging. Dc Dixon's work on this research was supported by the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Development and Education. Berlin. The cooperation of Robert K. Nielsen. M.D., the 
other physicians, and the members of the Annville Family Practice. Annville. Pennsylvania is deeply, 
appreciated. Address reprint requests to David F. Hultsch. Department of Psychology, University of 
Victoria. Victoria. BC, Canada V8W 2Y2. 
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Hertzog, in press: Hultsch, Dixon, & Hertzog, 1985; Zelinski, Gilewski, & 
Thompson, 1980). One central assumption underlying much of this work is that 
individuals' knowledge, beliefs, and affects about their own memory are 
important determinants of their behaviour in memory demanding situations. In 
the context of work on aging, it has also been assumed that such memory self-
perceptions may become particularly salient in later life, contributing signifi-
cantly to observed age-related declines in performance. 
In part, these notions are derived from more general arguments which 
emphasize the importance of linkages among social, personality, and cognitive 
processes in life-span development (e.g., Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 
1984; Hultsch & Pentz, 1980). More specifically, this view suggests that age-
related changes in basic memory processes may be but one contributing factor in 
the typically observed decline in performance with increasing age. In particular, 
individuals' performance may be shaped not only by their actual skills, but also by 
their understanding of the cognitive demand characteristics of the situation and 
their perception of the likely outcomes of their behaviours in such a situation. This 
perspective does not deny the occurrence of substantial age-related changes in 
underlying memory processes. Such changes undoubtedly exist. However, it does 
presume that observed age differences may be influenced by factors other than 
those defining memory ability per se. It argues that people's perceptions of their 
own memory may be important factors as well. 
Although a variety of approaches have been employed to measure individuals' 
perceptions of their own memory, the most prevalent has relied on self-report 
questionnaires. In recent years, a number of these instruments have been 
developed for use with adults including the Short Inventory of Memory. 
Experiences (SIME, Herrmann & Neisser, 1978), the Memory Functioning 
Questionnaire (MFQ, Gilewski, Zelinski, Schaie, & Thompson, 1983), and the 
Metamemory In Adulthood instrument (MIA, Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b. 1984) 
(see also Dixon, in press; Gilewski & Zelinski, 1987, for reviews of available 
questionnaires). Initial work with these questionnaires suggests that there is 
evidence for their reliability and factorial validity. In addition, previous work has 
provided some indication of the presence of age-related differences on some 
dimensions of metamemory and a number of linkages between individuals' 
knowledge and beliefs about memory and their actual performance on memory 
tasks (Chaffin & Herrmann. 1983; Dixon & Hultsch, 1983a: Zelinski et al.. 1980). 
However, it is equally clear that despite these preliminary positive results, several 
fundamental issues remain unresolved. 
First, the robustness of age-related differences in self-perceptions of memory 
is somewhat unclear. A review of the available literature reveals a number of 
inconsistencies (e.g., Dixon, in press). For example, although several studies 
have failed to find age differences in reported use of memory strategies (e.g., 
Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b; Gilewski et al., 1983; Perlmutter, 1978), others have 
reported that older adults use fewer strategies than younger adults (e.g., 
Weinstein•, Duffy, Underwood, MacDonald, & Gott, 1981). It is also unclear 
whether older adults report more memory failures in everyday activities than 
Age differences in metamemory 	 195 
younger adults. Whereas some studies (e.g., Gilewski et al., 1983; Perlmutter, 
1978) report negative age differences, others (e.g., Sunderland, Harris, & 
Baddeley, 1983) have found that younger adults actually reported more such 
incidents than older adults. Similarly, a mixed pattern of results appears for 
indicators of perceived memory abilities or capacities. Although Dixon and 
Hultsch (1983b), Gilewski et al. (1983), and Zelinski et al. (1980) found older 
adults had a poorer perception of their memory for various content domains than 
younger adults, Chaffin and Herrmann (1983) found a mixed pattern of results 
(including positive, equivalent. and negative age differences) across domains. 
and Bennett-Levy and Powell (1980) reported a positive age effect on their 
measure. The greatest consistency appears for indicators of perceived memory 
decline relative to previous levels of functioning. In this case, the findings suggest 
that older adults perceive their memory has declined more than younger adults 
(Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b; Gilewski et al., 1983: Perlmutter. 1978; Williams, 
Denney, & Schadler. 1983). 
A second set of concerns relates to the definition and measurement of the 
metamemory construct itself. Despite the appearance of several instruments 
which have demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability and factorial validity, 
additional measurement development work is required. 
First, additional evidence is required to demonstrate that memory self-
perceptions can be differentiated from more general self-perceptions such as self-
esteem, from affective states or traits such as depression, and from dispositions 
such as social desirability that may be evoked by the questionnaire formats 
typically used. For example. it has been suggested that older adults' complaints 
about their memory may be largely a function of depressive affect (Zarit, 1982). 
Indeed, a number of studies have found the correlation between memory 
complaints (as measured by a variety of self-report techniques) and depression to 
be higher than the correlation between memory complaints and actual perfor-
mance on selected memory tasks (e.g., Kahn, Zarit, Hilbert, & Niederehe, 1975). 
The magnitude of the relationship between self-reports of poor memory and 
depression varies depending on the study, but correlations of .30 to .50 are fairly 
common (e.g., West. Boatwright. & Schleser, 1984). Such relationships do not 
necessarily call into question the discriminant validity of the self-report measures 
involved, although they do suggest that depression is an important variable 
determining individual differences in metamemory. Nevertheless, data sets 
examining the relationship of many other aspects of self-perceptions of memory to 
multiple domains of affect and general self-perceptions are not available. As a 
result, additional information is required before the discriminant validity of 
various metamemory questionnaires can be resolved. 
The second measurement concern is convergent validity. It is now fairly clear 
that metamemory is a multidimensional construct. However, it is less clear how 
many dimensions are necessary to define it, what their relationships are, and 
whether the various questionnaires are tapping the same ones. For example, a 
recent analysis of data from 750 youn2er and older adults who had completed the 
MIA suggested that this instrument may contain at least two higher-order 
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dimensions that seem to reflect knowledge about memory and perceived self-
efficacy with respect to memory (Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg, & Hultsch, in 
press). Similarly. after comparing specific items and the general content of several 
existing instruments. Dixon (in press) has suggested that some of these may be 
tapping similar dimensions even though the subscale names are different. In one 
preliminary empirical demonstration, Cavanaugh and Poon (1985) have presented 
evidence of substantial correlations in a small sample between the MIA and 
SIME. For example, for older adults they report a .72 correlation between the 
MIA Capacity subscale and the total score from the SIME. Additional evidence 
examining the number and relationship of the various components of meta-
memory is clearly required. 
The third major issue concerns the relationship between measures of memory 
perception and measures of actual performance on memory tasks. The develop-
ment of metamemory questionnaires was guided, in large part, by the assumption 
that this relationship would be relatively strong. However, as Herrmann (1982. 
1984) and others have pointed out, evidence for such predictive validity is limited. 
The general pattern of results suegests that, when it does appear, the relationship 
between metamemory and performance is relatively weak. with correlations 
typically in the .20 to .30 range. Such findings have led some writers to reject the 
use of self-report questionnaires as substitutes for performance measures in 
clinical settings (e.g., Sunderland. Watts. Baddeley. & Harris, 1986). 
However, two caveats should be kept in mind in evaluating the predictive 
validity of metamemory instruments. First, the relationship between meta-
memory and memory performance may be domain-specific. For example. several 
studies have found that various components of metamemory correlate signifi-
cantly with text recall performance, but not with word recall performance 
(Sunderland et al.. 1983; Zelinski et al., 1980). Other studies have predicted and 
found some specific patterns of metamemory-memory correlations (Dixon. 
Hertzog, & Hultsch. 1986). In addition, Berry, West, and Scogin (1983) found 
that self-reports about memory predicted performance on a set of everyday 
memory tasks better than performance on a set of traditional laboratory tasks. 
Further. metamemory may be important for memory-related behaviours other 
than performance per se. For example, the decision to enter a memory demanding 
situation in the first place may be determined in part by the individual's 
perceptions of their self-efficacy in such situations. Such measures of memory-
related behaviour are virtually unexamined. 
Second, if we take a social-cognitive perspective, we should not really expect 
self-reports about memory to be veridical indicators of actual memory ability. It is 
likely that individuals differ considerably in the accuracy of their assessments of 
their memory abilities and the way they use them in various memory-demanding 
situations. The question is whether these individual differences in accuracy are 
systematic, and whether they relate to other behaviours relevant to memory-
demanding situations. There is sufficient evidence to support Sunderland et al. 's 
(1986) rejection of metamemory questionnaires as substitutes for measures of 
memory performance. However, if older adults' perceptions of their memory 
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TABLE 1 
Mean Education. Vocabulary. and Self-Rated Health for Victoria Sample 
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Age Sex n Education Vocabulary. Healthb 
20-26 M 49 13.98 33.31 1.78 
F 47 14.15 32.94 2.02 
55-61 M 26 14.08 43.00 1.96 
F 37 13.03 42.30 1.68 
62-68 M 47 14.98 41.60 1.89 
F 54 12.94 41.20 1.87 
69-78 M 50 14.40 44.08 2.04 
F 50 13.30 43.72 2 .00 
•ETS V-2(1). V-4(1). V-5(2). maximum score = 54. 
bTwo gems rating health relative to perfect state and to others of the same age on a 5-point Liken scale 
(I = very good). 
prove to be one link in a process relating the social and cognitive domains, then 
the construct is of interest even if it is not a substitute for performance measures. 
In sum, there are a number of crucial issues that require additional examination 
before we can determine whether measures of self-perceptions about memory will 
enhance our understanding of cognitive development in adulthood and old age. In 
part. what is required is a large-scale validation study that will provide data 
relevant to all of the issues outlined above within the same sample. This paper is 
one of several reports describing the results of such a study. Two large samples of 
subjects were tested in order to permit cross-validation of results. In addition. 
multiple indicators were used to index the variables of interest in order to permit 
the estimation of latent constructs. In the present paper. our focus is on the first 
issue raised earlier: Are there robust age-related differences in metamemory on 
individual questionnaires which have initial evidence for their reliability and 
validity? Subsequent reports will address the issues of discriminant, convergent. 
and predictive validity. 
Method 
Subjects: Two large samples of subjects were tested in order to permit cross-validation of the 
findings. The populations from which the samples were drawn differed in city size and 
nationality. One sample was drawn from a medium-size western Canadian city ( Victoria. 
British Columbia). whereas the other sample was drawn from a semi-rural area in the eastern 
United States (Annville. Pennsylvania). In addition. the adult age range was represented 
somewhat differently in the two samples. The Victoria sample was designed to be comparable 
to the "traditional" cross-sectionai sample used in cognitive nine research. In this sample. the 
younger adults were university students and the older adults were healthy, community-dwelling 
volunteers. The Annville sample was designed to represent the entire adult age range and 
consisted of younger. middle-aged. and older healthy. community-dwelling adults, none of 
whom was enrolled full-time in university at the time of testing. This sampling scheme 
permitted us to examine whether similar patterns of results occur when age comparisons are 
made using younger individuals differing in current educational activity. 
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TABLE 2 
Mean Education. Vocabulary, and Self-Rated Health for Annville Sample 
Age Sex n Education Vocabulary' Healthb 
20-33 M 13 13.69 27.08 7.00 
F 17 14.06 30.71 7.59 
34-40 M 30 15.30 34.47 7.23 
F 45 14.40 34.98 7.18 
41-47 M 26 13.73 29.58 7.04 
F 41 13.07 28.89 7.29 
48-54 M 18 13.67 31.11 6.94 
F 26 12.96 34.73 7.42 
55-61 M 27 13.33 33.93 6.59 
F 46 12.63 32.61 7.02 
62-68 M 37 13.65 34.30 6.84 
F 39 12.92 36.87 6.92 
69-78 M 25 13.08 35.64 7.00 
F 35 13.17 38.14 6.74 
"EIS V-2(1). V-4(1), V-5(2). maximum score = 54. 
bRated on the Duke "ladder . ' 9-point Liken Scale (9 = perfect health). 
The Victoria sample consisted of 378 individuals. Complete data were available for 360 of 
these, and it is these data which are reported here. Analyses incorporating the subjects who had 
some missing data did not result in any alteration of the findings. Subjects were recruited 
through newspaper advertisements and appeals to university and community groups. They 
were paid a nominal fee of $15.00 (Cdn) for their participation. The subjects were divided into 
four age groups: 20-26 years. 55-61 years. 62-68 years. and 69-78 years. Males and females 
were distributed roughly evenly within each age group. Analysis of the demographic 
characteristics of the sample. presented in Table 1. suggests that the sample was well above 
average compared with the general population in terms of education, verbal ability, and self-
rated health. 
The Annville sample consisted of 447 individuals. Complete data were available for 415 of 
these, and it is these data that are reported here. Analyses incorporating the subjects who had 
some missing data did not result in any alteration of the findings. Subjects were recruited 
through their membership in a large family medical practice. They were paid a nominal fee of 
$15.00 (US) for their participation. Analysis of the demographic characteristics of the sample. 
presented in Table 2. suggests that the subjects were somewhat less selected in terms of 
education and verbal ability than the Victoria sample, but still above average compared with the 
general population. On average, subjects rated their health as good. 
Measures and Procedures: Subjects from both samples completed a common battery of 
questionnaires and tasks including indicators of metamemory, social desirability, personal 
control (agency and causality), personality state (anxiety. arousal. fatigue. depression), verbal 
comprehension, and memory performance (free recall of texts and word lists). These 
instruments were administered to small groups of 5-15 subjects during two separate sessions. In 
the present report, we are concerned only with the two metamemory questionnaires which were 
given during the first session prior to any assessments of memory performance. 
Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) Instrument. This instrument, developed by Dixon and 
Hultsch (1983b. 1984). measures multiple dimensions of adults' self-perceptions of their 
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TABLE 3 








Knowledge and use of information about 
one's remembering abilities such that 
performance in given instances is 
potentially improved. + = high use) 
Knowledge of basic memory processes, 
especially as evidenced by how most 
people perform. I — = high knowledge) 
Do you write appointments 
on a calendar to help you 
remember them? 
For most people, facts that 
are interesting are easier to 
remember than facts that are 
not. 
3. Capacity 	 Perception of memory capacities as 
evidenced by predictive report of 
performance on given tasks. ( + = high 
capacity) 
4. Change 	 Perception of memory abilities as generally 
stable or subject to long-term decline. 
(+ = stability) 
5. Anxiety 	 Feelings of stress related to memory 
performance. ( + = high anxiety) 
6. Achievement 
	
Perceived importance of having a good 
memory and performing well on memory 
tasks. 	= high achievement) 
7. Locus 
	
Perceived personal control over 
remembering abilities. t + = internality) 
I am good at remembering 
names. 
The older I get. the harder it 
is to remember things 
clearly. 
I do not get flustered when I 
am put on the spot to 
remember new things. 
It is important that I am very 
accurate when remembering 
names of people. 
Even if I work on it. my 
memory ability will go 
downhill. 
Note. Based on Dixon & Hultsch. 1983b. 
everyday memory functioning using a live-point Likert scale. We used the 108-item version of 
this instrument, dropping the original Activity subscale as suggested by Hultsch et al. (1985). 
The remaining seven subscales. their definitions. and sample items are presented in Table 3. 
Prior work with multiple samples has suggested that these subscales are internally consistent 
(Cronbach's alpha range across multiple samples = .61 to .92.) and factorially valid (e.g.. 
Dixon & Hultsch. 1983b). 
Memory Functioning Questionnaire) MFQ). This 64-item questionnaire. developed by 
Gilewski et al. (1983: see also Gilewski & Zelinski. 1987), taps multiple dimensions of 
metamemory using a seven-point Likert scale. This form is a shortened version of a 92-item 
instrument originally developed by Zelinski et al. (1980). The a priori subscales and sample 
items associated with them are shown in Table 4. In the original sample. Cronbach's alpha 
ranged from .82 to .93, and 3-year test-retest reliabilities of the subscales ranged from .22 to 
.64 (Zelinski et al.. 1980). 
Results 
Analysis of the data from the two samples was conducted using different 
techniques in order to take advantage of the different age sampling strategies used 
in each instance. In the case of the Victoria sample, a traditional groups approach 
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TABLE 4 
A Prion Subscales of the Memory Functioning Questionnaire IMFQ) 
Subscale 	 Sample Item 
I. General Rating 	 I. How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds of 
problems you have? I+ = no problems) 
2. Retrospective Functioning 	2. How is your memory compared to what it was ... (a) one 
year ago? ( + = much better) 
3. Frequency of Forgetting 	3. How often do these present a memory problem for you ... 
(a) names? ( + = never) 
4. Frequency of Forgetting when 4. As you are reading a novel, how often do you have trouble 
Reading Novels 	 remembering what you have read ... (a) in opening chapters. 
once you have finished the book? ( + = nevert 
5. Frequency of Forgetting when 5. When you are reading a newspaper or magazine article, how 
Reading Newspapers and 	 often do you have trouble remembering what you have read 
Magazines 	 ( a) in the opening paragraphs. once you have finished the 
article? ( + = nevert 




6. How well do you remember things which occurred ... 
(a) last month? ( + = very good) 
7. When you actually forget in these situations, how serious of 
a problem do you consider the memory failure to be ... 
(a) names. ( -r = not serious) 
8. How often do you use these techniques to remind yourself 
about things ... (a) keep an appointment book. ( + = never) 
Note. Based on Gilewski et al.. 1983. 
was used. MANOVAs followed by univariate and post hoc tests- were used to 
explore sex and age differences on both the MIA and the MFQ. In the Annville 
sample, observations were sampled across a continuum of chronological age. 
Consequently. polynomial regression analysis was conducted on the data to 
identify age-related trends. Order 4 polynomials (linear through quartic terms) 
were fit to the data in a multivariate sex by year of birth (YOB) analysis. using 
hierarchical significance tests to evaluate the significance of increments to R 2 by 
adding higher order terms (and their interactions with sex) as recommended by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983). The powers of YOB were taken after centering 
(subtracting the YOB mean) in order to reduce multicolinearity of the independent 
variables. Due to the large sample sizes involved. the 1% level of confidence was 
used as a criterion for all multivariate significance tests. Given the significance of 
a multivariate test. univariate tests for the various metamemory subscales were 
evaluated at the 5 level of confidence. 
MIA Results: Victoria Sample. The sex by age (2 x 4) MANOVA conducted on the 
seven subscales of the MIA indicated significant overall effects related to sex. 
Wilks X = 0.942. F(7. 346) = 3.06. p < .004. and age, Wilks X = 0.602. F(21, 
994) = 9.16, p < .0001. and a marginally significant interaction, Wilks = 
0.907. F(21, 994) = 1.63. p < .04. 
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TABLE 5 
Mean MIA Strategy. Anxiety, and Achievement Scores as a Function of Sex for Victoria Sample 
Pooled 
Sex 
Subscales R 2 SD Males Females 
Strategy .035 9.64 62.50 66.20 
Anxiety .011 9.23 40.34 42.31 
Achievement .017 7.15 57.69 59.59 
TABLE 6 
Mean MIA Strategy. Capacity Change. and Locus Scores as a Function of Age for Victoria Sample 
Pooled 
Age Group 
Subscales R 2 SD 20-26 55-61 62-68 69-78 
Strategy .043 9.64 61.31 67.21 65.03 63.85 
Capacity .114 9.93 60.02 53.42 52.65 51.84 
Change .274 12.42 63.82 53.15 50.98 49.41 
Locus .054 4.88 33.41 33.70 32.14 30.81 
Univariate tests indicated significant sex differences on three subscales: 
Strategy. F(1, 352) = 13.51, p < .0003: Anxiety. F(1, 352) = 4.11, p < .04: and 
Achievement, F(1, 352) = 6.10, p < .01. Mean scores for males and females on 
these subscales are shown in Table 5. along with the pooled standard deviations 
for the sample and the estimated variance accounted for by each effect. 
Univariate tests also indicated significant age differences on four subscales: 
Strategy. F(3, 352) = 5.52, p < .001: Capacity, F(3, 352) = 15.66, p < .0001: 
Change F(3, 352) = 45.31, p < .0001: and Locus. F(3, 352) = 6.72. p < .0002. 
Mean scores for the four age groups on these subscales are shown in Table 6, 
along with the pooled standard deviations for the sample and the estimated 
variance accounted for by each effect. Follow-up analyses using Bonferroni r tests 
at the 5% level indicated that the youngest group scored significantly higher on 
Capacity and Change than all three older groups. The youngest group also scored 
lower than the 55-61-year-old group on Strategy and higher than the 69-78-year-
old group on Locus. Finally. the 55-61-year-old group scored higher on Locus 
than the 69-78-year-old group. 
MFQ Results: Victoria Sample. The sex by age (2 x 4) MANOVA conducted on the 
eight subscales of the MFQ indicated significant overall effects related to sex. 
Wilks X = 0.935, F(8. 345) = 2.99. p < .003. age, Wilks X = 0.703, F(24. 
1001) = 5.37. p < .0001, and a marginally significant interaction. Wilks 
X = 0.900. F(24, 1001) = 1.54. p < .05. 
Univariate tests indicated significant sex differences on two subscales: 
Remembering Past Events. F(1, 352) = 4.41, p < .04. and Mnemonics. F(1, 352) 
= 8.60. p < .004. Mean scores for males and females on these subscales are 
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TABLE 7 
Mean MFQ Mnemonics and Remembering Past Events Scores as a Function of Sex for Victoria Sample 
Pooled 
Sex 
Subscale R 2 SD Males Females 
Mnemonics .023 10.17 29.94 26.74 
Remembering .012 4.25 18.70 19.67 
Past Events 
TABLE 8 
Mean MFQ General Rating. Retrospective Functioning. Reading Novels. and Reading Magazines 
Scores as a Function of Age for Victoria Sample 
Pooled 
Age Group 
Subscales R 2 SD 20-26 55-61 62-68 69-78 
General Rating .041 1.24 5.02 4.64 4.78 4.33 
Retrospective .211 5.84 24. 1 7 18.25 19.02 17.65 
Functioning 
Reading Novels .032 5.47 28.06 27.04 26.46 25.45 
Reading Magazines .035 5.42 28.82 27.61 27.42 26.06 
shown in Table 7, along with the pooled standard deviations for the sample and the 
estimated variance accounted for by each effect. 
Univariate tests also indicated significant age differences on four subscales: 
General Rating, F(3, 352) = 5.19. p < .002: Retrospective Functioning, F(3. 
352) = 32.00, p < .0001: Reading Novels. F(3, 352) = 3.97. p < .008: and 
Reading Magazines, F(3, 352) = 4.39. p < .005. Mean scores for the four age 
groups on these subscales are shown in Table 8, along with the pooled standard 
deviations for the sample and the estimated variance accounted for by each effect. 
Follow-up analyses using Bonferroni t tests at the 5% level indicated that the 
youngest group scored higher than all three older groups on Retrospective 
Functioning. The differences associated with the remaining three subscales were a 
function of significant differences between the youngest and the oldest groups. 
MIA Results: Annville Sample. In the Annville sample. separate polynomial regres-
sion analyses were run for the MIA and MFQ. For the MIA, the multivariate tests 
revealed sienificant sex differences on the subscales. Wilks X = 0.903, F(7, 406) 
= 6.24. p < .0001. The results of the polynomial analysis suggested a significant 
linear trend for year of birth, Wilks X = 0.836. F(7 . 406) = 11.40,p < .0001. No 
other trends reached significance at a 1% level of confidence. There were 5% 
trends for the quadratic and quartic components. Likewise, no sex by YOB 
polynomial interaction achieved significance at the 1% level of confidence. 
Table 9 gives the univariate regression statistics for each MIA subscale. The 
significant sex effects were a function of univariate gender differences on the 
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MIA Scales: Polynomial Regression (Hierarchical) for Annville Sample 
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Intercept Sex YOB 
Variable a 1) 1 (se) b, (se) 	 F(model) R 2 
Strategy 59.18 3.98 (0.88)*** 0.02 (0.03) 	 10.69*** .049 
Task 59.85 0.47 (0.59) 0.03 (0.02) 1.40 .007 
Capacity 52.56 - 0.05 (0.98) 0.12 (0.04)*** 	5.56** .026 
Change 55.50 -2.35 (1.13)* 0.31 (0.04)*** 30.78*** .130 
Anxiety 36.94 4.11 (0.94)*** -0.01 (0.03) 	 9.67*** .045 
Achievement 58.54 0.79 (0.70) 0.00 (0.03) 0.65 .003 
Locus 32.38 - 0.18 (0.50) 0.04(0.02)* 	2.78 .013 
Model with Quadratic Trend Component 
a b 1 (se) b,(se) 	 b rdsel 	R 2 _IR= 
Strategy 58.35 4.04(0.881*** 0.01 (0.03) 	0.004 12.07) 	.057 .008 
Task 59.91 0.47 (0.59) 0.03 (0.02) - 0.000 (.001) .007 .000 
Capacity 52.05 - 0.02 (0.98) 0.11(0.04)** 	0.002 (.003) 	.029 .003 
Change 55.41 - 2.34 (1.12)* 0.31(0.041*** 0.000 (.003) .130 .000 
Anxiety 36.07 4.17(0.931*** 	- 0.01 (0.031 	0.000 (.002) 	.052 .007 
Achievement 57.80 0.84 (0.70) -0.01 (0.02) 0.003 (.002) .012 .008 
Locus 32.73 - 0.21 (0.50) 0.05(0.02)* 	- 0.002(.001) 	.018 005 
*p< .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001. 
Strategy and Anxiety subscales. Women reported higher levels of strategy use and 
greater anxiety about memory functioning. The age effects were associated 
primarily with the Capacity and Change subscales (with a nonsignificant trend on 
the Locus subscale). Older persons reported lower memory capacity and greater 
decline in memory functioning than younger persons. Table 9 also illustrates the 
validity of ignoring the 5% significance level quadratic term for YOB. None of the 
univariate regression weights associated with the quadratic term achieved 
statistical significance (even at the 5% level), and in no case did addition of the 
quadratic term increment R 2 by 1%. 
MFQ Results: Annville Sample. For the MFQ, the multivariate tests revealed no 
significant sex or YOB effects. although there was a 5% level trend for the linear 
YOB component. For comparison purposes. however, the univariate effects for 
the MFQ are given in Table 10. There were trends for age differences on the 
Retrospective Functioning, Reading Novels, and Mnemonics subscales, but not 
one of these age trends was substantial. Moreover. on the important Frequency of 
Forgetting subscale. no hint of a significant age difference could be seen. 
Finally, in order to permit comparison with the Victoria sample, the means and 
pooled standard deviations of selected subscales for the Annville sample are 
shown in Table 11. Included in the table are subscales that showed significant age 
differences in either one or both of the samples. The three oldest groups in Table 11 
span age ranges equivalent to those reported in the Victoria analyses. 
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TABLE 10 





b i tse) 
YOB 
b 2 (se) F(Modeli R 2 
General Rating 4.86 -0.18 (0.13) 0.02 (0.00) 1.57 .008 
Retrospective 19.63 -0.12 (0.55) 0.04 (0.02)* 2.26 .011 
Functioning 
Frequency of 89.53 -2.32(1.54) 0.03 (0.06) 1.26 .006 
Forgetting 
Reading Novels 26.85 -0.58 (0.60) 0.05 (0.02)* 2.61 .013 
Reading Magazines 28.78 -1.19 (0.54) 0.03 (0.02) 3.74 .018 
Remembering 17.63 0.37 (0.50) -0.00 (0.02) 0.27 .001 
Past Events 
Seriousness 66.87 -3.55 (2.54) 0.04 (0.091 1.02 .005 
Mnemonics 30.15 -1.42 (1.01) -0.09 (0.04)* 4.18' .020 
*p< .05. 
TABLE II 
Mean Scores of Selected MIA and MFQ Subscaies as a Function of Age for Annville Sample 
Pooled 
Age Group 
Subscales SD 20-33 34-40 41-47 48-54 55-61 62-66 69-78 
Strategy 8.74 65.20 67.42 66.64 62.81 64.23 64.40 67.52 
Capacity 9.68 56.88 53.37 54.04 52.18 51.58 50.90 50.61 
Change 11.05 58.47 57.44 54.42 49.73 49.90 48.32 46.02 
Locus 5.05 32.76 32.44 33.42 31.82 32.05 31.35 30.86 
General Rating 1.27 4.98 4.64 4.57 4.30 4.53 4.61 4.57 
Retrospective 5.49 21.45 20.12 18.49 19.91 19.39 19.05 18.70 
Functioning 
Readine Novels 5.97 27.03 26.89 26.15 26.00 25.01 25.91 24.97 
Reading Magazines 5.36 23.43 26.93 27.67 25.91 26.16 27.25 26.33 
Mnemonics 9.81 26.46 24.13 27.57 30.06 30.17 29.14 27.39 
Discussion 
The present results paint a reasonably consistent picture that permits us to unravel 
some of the confusion present in the literature. In particular. consistencies 
between the two current samples and between the current samples and earlier 
studies suggest that there are age differences in adults' self-perceptions of their 
memory functioning. In addition. there appear to be sex differences in such self- 
perceptions. In considering these conclusions. it is important to attend to the size 
of the effects reported in the present data set. as well as their level of statistical 
significance. Because of the large sample sizes involved. a number of effects 
reach statistical significance even though they account for little variance. 
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Age Differences: There appear to be a number of congruous differences between 
younger and older adults on several metamemory dimensions. Specifically, 
compared with younger adults, older adults see themselves as having less 
memory capacity and report that their memory has declined over the years. Such 
differences, as indexed by the Capacity and Change subscales of the MIA, 
emerged in both the Victoria and Annville samples. In particular, the Change 
subscale accounted for substantial portions of the variance in both samples 
(Victoria 27%, Annville 13%). A similar pattern of age differences was observed 
in our earlier work (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b). 
In addition, there was a suggestion that, compared with younger adults, older 
adults believe that there is little that they can do to enhance their memory or 
prevent its deterioration. This difference, as indexed by the Locus subscale of the 
MIA. was significant in the Victoria sample. accounting for an estimated 5% of 
the variance, although it only approached significance in the Annville sample. 
Age differences between young and middle-aged to older adults were also 
observed on the Locus subscale in our earlier work (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b). 
The present results also show age differences on the MIA Strategy subscale in 
the Victoria sample and on the MFQ Mnemonics subscale in the Annville sample. 
These two subscales correlate highly (Victoria — .76, Annville — .71). In both 
cases. older adults report more use of strategies than younger adults. Our earlier 
work did not show such an age difference. However. the earlier factor analysis of 
the MIA suggests that the Strategy subscale may have two subcomponents: use of 
internal mnemonic devices such as imagery and use of external memory aids such 
as making lists (Dixon & Hultsch. 1983b). These analyses of the two types of 
items suggested that younger adults may be more likely to rely on mnemonic 
devices, whereas older adults may be more likely to rely on external aids. A 
majority of items on the MFQ Mnemonics subscale reflect the use of external 
aids. Further analyses are planned in order to investigate whether the presence or 
absence of age differences on strategy use measures, then, may reflect the mix of 
items referring to internal versus external memory strategies. 
There are several qualifications that should be discussed with respect to these 
findings related to age differences in metamemory. First, the age differences 
observed appear to be most pronounced when a contrast is drawn between a young 
university student sample and middle-aged and older community residents. In the 
Victoria sample, age differences between the youngest group and the remaining 
groups were generally significant, whereas contrasts among the three older 
groups were generally not significant. This observation, however, should be 
qualified by the results of the hierarchical regression analysis of the Annville 
sample. which indicated linear trends consistent with the Victoria data. However, 
a similar analysis conducted on the data from the 55- to 78-year-olds from the 
Victoria sample did not show any significant linear trends. This suggests that age-
related differences at the mean level within the middle to older age ranges are 
fairly fragile. As a result. discrepant findings in the literature may be partially due 
to the nature of the subjects sampled in this portion of the life span. With this in 
mind. we conducted a MANCOVA on the Victoria data using education. 
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vocabulary, and self-rated health scores as covariates. The results indicated that 
the sex and age effects observed in the earlier analyses remained virtually 
unchanged. 
Second, it also appears that the MIA and the MFQ are differentially sensitive to 
detecting mean age differences. Such differences are more likely to be found with 
the MIA than with the MFQ. In the Victoria sample, significant age differences 
were observed on the General Rating, Retrospective Functioning, Reading 
Novels, and Reading Magazines subscales of the MFQ. However, the magnitude 
of the effects was generally smaller than those observed in the case of the MIA. In 
the case of the Annville data where a nonstudent sample was examined, only 
trends in the direction of age differences were observed on the MFQ. In contrast, 
as noted above, several significant age differences emerged on the MIA. 
Related to this, the present results suggest that the phrasing of the questions 
may be of significance. No age differences were observed on subscales consisting 
of questions that ask people to report the extent to which they experience episodes 
of forgetting in particular domains (e.g., MFQ Frequency of Forgetting). In 
contrast, age differences were observed on subscales consisting of questions that 
ask people to rate their memory relative to some unspecified anchor (MIA 
Capacity). Age differences are particularly apparent on subscales consisting of 
questions that ask people to rate their memory relative to the anchor of their own 
past performance (e.g., MIA Change; MFQ Retrospective Functioning). One 
possible explanation of this pattern is that, although older adults perceive that their 
memory has declined from previously higher levels of functioning, they do not 
perceive this loss as a problem, either because their current level of functioning 
conforms to what they expect or because the incidents of forgetting are not 
perceived as particularly serious for their everyday functioning. Recent data 
reported by Sunderland et al. (1986) are consistent with this latter notion. 
Sex Differences: There do appear to be sex differences in metamemory that are 
consistent across measures and samples, although they do not account for large 
amounts of the variance. Our prior work did not address the issue of sex 
differences because those samples were predominantly female. Similarly, 
previous work by other investigators does not suggest any consistent pattern of sex 
differences. In the present study, we found some evidence that women 
consistently reported more strategy use and greater anxiety associated with 
memory-demanding situations than men. Differences were observed on the MIA 
Strategy subscale for both samples and on the MFQ Mnemonics subscale in the 
Victoria sample. Differences were observed on the MIA Anxiety subscale in both 
samples. There were also significant sex differences on the MIA Achievement 
subscale and the MFQ Remembering Past Events subscale, with women scoring 
higher than men. 
Conclusion: In sum, there appear to be sex- and age-related differences on some 
dimensions of metamemory. In particular, women show a small but consistent 
tendency to report more strategy use and greater anxiety about memory-
demanding situations than men. Compared with younger adults, older adults 
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report less memory capacity, more decline in memory functioning, and believe 
that they have less control over their memory ability. The central features of these 
perceptions appear to cluster around perceptions of self-efficacy and changes in 
memory over time. There is little evidence for age-related differences in the 
knowledge aspects of metamemory that were originally of interest to developmen-
talists (Flavell, 1971; Perlmutter, 1978). The age differences that are observed are 
reasonably consistent, but particularly within the older age ranges they are 
somewhat subtle. Similarly, the extent to which age differences are observed 
appears to be partly a function of the particular way the questions are phrased. As 
a result, some of the inconsistency observed in previous studies may be related to 
sampling and measurement problems. Nevertheless. it appears that age-related 
differences in metamemory constitute a reliable phenomenon that is appropriate 
for further investigation. As mentioned at the outset. several avenues of research 
remain to be considered including issues of discriminant, convergent, and 
predictive validity. Analyses examining these issues within the current data sets 
are currently in progress. 
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CHAPTER 
12 
Using Confirmatory Factor Analysis for 
Scale Development and Validation 
Christopher Hertzog 
The past several years have been marked by an accelerating rate of increase in 
sophisticated new methods for conducting valid and informative empirical research 
on the measurement properties of psychological scales. One of the more impor-
tant approaches has involved the use of confirmatory factor analysis to test prop-
erties of individual items and whole scales, examining factorial validity, reliability, 
and the like [1-4]. These methods are of special interest to gerontologists, because 
they explicitly provide a way of testing for age group equivalence in scale prop-
erties. The methodological foundations for using confirmatory factor analysis to 
examine measurement properties in scales. and to test age group equivalence in 
measurement properties. has been discussed in some detail by Schaie and Hen-
zog [5]. and of course. in more technical material on the topic. This review is 
not designed to duplicate this material. but rather. to add to it by emphasizing 
practical issues associated with applications of the method. I avoid a mathematical 
treatment of the topic. and instead attempt to keep the focus at the level of discuss-
ine existing work that has used confirmatory factor analysis for scale validation. 
The topic is unfortunately somewhat complex. and we will wade into deep water 
occasionally, My hope is that the emphasis on discussing empirical applications 
will help the reader keep his or her head above the water line! 
There are several different types of confirmatory factor analysis designs appro-
priate for scale development and validation. They fall into two very broad classes: 
1) those that analyze the factor structure of sets of individual items; and 2) those 
that analyze sets of scales (often. summative scales of items using Liken-type 
ratings). Schaie and Hertzog discuss in some length the analysis of scales for 
the purpose of evaluating reliability and validity in gerontological research 
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applications 151. Here I shall focus more attention to the analysis of items, although 
here will be a brief discussion of the analysis of scales as well. 
ITEM FACTOR ANALYSIS 
3ENERAL ISSUES 
Confirmatory factor analysis has been employed with increasing frequency to 
)erform item factor analysis of psychological scales, especially measures of sub-
ect ive well-being (life satisfaction, morale) in older populations 16, 71. Reviews 
if the subjective well-being concept are beyond the scope of this review 17-91. 
['his literature can be somewhat overwhelming, in that complex models are 
'resented with little justification or explanation. This chapter illustrates some of 
he basic features of confirmatory factor models for item factor structure with 
pecial reference to an analysis of a leading depression scale. With this discus-
ion as background, I shall then review the literature analyzing scales of subjec-
:ye well-being in adult populations, focusing prinwily on methodological issues. 
The advantage of confirmatory factor analysis for analyzing scale properties 
that it is often the case that the items have been selected in advance to measure 
ypothesized dimensions. In some cases, it is assumed that all the items in a scale 
Icasure one latent variable. Cronbach refers to such scales as hoinowneous scales, 
and discusses the merits and disadvantages of scale heterogeneity 1101. The 
isumption that all items are determined by a single latent variable (one, hopefully, 
tat the scale is designed to measure) has been termed unidimensionality by 
IcDonald 1111. It is a little appreciated fact that the calculation of Cronbach's 
, or of other internal consistency estimates of reliability, depends crucially upon 
validity of the unidimensionality assumption. In fact, a is a lower hound 
aimate of the reliability, and a scale that is not unidimensional will have a reliahili-
larger than that estimated by internal consistency methods. Titus, one reason 
perform item factor analysis on a scale is to test the assumption of 
Adimensionality. 
Related reasons for using confirmatory factor analysis for scale validation arise 
hen a scale is hypothesized to contain multiple subscales (i.e., multidimensionali-
). In particular, one may be interested in whether as many factors are required 
account for item correlations as were originally hypothesized, and whether, 
some instances, it makes sense to collapse or combine subscales on the basis 
factor analysis results in order to achieve parsimony. In this case, it is useful 
specify an item factor model that tests whether the items actually factor as 
pothesized by the investigator. Depending upon the results of the analysis, it 
ay be judged necessary and/or appropriate to alter the number of scales calculated 
the questionnaire. Confirmatory approaches arc appropriate in this context 
-cause the focus is on validating a model for item factors that has been specified 
qriori. Thus it is possible to test the hypothesized item factor structure directly 
ithout resort to interpretation of exploratory factor analyses. 
Use of exploratory factor analysis for assessing item factor structure is often 
appropriate and informative. It is not my purpose to castigate previous work on 
the grounds that exploratory factor analysis was used. Nevertheless, use of ex-
ploratory factor analysis can lead to unnecessary interpretive ambiguity, especially 
if the scales (and their corresponding item factors) correlate at moderate to high 
levels. Why is this a potential problem? On one extreme, most computer pro-
grams use an orthogonal rotation (usually, varimax) as a default option. Use of 
an orthogonal rotation when the item factors are truly correlated can distort fac-
tor pattern matrices and lead to erroneous conclusions about relations of items 
to factors. On the other hand, use of an oblique rotation to get correlated factors 
is not necessarily an adequate solution to the problem. There arc, in exploratory 
factor analysis, an infinite number of rotational solutions. With oblique rotation, 
there are multiple, legitimate rotations that may vary dramatically in the degree 
of factor correlation permitted by the rotation algorithm. For example, the pro-
max rotation constant controls the maximum degree of factor intercorrclation, 
and changes in the constant can result in dramatic changes in the estimated factor 
correlations. This fact should cause discomfort, for it is precisely these factor 
correlations that are the basis upon which one must decide whether multiple scales 
can be combined with minimal loss of information. 
liven if the scales are expected to be orthogonal, there are distinct advantages 
of confirmatory factor analysis for an item set, including I) ability to test the 
hypothesized configuration of item factor structure, and 2) direct testing of the 
hypothesis of orthogonality. Confirmatory factor analysis provides a formal basis 
for testing hypotheses, because it is possible to take the difference in the x 2 
goodness-of-fit test for competing models as a test of the restrictions contained 
in the more restricted model (for gerontological examples, see refs. 112-151). 
Thus, if one wanted to test the hypothesis of orthogonal scales, is is a simple 
matter to specify two alternative models for a set of items. One model allows 
the item factors to intercorrelate freely. The second model forces the factor cor-
relations to be fixed to zero. The. difference in x 2 between the two models is 
a test of the hypothesis that the factor correlations are, indeed, zero in the popula-
tion. This sort of approach is general and quite powerful, permitting the use of 
clever psychometric designs to test a number of hypotheses about item and scale 
interrelationships. 
The advantages of confirmatory factor analysis listed above relate to the fac-
torial validity ofa multidimensional scale. Factorial validity implies that the items 
form item factors as predicted by their hypothesized relation to an underlying 
psychological construct 110, 161. Factorial validity is an important part of 
demonstrating the construct validity of a scale. The confirmatory factor analysis 
approach also enables the researcher to address other aspects of construct validi-
ty. With item factor analysis, this can he accomplished by modeling the relation-
ships of the item factors to other variables. Latent variable models for convergent 
validity (do the multiple item factors interrelate, and do they converge with item 
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factors from other scales to measure the same construct), discriminant validity 
(are converged latent variables less than perfectly correlated with cognate con-
structs [171), and predictive validity (does a lacnt variable predict other variables 
in a manner consistent with the assumption that it is a valid measure of the con-
struct defined by theory) can easily be formulated provided that other latent 
variables have been measured as part of the design [3, 171. Use of confirmatory 
modeling approaches to demonstrate evidence for factorial, convergent, discrimi-
nant, and predictive validity would in principle constitute compelling evidence 
for the construct validity of a scale. 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
As an illustration of item factor analysis, I use data collected by David ['Misch, 
Roger Dixon, and myself as part of a validation study of the Dixon and Hultsch 
;191 Metamemory in Adulthood questionnaire. The data were collected on two 
samples: 1) 437 adult volunteers, ages twenty to eighty from a family practice 
n Annville, Pennsylvania (hereafter, the Annville sample), and 2) 270 adult 
/olunteers ages fifty live to seventy-seven from Victoria, B.C. (hereafter, the 
Victoria sample). Participants rated themselves on items from the Center fir 
pitlemiological Studies Depression Scale (('ES-I); 12011. The 20-item CIS-I) 
;cale was specifically designed to measure degree of depressive symptoms in the 
u)pulation at large. Subjects are asked to respond how frequently during the last 
veck a list of statements apply, using a 4 -level rating scale (scored 0- 3). Scores 
)1 16 or higher are considered above the cutoff for mild depression 1201. The 
'ES - 1) has become an increasingly popular measure of depression1211 and recent-
y Gatz, Hurwiez, and Weicker reported large cross-sectional data on age and 
lepression using the CES-D [221. The original validation study by Radloff [201, 
nd subsequent work by Aeneshensel 1231, suggest that there may be four factors 
ontained in the CES-D: (depressive) Affect, (lack of) Well-Being, Somatic Synup-
mis (also labeled Psychomotor Retardation), and Interpersonal Problems. 
- The analysis summarized here was designed to test the four factor model using 
onfirmatory factor analysis. Further information on the CES-D item analysis 
ray be found in ref 1241. Before discussing the confirmatory factor analysis, it 
; instructive to ask what an exploratory factor analysis tell us about the item 
'dor structure of the CES-D. For illustrative purposes, the Annville sample data 
, ere analyzed by the principal factor method, with squared multiple correlations 
n the diagonal as communality estimates. The least squares solution was then 
uated by varimax to an orthogonal solution, and also by promax to two dir-
n-ent oblique solutions (one with the rotation constant set at 3, the other at 10). 
able I reports the factor pattern weights for all three solutions, and the factor 
wrelation matrices for the two oblique rotations. Each column labeled R con-
tins the varimax factor loadings estimated by Radloff 1201. The columns labeled 
contain the varimax rotation 1ro ► the Annville data. The columns labeled P3 




Item R V P3 P10 R V P3 
P10 
Bothered 23 11 -09 -25 -09 -31 -28 
-28 
Appetite 12 12 -01 -11 00 -17 -11 
-06 
Blues 60 36 27 26 -15 -35 -23 
-20 
Good 11 -05 16 35 68 42 48 
57 
Mind 24 21 08 -02 -10 -03 15 
37 
Depress 64 55 53 62 -18 -44 -28 
-26 
Effort 15 30 17 10 -07 -18 -
01 14 
Hopeful -10 -21 -06 03 68 59 
66 82 
Failure 44 29 16 08 -28 -38 -31 
-29 
Fearful 31 38 40 48 -19 -05 
17 35 
Sleep 21 13 -04 -20 01 -12 
00 14 
Happy -38 -25 00 18 62 63 
63 72 
Talk 00 23 16 15 -10 -22 
-14 -11 
Lonely 72 50 49 57 -06 -38 -22 
-17 
Unfriendly 15 11 01 -08 -07 -22 -20 
-18 
Enjoy -35 -26 -04 12 68 61 
61 69 
Cry 65 52 66 91 -01 -12 
08 17 
Sad 78 64 69 88 -09 -37 - 16 
-09 
Dislike 15 15 -01 -17 -04 -23 -16 
-97 




Item R V P3 P10 R V 
P3 P10 
Bothered 51 51 52 75 10 01 -14 
-27 
Appetite 50 44 46 66 -13 01 -10 
-21 
Blues 41 47 33 40 13 13 -06 
-15 
Good -01 -16 -04 -03 -11 -28 -22 
-27 
Mind 59 48 48 66 11 33 27 
31 
Depress 43 41 14 06 15 23 00 -07 
Effort 64 63 61 83 06 14 -01 
-11 
Hopeful -06 -15 08 18 01 -17 -02 
00 
Failure 07 28 09 04 11 38 26 
32 
Fearful 26 33 20 19 13 29 20 
23 
Sleep 55 49 51 72 -07 24 16 
16 
Happy -25 -40 -21 -24 -05 -29 -11 
-09 
Talk 54 38 33 43 20 -01 -14 
-26 
Lonely 18 34 08 -03 09 29 10 
09 
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R 	V 	P3 
  
Interpersonal 
    
em P10 	R 	V 	P3 	P10 
	
84 	47 	48 	67 
02 -35 -19 -21 
-04 	09 	-07 	-13 
15 29 07 05 
83 	56 	55 	73 
07 14 02 -05 
aDeeimals omitted. 
Note: Comparison of Radloff 1201 four-factor Varimax solution (Column R) and three 
ferent four factor solutions on Annville Validation study data: Varimax rotation (V), promax 
ation with constant at 3 (P3), and promax rotation with constant = 10 (P10). Loadings 
.3 are italicized. 
I PIO contain the factor loadings for the Iwo promax solutions 	this data 
. As can he seen, the varimax-rotated factor loadings f ► r the two samples are 
idar. The difference in the varimax and promax solutions is predominantly 
lie number of nonzero loadings in the varimax solution a pattern that would 
expected if an orthogonal solution were inappropriately imp4)sed on oblique 
iors. 
Joie the difference in the factor correlations estimated in the three solutions 
the Annville sample, as reported in Table 2. In the varimax rotation the factors 
:elations are zero, by fiat. In the promax solution with default values of the 
slant set at 3, the correlations arc substantial and predominantly in the .5 to 
With the promax constant set at 10, the factors arc highly oblique, with 
t of the correlations .7 or higher. The well-being items have not been reverse 
ed, so the negative correlation of Well-Being with the other factors is expected. 
that the semantically polar opposites, happy and sad, have very high loadings 
Table 2. CES-D Item Analysis: Factor Correlationsa 
Promax 	 Promax 
(constant 3) 	 (constant = 10) 




Somatic 88 -83 
Interpersonal 	75 -75 79 1 
rcimals omitted. 
e: Factor correlations for Iwo oblique rotations on the Annville Validation Study data set.  
on Well-Being and Affect, respectively, but the factor correlations are not suffi-
ciently close to -1.0 to conclude that Well-Being and Affect arc opposite poles 
of the same dimension. While this result is evident in both promax solutions, 
the differences in the magnitudes of the factor correlations between the two solu-
tions presents an important interpretive problem. Which one is "right?" How 
should the factor correlations be treated, given that their magnitude is dependent 
upon the constant used in the promax rotation? Given that there are an infinite 
number of possible rotated solutions, tinder what rotational transliirmations would 
we find the correlation of Affect and Well-Being sufficiently close to -1.0 to 
alter our conclusions in favor of considering the factors bipolar opposites? In sum, 
the dependence of estimated factor correlations upon the selection of a particular 
rotation constant renders a critical research question ambiguous and arbitrarily 
dependent upon methodological criteria. 
In the confirmatory approach, there is no ambiguity about the factor correla-
tion matrix. It has been uniquely identified by the specification of many non-zero 
factor loadings. In fact, the large number of fixed zero loadings overidentifies 
the model, and supplies surplus degrees of freedom for evaluating the model's 
goodness of fit. There is still a methodological and substantive issue, of course. 
It is whether the relationships of items to scale factors are indeed those specified 
in the model. In particular. one could he concerned about the accuracy of the 
assumptions of lack of relationships between items and factors—as represented 
in the fixed (I factor loadings. A different specification of item-factor relation-
ship would lead to different scale factors and different factor correlations, with 
the degree of variation depending upon the differences between specifications 
and their relative deviation from the "correct" model. However, in confirmatory 
analysis the model specification is clear, and the approach allows us to assess 
the adequacy of the model in terms of its fit to the sample data. 
Table 3 gives the LISREL estimates of the regression coefficients (factor 
loadings) for a model postulating the isolated configuration of item factors sug-
gested by the Radloff analysis 1201. The solutions lin - both the Annville and Vic-
toria samples are reported. The model fares well in both samples, with signifi-
cant factor pattern weights for all items. The correlational patterns are similar, 
although of smaller magnitude in the Victoria sample. 
It is critically important to replicate results in multiple samples. Given that the 
four factor solution proposed by Radloff fare well in both the samples studied 
here 1201, there is reason to have greater confidence in its validity. Reptitirthm 
should not, however, be confused with •ortjirmation. Our model may be con-
sistently misspecilicd, and the misspecilied model may be replicable, even if in-
correct. Confirmation is more critically important than replication, and is attained 
when I ) additional predictions of a theory lead to new predictions about the 
behavior of the Factors identified by Radloff 1201, and 2) these predictions are 
upheld by new, independent data (see refs. 112, 25, 261 for further discussion 
of this issue). Nevertheless, the ability to replicate results is critically important. 
nfriendly 
	
07 -03 -19 	-34 
njoy 	-14 	-33 	-11 -07 



















being 	-56 	1 
itic 68 -66 	1 
iersonal 
	
42 -46 53 1 
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Table 3. LISREL Model of CES-D Items for Annville (AVS) 










Bothered 0 0 0 0 56 
54 0 0 
Appetite 0 0 0 0 46 
52 0 0 
Blues 69 75 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Good 0 0 47 35 0 
0 0 0 
Mind 0 0 0 0 
56 63 0 0 
Depress 85 80 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Effort 0 0 0 0 76 
82 0 0 
Hopeful 0 0 64 54 0 
0 0 0 
Failure 65 69 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Fearful 52 62 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Sleep 0 0 0 0 55 
46 0 0 
Happy 0 0 87 88 
0 0 0 0 
Talk 0 0 0 0 
48 43 0 0 
Lonely 77 77 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Unfriendly 0 0 0 0 0 
0 52 55 
Enjoy 0 0 85 77 0 
0 0 0 
Cry 52 52 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Sad 83 85 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Dislike 0 0 0 0 0 
0 75 71 
Getgoing 0 0 0 0 64 
69 0 0 
Factor Correlations' 
V AVS 	 IC 
Affect 	 1 	 Affect 	
1 
Well-being 	-85 1 	 Well-being 	-76 
	1 
Somatic 	83 -73 1 	Somatic 
71 -55 	1 
Interpersonal 	65 -63 48 1 	Interpersonal 	
54 -41 	47 1 
Goodness of fit: 
AVS: x 2 (164) = 343.84 
	
GFI = .93 
VIC: x 2 (1641 = 280.79 GFI = .91 
AGFI = .90 
AGFI = .86 
'Decimal omitted. 
Note: All 0 loadings and standardized factor variances were fixed by hypothesis. All nonzero 
parameter estimates were significantly different from 0 beyond the .1 percent level of 
confidence. 
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Replication is also crucial for lending credence to any modifications in the model 
that are based upon the original model's fit to sample data. In the present analysis 
we modified the model for the Annville sample, using LISREL's modification 
indices and other diagnostics to free several parameters that were fixed to 0 in 
the original model. These additional parameters reduced the x 2 and increased 
the LISREL goodness-of-fit index. But the critical issue is deciding whether these 
model modifications are pointing to an improved model for the population, or 
alternatively, simply capitalizing upon chance to maximize lit to the particular 
sample. The best way to assure oneself of the broader applicability of the modified 
naslel is to cross-validate it in a separate sample. When we en)ss-validated these 
modifications in the Victoria sample, we found that the new factor loadings were 
not statistically different from zero. This result forced us to conclude that the 
modifications were merely improving fit to the Annville sample, not the general 
population. Given the importance of replication, it is always advisable either I) 
to collect data on more than one sample, or 2) to collect enough data in a single 
sample to he able to randomly assign subjects to half-samples. In confirmatory 
factor analysis sample sizes of 200 or greater arc preferred, so an overall sample 
size of 400 or lime is optimal 1271. 
Another issue illustrated in the analysis of the CFS-D involves the proper in-
terpretation of a model's lit to sample data. A intxlel can be accepted as useful 
even if its likelihood ratio x 2 test is statistically significant. A significant x 2 im-
plies that we reject the !mulct as fully adequate in accounting for the sample cor-
relation matrix. It is often (indeed, usually) the case that this test statistic will 
he significant in samples of moderate size. With sample size a 250 or greater, 
the likelihood ratio test is very powerful and will be significant even when a model 
is stable (in the sense that parameter estimates do not change greatly if new 
parameters are added to the model) and when it accounts for most of the infor-
mation in the correlation matrix. Given the power of the likelihood ratio test with 
large samples, it is a good idea to calculate an index of fit that is independent 
of sample size. Bender and Bonett 1281 and James, Mulaik, and Brett 1291  describe 
some alternative fit indices. The LISREL program provides its own, alternative, 
relative fit indices. For the CES-D item analyses, the LISRFL goodness-of-lit 
index in both samples is around .9, indicating it fairly satisfactory level of fit. 
The fit of the CES-D model is actually quite good for an item factor analysis, 
for two different reasons. First, the assumptions of multivariate normality are 
violated in data consisting of ordinal rating scales. I luba and liar low showed that 
this violation did 11(11 greatly affect the LISREL parameter estimates, but it did 
inflate the standard errors and the likelihood ratio x2  fit test 1301. The second 
reason to he satisfied with the la of the model concerns the nature of inter-item 
relationships. It is often the ease in item analysis that individual items may cor-
relate with each other to a degree not fully accounted for by the item factors. 
Two items may have very similar wordings, and therefore have a residual rela-
tionship with each other even if both load on the same item factor. Such specific 
vw of ET.s] 
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elationships will cause lack of fit to the factor model, but such deviations may 
)e relatively trivial, so long as the estimates of the factor loadings and factor 
•orrelations have stabilized and are replicable. In our CES-D analysis, the primary 
iarameter estimates did not shift greatly when additional modifications were made 
o the model. It seems safe to conclude that Radloff's model for the CES-D is 
reasonable representation of the underlying factor structure 1201. 
The principal pragmatic question after the confirmatory factor analysis is what 
t implies for calculating CES-D scale scores. Is it appropriate to combine all 
wenty items into a single scale score measuring depression? Is one better off 
!stimating scale scores for each of the four factors separately? These issues can 
► ly he summarized briefly here (see ref. 1211 for a fuller discussion). A deci-
sion to use the Rudloff model as a basis for calculating four subscales of the CES-D 
s predicated upon the validity of the four factor model 1201. Clearly, it has sur-
/ived the confirmation test, and can he accepted as a useful model for the item 
actors. This finding lends credence to the four factor representation as a possi-
)le basis for creating subscales for the CES-I). However, there may be practical 
noblems with calculating four separate subscales. A decision to use the four scales 
mist face two issues: I) the scales will he highly intercorrelated, and 2) two of 
lie four scales arc based upon an unacceptably hflx, ntlinher or items, minimizing 
icale reliability. The fourth factor, Interpersonal Problems, is defined by two 
items— too few to be considered an adequate basis for a separate subscale. The 
Well-Being factor is defined by but items, and similar concerns apply. 
Gatz et al. used unit weighting to combine the items using the assignments im- 
►iled by the Rudloff model 1221. Their internal consistency estimates orreliabili-
ly were relatively low for the Interpersonal Problems scale. On the other hand, 
Glitz et al. did find quite different mean age differences on the four subscales, 
with larger age differences in Well-Being than on the other CES-D subscales 1231. 
their results may indicate that the Well-Being scale is measuring something dif-
ferent than the other CES-D subscales, a notion consistent with the factor cor-
relations estimated in the Hertzog et al. analysis 1241. Certainly, it does not ap-
pear that Well-Being and Depressive Affect arc polar opposites, even though they 
have a strong negative correlation. This finding is consistent with studies on 
psychological well-being and distress 131, 321 suggesting that Distress (a factor 
marked by depressive affect and other indicators) and Well-Being should he con-
sidered independent, negatively corrrelated dimensions. Apparently there is merit 
in separating positive and negative affect in well-being measures 18, 91. Note 
also that, unlike the exploratory factor analyses, both cimfirmatory analyses sug-
gest that the fourth factor, Interpersonal Problems, has lower correlations with 
the other three factors. The lour factors are substantially correlated, with the lowest 
correlation beween Interpersonal Problems and the other three scales. 
What case can he made for the single CES-D scale score? The relatively high 
intercorrelations among the scales indicate that there is justification for summing 
all items into a single CES-D depression scale score. More definitive justification 
for the single scale may be assessed by performing second-order factor analysis 
on the four first-order item factors 16, 33, 341. Figure 1 shows the Liang model 
for a second-order factor in a measure of life-satisfaction [331 (see below). The 
critical concept is that the second-order factor determines the first-order factors. 
Let us assume lOr the moment that the primary issue driving the research is 
whether subscale scores should be combined into a single scale (given the high 
Figure 1. Second-order factor model of Liang 1331 relating Subjective 
Well-Being to three first-order factors (Mood Tone, Zest, Congruence). Items 
are represented by squares, first-order and second-order factors by circles: 
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aibscale correlations). The second-order factor analysis enables a full evaluation 
if this issue. There arc three separate questions to be addressed. The first ques-
ion is: are the first-order factors properly specified? This issue has already been 
addressed for the CES-D data set. The second question is: how well does the 
;econd-order factor model account for the first-order factors? There are two dif-
erent aspects of this question to be considered. First, can the first-order factors 
►e represented by some (possibly multidimensional) second-order factor model? 
;econd, how much of the variance in each first-order factor is determined by 
he second-order factors? The first question is essentially asking whether it is 
'lausible to model higher order factors, and if so, whether the second-order model 
pecificd fits the data well. This issue of fit is conceptually distinct from the issue 
'1 how much of the variance in the first-order factors is predicted by the second-
Tiler factors. It is possible fin - a second-order factor to but still account 
a- relatively little variance in the .first-order fiwtors. 
The third question to he addressed is: do the first-order factors covary with 
ther important constructs independent of the second-order factor? This question 
;, in a sense, the most critical one to he addressed in deciding whether to cont-
hie the scales, yet it is one generally neglected in the emergent literature on 
.'coed-order factors, Of course, if the second -order factor accounts l ► r all the 
ariance in the lirsi-order factor, the third question is moot. That outcome would 
alicate that there is no residual component at the first-order level left to cor- 
• ate with other variables. However, if there is substantial residual variance at 
le first-order level, then it is possible (and perhaps likely) that some variables 
f interest may covary with the first-order factor independent of the second-order 
ictor. If these variables arc of specific interest in a research problem, combin-
ig, the subscales into a single overall scale would mask this relationship. 
Ilertzog et al. ran a second-order factor analysis of the (1 	data, 
multancously estimating the first and second-order solution in I .ISREI. 1241. 
he model specified a single second-order Depression factor, and restricted the 
•sidual covariance matrix to he diagonal (modeling the second-order factor as 
e sole determinant of covariance among the first order factors). Table 4 reports 
e second-order factor loadings and residual variances. The second-order loadings 
ere substantial, and significant for all four first--order factors. In the Annville 
da, Depression accounted for 70 percent or 111 ► 1 -C of the variance in three of 
c four factors. The pattern was similar in the Victoria study, although less 
fiance was determined by Depression. In both studies, Interpersonal Problems 
id the weakest relationship to Depression. 
How do we test whether Depression adequately accounts for the covariances 
'long the first order factors? As is so often the case in confirmatory modeling, 
is question may he addressed by examining differences in fit between two alter-
live models. In this case, we have imposed additional restrictions on the first-
der factor model by specifying the Depression factor as the sole source of the 
variances among the four first-order fiictors. The difference in -1( between these 
Table 4. Models with a Second-Order Depression Factor for the CES-D 
in Annville (AVS) and Victoria (VIC) Samples 
(Standardized Solution) 
Factor Loadings a 
Depression 
First-Order Factor AVS VIC 
Affect 98 98 
Well-Being -87 -77 
Somatic 84 72 
Interpersonal 65 55 
Unique Variances° 
AVS VIC . 
Affect 03 05 
Well-Being 25 40 
Somatic 30 48 
Interpersonal 58 69 
Goodness of fit: 
AVS: x2 (166) = 350 . 55 GFI = .92 AGFI = .90 
Loss of fit from first order: 	2 (2) = 6.71, 	p < .05; A AGFI - .01 
VIC: 	x 2 (166) = 282.43 GFI = .91 AGFI = .88 
Loss of fit: 	 x212) = 	1.64 (N.S.), A AGFI = .00 
aDecimals omitted. 
two models tests the loss of fit caused by adding the second-order factor to the 
model. In both samples, the loss of lit is small (see Table 4). So the Depression 
factor does a good job of accounting for the covariance among the factors. 
however, the goodness-of-fit test does not tell the whole story. In both samples, 
the covariance of Interpersonal Problems with Somatic Symptoms is overfit (a 
higher predicted than observed covariance), whereas the covariance of Affect 
and Well-Being is undedit. The consistency of this dblerence suggests there may 
he subtle, additional relationships that cannot be detected because of omitted fac-
tors. On the other hand, it is clear that the second-order factor is a very useful 
approximation to the relationships among the first-order factors. We can con-
clude that the combined scale—as reflected in the second-order factor—does have 
jiictoriii/ 
Of course, the third question—the adequacy of predictive validity by the second-
order factor—cannot be addressed merely by analysis of the CES-D. It can only 
be addressed by research that measures the CES-D and other constructs (and out-
come measures) of theoretical interest. 
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These results, then, support the factorial validity of the single CBS-D score. 
They also suggest that the four first-order factors relate differentially to the second-
order factor. Thus, although one is justified in using the single (combined) CES-
D depression scale, there may be research applications in which maintaining the 
separate factors is important and useful. Further evidence of predictive and con-
struct validity of both the overall CES-D scale score and the liar subscales is 
needed, however, for this information will be the critical determinant of whether 
(and when) one is best served by using the overall scale or the four subscales. 
A few additional conclusions are warranted by the item analysis. First, if a 
maximally homogeneous measure of self-report depression is desired, it would 
appropriate to form a 14-item scale combining only the Depressive Affect and 
somatic Symptoms subscales. These two factors seem closest to a face-valid detini-
ion of depression and have strong correlations with each other. Second, the fact 
hat Interpersonal Problems does not relate as strongly to the second-order Delves-
Ion factor in the CES-D leaves open the possibility that it may be associated 
vith other personal characteristics (e.g., introversion, neurotieism; [351) in ad-
lition to depression. The issue of discriminant validity fin - this subscale needs 
a he addressed in further research. The same issue seems important for the Well-
Icing suhscale, for it seems, at the level of face validity, highly related to items 
()omitted in Subjective Well-Being scales. Finally, if these latter two scales are 
annd to have convergent and discriminant validity with respect to the domain 
f depression, and if they have predictive validity of important Ater constructs 
'dependent of the Depression factor, then these subscales would be of interest 
their own right. In that event additional items measuring these dimensions should 
e developed and added to the scale. 
:ONFIRMATORY FACTOR MODELS 
IF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
With the preceding discussion of item factor analysis, we are now poised to 
iscuss the burgeoning literature on the factorial validity of measures of subjec-
ve well-being in adult populations. This literature has shown a decided progres-
on from the use of exploratory factor analysis to the use of confirmatory methods. 
)ne of the first uses of confirmatory factor models was reported by Hoyt and 
reech 136]. Using LISREL models, they were unable to confirm the original 
.odel for the original Neugarten versions of the Life Satisfaction Index (LISA) 
, 7]. Hoyt and Creech subsequently used exploratory factor analysis to arrive 
a reduced three-factor model for eight of the LSIA items 1361. hang and col-
ognes 16, 33, 34, 38, 391 have conducted several SEM investigations of the 
on factor structure of measures of subjects well-being, including the Philadelphia 
Alatric Center Morale Scale (PG(') 1.101, the 1.SIA. and Bradburn's Affect 
dance Scale (ABS) (411. A central feature of the hang work has been the 
nultaneous estimation of first and second-order factors. For example, Hang 
and Bohlen reported an item factor analysis of the PGC that specified three first-
order factors: Agitation, Dissatisfaction, and Attitudes ToWard Aging 1341. 
!however, they also estimated a single second-order factor (Subjective Well-Being), 
and found that the loadings on the second-order factor were high. They argued 
from these results that the multidimensionality of the PGC was at question. Subse-
quent analyses by Liang and Bollen 1381 and Liang et al. [391 have supported 
the second-order factor model and indicated invariance of the first and second-
order factors across age (young-old versus old-old) and sex groups. The Liang 
analysis of the LSIA 1331 (depicted in Figure I) posited the three first-order fac-
tors (Zest, Mood Tone, and Congruence) suggested by Neugarten et al. 1371 that 
had been previously replicated by Hoyt and Creech 1361. This model was fit to 
eleven of the seventeen LSIA items using responses from a large national sam-
ple, divided into four subsamples fOr model replication. The model fit accept-
ably well and replicated across the lintr subsamples. As in the Liang and Bohlen 
model for the PGC 1341, Liang estimated a single second-order factor of Subjec-
tive Well-Being [331. Subjective Well-Being was niarked primarily for Zest for 
Life, and (Positive) Mood Tone, with a much smaller loading fOr Conguence. 
There is much to appreciate Liang's work. First, the rationale far item selec-
tion is clear and explicitly stated. Second, the nto4.1•1 specification is hilly delineated 
and relatively complete results reported. This allows the reader to evaluate the 
results and the 'mids carefully and critically, a feature not present in all reported 
work in this domain 1421. Third, the models fit well and are parsimonious. Finally, 
the results are replicated on multiple subsamples, increasing confidence in their 
generality. 
There can be substantive and methodological concerns regarding the analyses 
however, and these studies should not be considered definitive closure on the 
appropriate models for subjective well-being (a point noted by Liang and his col-
leagues in their own papers). What kinds of concerns can be raised? Sonic are 
minor methodological points that, in the long run, probably will not vitiate the 
general conclusions drawn. For example, Liang and his colleagues routinely rely 
on pair-wise deletion of missing data in order to create (Pearson and polychoric) 
correlation matrices based upon maximum sample sires. If items are not missing 
at random, then this practice can lead to distortions in the solutions, although 
the replication across multiple suhsamples cases some of the concern. A more 
substantial concern specific to the Liang analysis of the LSIA is that items were 
deleted for multiple reasons, including "cross-construct error covariances" 1321. 
Apparently, items with relationships not fully accounted for by the model were 
deleted from the analysis. This approach suggests that the utility of the model 
was achieved to some degree by eliminatioli of some of the complex interrela-
tions among items. One might well be suspicious of this approach, however, in 
that a good solution is achieved in part through elimination of items that do not 
behave according to theory. On the other hand, the Liang and Bohlen model for 
the PGC specified multiple residual item covariances that seem to firm two 
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relatively large clusters 1341. These clusters seem to involve negative affect (anger, 
frustration) and perception of negative change in the last year (eg., loss of pep). 
There is therefore some question as to whether additional item factors could have 
been extracted, and what that would have implied for the adequacy of Subjective 
Well-Being as a second-order factor. 
Third, although estimation of the second-order Subjective Well-Being factor 
►ddresses some useful questions (as illustrated above for the CES-D), one should 
►ot prematurely close on the idea that well-being can be adequately measured 
►y a single subjective well-being scale score. Liang's results demonstrate that 
hese scales can have well-delined, multiple dimensions, and still measure a higher- 
►rder construct. However, it is important to point out that the models estimated 
y Liang do not provide a definitive test of the single second-order factor model 
n one important sense. The PGC and LSIA models specify only three first-order 
actors. In these cases, the Subjective Well-Being factor is just-identified. lust-
dentification is a technical term I cannot fully define here. It means, in essence, 
hat a solution for the parameter estimates may he calculated but that this solu-
ion places no restrictions on the model whatsoever. In this case, just-identification 
if the second-order factor loadings means that the second-order factor fits the 
ovariances among the first-order factors perfectly (and trivially so). Thus it is 
lot possible to use model restrictions to lest the adequacy of the lit of the second-
prder factors (as we did in the example with the CES-D given above). It is true 
hat Liang's estimated factor loadings arc large enough to warrant the conclusion 
hat Subjective Well-Being is a valid second-order factor. However, we cannot 
se the logic of k a to test the adequacy of the second-order factor model as a 
opresentation of the covariances among lirst-order factors. Moreover, the most 
ritical issue regarding the Subjective Well-Being factor—whether it mediates rela-
onships between first-order factors and other constructs -- is not in any way ad-
ressed in the Liang analyses. The fact that the coefficients of determination for 
►me first-order factors are about 50 percent suggests that there is at least the 
ossibility that the first-order factors (e.g., Congruence) will relate to other con-
tructions independent of Subjective Well-Being. 
The problem of a just-identified second-order factor was avoided in Liang's 
■ udy combining data from the LSIA and the ABS [61. Liang identified four item 
'dors (Congruence, Happingess 'formerly, Mood Tone', Positive Affect, and 
legative Affect) on the basis of fifteen items from the two scales 161. The Positive 
.ffect and Negative Affect factors derive from Bradburn's conceptualization of 
tese two factors of well-being 1401 and are marked by eight items from the ABS. 
t this analysis, Hang dropped the Zest item factor defined by the LSIA from 
ie model. Thus, seven of the original I.SIA items remain, marking the Con-
-uence and Happiness factors. Liang found good fits to his model, which M-
oiled a single second-order Subjective Well-Being Eictor 161. ( iiven that the fOur 
rst-order factors overidentify the SWB factor, it is possible to test the fit of the 
ngle-factor model relative to an unconstrained first-order fitctor structure. 
afortunately, this was not done (directly). Instead, hang demonstrated that the  
second-order model lit better than an orthogonal first-order factor model, and 
that adding residual covariances among first-order residuals improved the fit, but 
not by much 161. Since this latter model is just-identified at the level of the second-
order analysis, its fit would equal that of a model specifying only first-order fac-
tors. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a slight loss of fit for the model 
with Subjective Well-Being determining all first-order factors. However, Liang 
appears to he correct in his argument that the loss of fit is not substantial [61. 
The most important contribution of the Liang 161 analysis is to show that item 
factors from two separate scales relate strongly to the second-order factor, justi-
fying the argument of convergent validity for well-being. 
Conclusions that appear justified for the Subjective Well-Being factor parallel 
those outlined above lire the CES-D Depression factor. In some cases, it may 
he preferable to estimate a single scale. However, there is sufficient residual 
variance for sonic first-order factors to leave open the question of whether Sub-
jective Well-Being mediates relationships to other constructs. Moreover, Liang's 
careful approach to item selection may have pushed the analyses in the direction 
of validating the single second-order factor model. Liang found a small but signifi-
cant residual for the Positive and Negative affect factors, and one wonders if there 
might not have been positive residuals for Zest and Happiness (given the strong 
relationship of the two in the Liang analysis 1331) had the Zest factor been in-
cluded in the analysis. The conservative approach to item selection was undoubted-
ly justified, given the conlitsion in the literature on the structure of these scales. 
At this point, however, the en tphasis should he placed upon risking the model 
by adding more items and factors and testing the single second-order factor model. 
This may require new items rather than analysis of the remaining items in the 
existing scales. Nevertheless, closure on the single Subjective Well-Being factor 
as adequate to account for die first-order item factors may be premature. 
Stock, Okun, and Benin 171 have criticized Liang's 16, 33] n ► xlel for the LSIA 
and ABS on conceptual grounds, questioning Liang's first-order item factors. They 
formulated and estimated an alternative model using SEM. It is based primarily 
upon the Bradhurn perspective, emphasizing Positive and Negative Affect, but 
was also influenced by Andrews and McKennell 1431. Their first-order factors 
were Positive Affect, Negative Affect, and Cognition (in essence, items reflect-
ing an evaluation or appraisal of the significance and meaning of one's own life; 
operationally defined as items involving "social comparison, a self-to-self com-
parison over time or a life review" 17, p. 95]. These factors were specified to 
account for six ABS items (Liang used 8 161) and the eleven LSIA items used 
by Liang 1331. The model was fitted to the same data set used by Liang 16, 331. 
In addition to their own model, Stock et al. fitted an SEM model based upon 
the Hang model for the I,SIA (including Zest, Mood Tone, and Congruence as 
factors) 1331. They argued that their model lit as well or better as one based upon 
the Hang model 1331, and championed their own as being more soundly based 
upon a theory of subjective well-being. 
The Stock et al. 171 analysis obviously was conducted before the Liang 161 model 
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was known to them, for the Liang model does include Positive and Negative Af-
fect (see above). As such, the conceptual differences between the Stock et al. 
,71 model and the Liang 161 model have narrowed, relative to the Liang model 
;331. As the Liang [33] model was based upon Hoyt and Creech 1361, I shall 
mempt to avoid confusion by labeling it the Hoyt-Creech model. In any event, 
he Stock et al. analysis does not appear to be definitive with respect to which 
approach is the most appropriate basis for a model for subjective well-being 171. 
NIthough their three !actor model fits somewhat better than the Hoyt-Creech model 
specifying Zest, Mood Tone, and Congruence), it does so by adding more 
► rameters. They do achieve a small but appreciable gain in the relative fit M-
ies, but their theory specifies many factor loadings that, empirically, were either 
lot statistically reliable or of small magnitude. Their original model encountered 
mpirical identification problems that were solved by dropping an item from the 
analysis. Moreover, their model does not appear to cross-validate across two 
amples as well as the Hoyt-Creech model they estimate (or as well as the Liang 
nodel 161). There is little to differentiate their Cognition factor from the Hoyt-
'reech Congruence factor. The items that mark one factor saliently also mark 
he other, and the loadings that differ, by specification, are not large in magnitude. 
vloreover, the factor correlations Stock and colleagues report for their Hoyt-
:reech model are somewhat more consistent across the two samples than are the 
•orrelations in their preferred model. 
On the other hand, the pattern of correlations in the Stock et al. model has 
ntuitive appeal 171. They report a negative correlation of Negative Affect with 
Positive Affect and Cognition (consistent with Liang's 161 report of a negative 
.econd-order factor loading, and consistent with other work on subjective well-
icing; see above). Their factor correlations are also lower than those among the 
actors from the Hoyt-Creech model, which may have empirical advantages (e.g., 
ndependence of prediction to outcome measures). 
At this point, it would appear that both Stock et al. 171 and Liang 161 have 
)ffered important alternatives to the Hoyt-Creech formulation. Liang's model can 
le viewed as merely an extension of the basic Hoyt-Creech model to add ABS 
actors, whereas the Stock et al. model is a legitimate reformulation. It is too 
•arly to tell which model will ultimately prove more useful. Since Liang 161 deleted 
.SIA items marking Zest, and Stock et al. [71 specified three factors instead of 
_iang's four, it is difficult to make direct comparisons between the models. At 
his time, it is not known whether a live-factor model based upon Liang's 161 
!xtension of Hoyt-Creech, but reintroducing Zest, would lit appreciably better 
han the Stock et al. three' factor model 171. It is also unclear whether a single 
econd-order Subjective Well-Being factor could account for the relationships 
,mong the five factors implied by the Liang [6] extension of the Hoyt-Creech 
node'. What is clear, however, is that the debate so far has centered exclusively 
In the issue of factorial validity for alternative item models, and that it has not 
'et been extended to an additional l ►cus upon the issues of discriminant and predic- 
live validity of those factors. Additional insights will probably require moving 
beyond analysis of existing scales from large data archives to the creation of ad-
ditional item pools formed on theoretical grounds 171. With respect to the specific 
issues of selecting an optimal item model (Hoyt-Creech, Liang, Stock et al., or 
some as-yet-unspecified alternative), any definitive verdict will probably require 
I) extension of the item factors to account for new items constructed on theoretical 
grounds to load on the different factors, and 2) the ability of the different factors 
lo model relationships to other constructs (e.g., depression) and to meaningful 
outcome measures (e.g., social isolation, morbidity). 
One methodological lesson to he learned from this literature is that use of con-
firmatory factor analysis—in and of itself—does not necessarily resolve disputes 
about the empirical behavior and proper interpretation of latent variables. Resolu-
tion is dependent upon a well chosen design that clearly establishes the alternative 
models and grounds them in meaningful empirical tests. Thus the discriminative 
power of confirmatory factor models rests primarily on the measures selected 
and populations studied, and not upon the statistical procedures per se 1121. 
However, the orientation to use the logic of model falsification inherent in con-
firmatory analysis establishes the possibility that critical tests of the alternative 
models can be devised and investigated empirically. Thus one can perceive that 
a context of discovery has been created in the domain of subjective well-being 
assessment. fueled largely by the introduction of confirmatory logic and method 
into the area. work just reviewed appeals to have set the stage fur new research 
that offers a more definitive test of alternative conceptions of well-being scales. 
There is a justification for optimism that this process will ultimately lead to more 
valid measures of well-being in adult populations. 
MODELS FOR MEASUREMENT 
PROPERTIES OF SCALES 
The type of item analysis just discussed is important for demonstrating that 
individual scale items map into a summative scale (or subscales) as predicted by 
the measurement theory. One can also use confirmatory methods to test a variety 
of hypotheses about the measurement properties of the scales themselves. For 
this type of analysis, what was a first-order factor in item analysis is converted 
into an observed variable (scale), and interest lOcuses on the covariances among , 
these variables. 
Schaie and I lei tiog discuss in great detail the literature on using confirmatory 
factor analysis to estimate reliability and to assess equivalence of measurement 
properties across multiple populations 151. Here I shall focus on one recent ap-
plication of these methods, for it nicely illustrates two important concepts: I) 
the conceptual distinction between scale reliability and stability of individual 
diffe'rence's and 2) the use of alternate forms to reveal information about the 
00 / HERTZOG 
aeasurement properties of scales. The data to be discussed were originally col-
xted by Nessclroade, Mitteness, and Thompson 141, and consist of sell-ratings 
T elderly individuals of two mood state factors: Anxiety and Fatigue. The design 
;wolves a short-term retest, so that individuals were given the mood state ques-
ionnaires twice, with approximately one month intervening between administra-
ons. The three measures of state Anxiety included Spielberger's State Anxiety 
.:ale and Forms A and B of Curran and Cattell's Eight State Questionnaire 1441. 
he three measures of Fatigue were actually sets of items from the Eight State 
atigue scale. Our interest here is on the measurement properties of the Anxiety 
:ales. In particular, Nesselroade et al. demonstrated that the Anxiety and Fatigue 
ictors could be identified using confirmatory factor analysis, and that the stability 
I individual difICrences in Anxiety was substantial, but not perlixt, over the one-
ionth period 1451. Hertzog and Nesselroade 1131 reanalyzed the Nesselroade et 
. data 141, focusing on estimating the measurement properties of the Forms A 
ld B of the Eight State Questionnaire. 
The model used by Hertzog and Nesselroade is shown in Figure 2 1131. This 
.odd specified that the three scales of state anxiety loaded On an Anxiety factor, 
id that there was a residual covariance for the Spielberger scale across the Iwo 
L.:ism -einem occasions, In a series of models, I let Vol! and Nessclroade 1111 tested 
holier the Cattell Forms A and B could he considered parallel limns 1461. Parallel 
, rms are interchangeable, because they have equal reliabilities and equal 
iriances. The hypothesis of parallelism was tested by constraining factor loadings 
id residual variances (error variances of measurement) to he equal !Or Forms 
and 13 11, 21. 
Hertzog and Nesselroade also tested whether the measurement properties of 
wins A and 13 were equivalent across the two measurement occasions 1131. The 
it of equivalence over time was made by constraining these parameters equal 
rocs the first and second administrations of the questionnaires. The results 
owed clearly that I) Forms A and B were parallel, and 2) that the measure-
mt properties of Forms A and B were identical over the two occasions of 
astirement. 771c estimated reliability !Or Forms A and 13 was ./39. Clearly, the 
aril Eight State Anxiety scales have excellent measurement properties in older 
pliknions. 
The high reliabilities for the scales contrast with the moderate (but lower) 
Ibilities of individual differences in the latent variable, Anxiety. The stability 
individual differences is an important issue in gerontological research, fOr a 
ijor question is whether individuals maintain their relative differences on 
ychological attributes as they grow older 15, 471. In the Hertzog and Nesselroade 
alysis 1 I31, the stability of individual differences is reflected in the covariance 
1%veen the latent Anxiety factors over the two measurement points (0 3.1 in 
;tire 2). Using the parameter estimates from the Hertzog and Nesselroade 
dysis [131, an estimate of .72 is obtained for the correlation of the Anxiety 
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node' here is that the factor correlation is not attenuated by measurement error 
as are the correlations among the scales themselves). The implication of this disat-
Amation is that the correlation could be as high as a perfect I.() if individual 
ifferences in Anxiety were perfectly consistent across the one-month period. 
he estimated correlation was certainly greater than zero, but less than 1.0, 
► dicating individual differences in mood state change between the two times. 
stands in marked contrast to the long-ter ► stability of intelligence and per-
nudity constructs. For example, I lerizog and Schaie found that a general imrlli 
ewe factor correlated .9 or greater with itself over a seven-year longitudinal 
!st interval 1141. 
From the Hertzog and Nesselroade analysis 1131, we can conclude that those 
ho are anxious at time I are likely to be anxious at time 2, but only about 5(1 
!rcent of the variance in self-reported anxiety at time 2 can he predicted from 
ixiety levels at time I. The most important teatime of the analysis, however, 
that this stability of individual differences has been estimated in a way that 
sentangles it from reliability. We can reject the hypothesis that the less-than-
!rfect stability ill Anxiety is a function of attenuation due to measurement error. 
(inversely, the analysis shows that the lability in mood states does not imply 
at the mood state measures arc unreliable. Indeed, the Bight State Anxiety scale 
years to have very good reliability in older populations. Given that one would 
pee( mood states to fluctuate, the lability of Anxiety, and the excellent ine:isure-
c111 properties of Forms A and li, actually argue indirectly for the construct 
1104 of the scales, and suggest that they measure something different from 
e personality trait of Anxiety, which has been shown to exhibit a high degree 
stability of individual differences 1351. 
of confirmatory factor analysis for scale validation: the use of simultaneous multi-
ple groups analysis to test the equivalence of factor structures across multiple 
age groups. In a sense, this chapter provides a foundation that can be generalized 
to the case of multiple groups analysis. Technical (hut rewarding) reading on this 
topic may be found in several sources II, 4, 5, 25, 49]. Hertzog reviews a number 
of empirical applications of confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation 
models in gerontological research, including the use of multiple groups analysis 
1501. 
There are sonic disadvantages to confirmatory factor analysis for scale develop-
ment, but I will leave it to others to point them out in detail! Part of the rationale 
'Or doing so is the rapid technological advances that are currently underway. 
Techniques that avoid sonic of the assumptions of standard maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures are now generally available, both in LISREI, and com-
peting programs such as EQS 1511. Specialized methods for dealing with 
categorical and ordinal variables are also appearing 1521. The general principles 
of confirmatory factory analysis illustrated in this chapter hold fOr these newer 
techniques as well. 
The thesis of this chapter has been that confirmatory factor analysis provides 
a powerful 111•110(1 for evaluating the measurement properties of psychological 
scales. I have sought to show that confirmatory models can he profitably used 
for itch factor analysis and scale validation. As this technique becomes more 
widely understood and available, it is likely that the current literature using con-
firmatory approaches to scales of subjective well-being, as reviewed above, will 
he mirrored in other measurement domains crucial fru - the study of adult develop-
ment and aging. This is an exciting prospect, for it suggests that, as a field, we 
will he making considerable progress in evaluating the reliability and validity of 
out measures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As is always the case with a complex topic, this chapter has not covered a 
tuber of additional applications that illustrate important other features of con-
'minify factor analysis lOr scale validation. One important area, alluded to above, 
the use of confirmatory techniques for testing convergent and discriminant 
lidity of multiple scales 1251. For example, flertzog, ilultsch, and Dixon recently 
sorted results of a series of confirmatory factor analyses that show convergent 
lidity of two questionnaires measuring inetamentory (an individual's knowledge 
I beliefs about memory functioning) 1241: the Dixon and I lultsch Meta ► e ► ory 
Adulthood questionnaire 1191 and the Memory Functioning Questionnaire 148). 
e analysis by Hertzog, I lultsch, and Dixon also demonstrated the discriminant 
idity of a memory self-efficacy beliefs factor, taken from both questionnaires, 
I other psychological constructs le.g., netiroticism, internal local of control, 
I subject well-being) 1241. 
;pace did not permit an extended discussion of one ()I the chief advantages 
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Evidence for the Convergent Validity of Two Self-Report 
Metamemory Questionnaires 
Christopher Hertzog 	 David F. Hultsch and Roger A. Dixon 
Georgia Institute of Technology University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada 
Examined the convergent validity of two metamemory questionnaires: the Metamemory in Adult-
hood questionnaire (MIA) and the Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ). Confirmatory factor 
analysis showed that each instrument yields a higher-order factor labeled Memory Self-Efficacy 
(MSE) with approximately a .9 factor correlation. The analysis also showed convergence of the two 
questionnaires' scales measuring self-reported strategy use and perceived change in MSE. Simulta-
neous factor analysis in multiple cross-sectional age groups indicated that MSE has age-invariant 
factor loadings, although there was an age-related increase in the correlation of the MSE and Change 
factors. Additional models suggested (a) age differences in metamemory scales are primarily pro-
duced by age differences in MSE and (b) a minor method factor in the MFQ, producing both the 
less-than-perfect correlation of the two MSE factors and a reduced sensitivity of the MFQ to age 
differences. 
Cognitive psychologists interested in age-related changes in 
memory have hypothesized that metamemory, defined as 
knowledge and beliefs about one's own memory functioning, 
may represent a key to understanding both age changes in labo-
ratory memory task performance and the use of memory in 
everyday life (e.g., Cavanaugh, Kramer, Sinnott, Camp, & 
Marldey, 1985; Dixon & Hertzog, 1988; Hultsch, Hertzog, & 
Dixon, 1985; Perlmutter, 1978; Zelinski, Gilewski, & Thomp-
son, 1980). One approach to metamemory assessment has been 
the use of self-report questionnaires. There is currently a pleth-
ora of questionnaires in the literature (see Dixon, in press; Gi-
lewski & Zelinski, 1986). However, four questionnaires have 
found the most frequent usage in aging studies: the Short Inven-
tory of Memory Experiences (SIME; Herrmann & Neisser, 
1978), the Everyday Memory Questionnaire (EMQ; Sunder-
land, Harris, & Baddeley, 1983), the Memory Functioning 
Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski, Schaie, & Thompson, 
1983), and the Metamemory in Adulthood instrument (MIA; 
Dixon & Hultsch, 1983, 1984). Each of these questionnaires 
has apparent virtues and some apparent limitations (Gilewski 
& Zelinski, 1986). 
What is the basis, then, for selecting one or more of these 
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questionnaires for research and assessment? Answering this 
question is difficult, given that the principals have attended pri-
marily to research validating their own instruments. For exam-
ple, Dixon and Hultsch (1983) showed that the MIA's multiple 
subscales have good reliability and factorial validity. However, 
further work investigating the construct validity (e.g., Cronbach 
& Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1981) of metamemory questionnaires 
for adult populations is critically needed (Dixon, in press; 
Dixon & Hertzog, 1988; Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986; Herrmann, 
1982). 
The dimensionality of the metamemory construct is a central 
issue in evaluating the validity of metamemory questionnaires. 
How many differentiable constructs exist in the broad domain 
of metamemory? How ought the general domain and the spe-
cific constructs be conceptualized? It appears clear that there 
are multiple dimensions of metamemory. One organizing prin-
ciple for conceptualizing the domain is the distinction between 
knowledge about memory mechanisms, processes, and failures 
and beliefs about one's own memory abilities, strengths, and 
weaknesses (see Dixon, in press; Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg, 
& Hultsch, 1987; Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & Davidson, 1988). 
Our approach to this issue is informed by Bandura's (1986) 
concept of self-efficacy. This concept provides a fruitful theoret-
ical framework for conceptualizing the metamemory domain 
(Cavanaugh et al., 1985; Hultsch et al., 1985; Lachman, 1986; 
West, Berry, & Dennehy, 1987). The self-efficacy perspective is 
consistent with the distinction between memory knowledge and 
memory beliefs. Consistent with Bandura (1986), memory self-
efficacy can be defined as beliefs about one's own capability to 
use memory effectively in various situations. The differentia-
tion of knowledge about memory from memory self-efficacy al-
lows for the possibility that an older individual may have exten-
sive and accurate knowledge about how memory functions but 
may also believe that his or her ability to remember in a given 
context is poor. The concept of memory self-efficacy also makes 
it possible to entertain questions concerning the accuracy of 
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memory beliefs (Langer, 1981; Sunderland, Watts, Baddeley, & 
Harris, 1986; West, Boatwright, & Schleser, 1984) and to de-
velop intervention techniques designed to identify and amelio-
rate negative self-efficacy beliefs so as to enhance the effective 
functioning of the individual (Bandura, 1986; Zarit, 1982). 
The broad distinction between knowledge and beliefs is not 
sufficient to capture the full range of constructs commonly sub-
sumed under metamemory. Hultsch et al. (1988) have suggested 
four broad subdomains of metamemory: memory knowledge, 
memory monitoring, memory self-efficacy, and memory-re-
lated affect. Each, in turn, can be subdivided into multiple spe-
cific constructs, more akin to the specific scales contained in 
the multidimensional instruments like the MIA and the MFQ. 
Gilewski and Zelinski (1986) identify 10 dimensions of meta-
memory, the most important of which they labeled frequency 
of forgetting. This label is consistent with the format of items 
from the SIME and the MFQ, which ask individuals to rate how 
often they forget specific types of information. 
Incidents of forgetting are undoubtedly a source of informa-
tion that individuals use to create and update memory self-
efficacy beliefs. In a sense, then, the actual frequency of forget-
ting is likely to be a proximal determinant of memory self-
efficacy. However, it seems highly probable that the proximal 
cause of self-reported frequency of forgetting is not true fre-
quency of forgetting but, rather, memory self-efficacy beliefs. 
This hypothesis is based on evidence that individuals' self-re-
ports are often based on access to generalized beliefs and self-
schemata—the stable representations of self that are products 
of a self-appraisal process (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Wyer & 
Srull, 1986)—rather than access to specific, discrete episodes in 
memory. It is improbable that individuals base a frequency of 
forgetting estimate on an exhaustive retrieval search of memory 
for incidents of forgetting. A more plausible representation of 
frequency report behavior is that individuals access beliefs 
about their memory self-efficacy and then convert these beliefs 
into a frequency estimate. 
This perspective on self-reported frequency of forgetting pre-
dicts substantial correlations between superficially different 
questions about remembering and forgetting. At least two MIA 
scales appear to measure related aspects of memory self-effi-
cacy: beliefs about current levels of memory ability (Capacity) 
and beliefs about the degree of change in capacity from early 
adulthood (Change). We hypothesize that the MFQ also con-
tains multiple scales that may be subsumed under the self-effi-
cacy category, especially including those related to the fre-
quency of forgetting dimension. 
Appreciation of the knowledge/beliefs distinction can alter 
inferences regarding metamemory scale validity. For example, 
Gilewski and Zelinski (1986) criticized the EMQ and the Inven-
tory for Memory Experiences (IME) for their lack of sensitivity 
to age differences (e.g., Chaffin & Herrmann, 1983) and recom-
mended the MIA and the MFQ instead. The implicit basis for 
their concern seems to be the premise that, given age differences 
in memory functioning, a valid measure of metamemory ought 
also to display age differences. This assumption presumes, how-
ever, that memory self-ratings are accurate. Alternatively, the 
IME may be a valid measure of memory self-efficacy, yet fail to 
show age differences because older persons' self-efficacy beliefs 
do not change in accordance with changes in their actual mem- 
ory capacity. This perspective suggests the hypothesis that the 
IME validly measures the memory self-efficacy construct, but 
that this construct has little predictive utility for memory task 
performance. 
Ironically, Hultsch, Hertzog, and Dixon (1987) recently re-
ported finding no significant age differences on the MFQ Fre-
quency of Forgetting scale in samples also yielding significant 
age differences on the MIA measure of memory capacity. 
Hultsch et al. (1987) did find significant mean differences be-
tween a group of older adults and university students for other 
MFQ scales. However, a different cross-sectional sample of 
adults, in which age varied continuously from 20 to 78, yielded 
only marginally significant differences on these same MFQ 
scales, but robust age differences on the MIA Capacity, Change, 
and Locus scales. The MIA's greater sensitivity to age differ-
ences does not necessarily imply that the MIA is more valid 
than the MFQ as an instrument for measuring metamemory. 
The larger age differences could reflect the influence of an age-
related source of systematic measurement error. However, the 
pattern of the Hultsch et al. (1987) results raises an interesting 
question. Does differential sensitivity to age effects refute the 
hypothesis that the MIA and MFQ scales converge to measure 
memory self-efficacy? 
This study is part of an ongoing research project designed to 
examine the construct validity of the MIA and the MFQ. We 
use confirmatory factor analysis and structural regression 
models to test the convergent, discriminant, and predictive va-
lidity of related MIA and MFQ subscales. Although a complete 
assessment of construct validity requires attention to all of these 
aspects of validity, this report focuses on a complex set of analy-
ses examining the convergence of the MIA and MFQ. Conver-
gent validity refers to the degree to which scales from the two 
questionnaires actually measure the same underlying con-
structs. Although their construct domains do not overlap com-
pletely (e.g., the MIA, but not the MFQ, measures affect about 
memory), they do appear to overlap in (a) measures of memory 
self-efficacy, (b) measures of perceived change in memory func-
tioning, and (c) measures of self-reported memory strategies 
(principally, use of external memory aids). 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) argued that convergent validity 
implied that measures of the same construct correlate more 
highly with each other than with measures of different con-
structs (discriminant validity; see also Cook & Campbell, 
1979). Although this implication is correct, the convergence hy-
pothesis is inadequately assessed by inspection of, zero-order 
correlations for several reasons. First, higher correlations do not 
necessarily imply that two variables measure the same con-
struct; instead, they may measure different but correlated con-
structs. Second, magnitudes of correlations are attenuated by 
the reliability and validity of the measures. Hence, low corre-
lations may reflect low reliability, low validity, or both, rather 
than the influence of different constructs on eack measure. Al-
though inferences that are based on differential magnitudes of 
pairs of correlation may often be accurate, the possible biasing 
effect of combination of differential reliabilities and validities 
can lead to errors of inference regarding discriminant validity. 
Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation models 
provide an attractive set of methods for addressing construct 
validity (e.g., Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Bentler, 1978; hire- 
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skog, 1974). A principle advantage is that the latent variable 
model is fit to the entire set of correlations, providing a more 
direct representation of the convergent and discriminant valid-
ity hypothesis. This in turn provides a more stringent falsifica-
tion test of the model for the latent constructs. The constructs 
determining a set of measures are operationally defined as la-
tent variables (factors) in these models. Figure 1 illustrates two 
alternative methods for representing convergence with latent 
variables, both of which are used in the present study. In Panel 
A, two measures (X i and X4) are each determined by the same 
latent construct (Memory Self-Efficacy). In Panel B, two latent 
Memory Self-Efficacy constructs are each defined by three mea-
sures, and the issue of convergence is assessed by evaluating the 
magnitude of the correlation between the constructs. 
When using confirmatory factor models for construct valid-
ity, relations among constructs are represented at the level of 
factor correlations (as represented by the curved arrow in Fig-
ure 1). Estimates of factor correlations are disattenuated for 
measurement error in the individual measures (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). Because the upper bound of a disattenuated 
correlation between two factors is 1.0, it becomes meaningful 
to test whether the correlation of two latent variables is 1.0 and 
to use this test as a test of convergence (see Joreskog, 1974). If 
the factor correlation does not differ from 1.0, there will be no 
cost in reformulating the model to have a single latent variable 
determining all measures. The advantage of the two-factor ap-
proach is that it does not assume convergence but directly tests 
the convergence hypothesis. 
Rejection of the hypothesis that the factor correlation is 1.0 
implies either that (a) the factors are determined by related but 
distinct constructs or (b) the factors are measures of the same 
construct, but that systematic sources of variance influence 
measures of the same factor (i.e., method variance). The latter 
possibility can be assessed by using a confirmatory factor analy-
sis of a multitrait/multimethod design (Joreskog, 1974; Long, 
1983; Widaman, 1985). That approach is not possible in this 
study, because the constructs measured by the MIA and the 
MFQ do not completely overlap, and, thus, the trait and 
method factors are underdetermined. 
Previous factor analyses of the MFQ and the MIA support 
the contention that there are higher-order dimensions in both 
questionnaires. Gilewski et al. (1983) found that several MFQ 
scales loaded on their Frequency of Forgetting factor. Hertzog 
et al. (1987) reported that the MIA scales of Capacity, Change, 
Anxiety, and Locus all loaded on a dimension interpreted as 
Memory Self-Efficacy. In the present study, the hypothesis that 
multiple scales of the MIA and the MFQ are related to memory 
self-efficacy is represented in a model with separate memory 
self-efficacy factors for each questionnaire. This specification 
enables a test of the hypothesis that these latent variables have 
a 1.0 correlation. 
Method 
Subjects 
Two samples were included in the study. One sample was drawn from 
a medium-size western Canadian city (Victoria, British Columbia). The 
second sample was drawn from a semirural area in the eastern United 
States (Annville, Pennsylvania). We included only those cases with com- 
plete data on the metamemory scales (see below) in this report. The 
Victoria sample consisted of 360 individuals, 96 university students (age 
range = 20-26 years; M = 22.11, SD = 1.85) and 264 older adults (age 
range = 55-78 years; M = 65.88, SD = 5.45), whereas the Annville 
sample included 415 adults (age range = 20-78 years; M = 52.33 years, 
SD = 13.67). There were slightly more women than men in both sam-
ples. All subjects were paid volunteers. Subjects generally reported 
themselves to be in good to excellent health. Years of education ranged 
from 6 to 22 years in the Annville sample (M = 13.47, SD = 2.95) and 
from 2 to 24 years in the Victoria sample (M = 13.74, SD = 3.32). The 
Victoria area is a prime retirement location in Canada and tends to 
produce relatively select samples of older adult volunteers. A compari-
son of Annville adults, 56 to 78 years of age, with Victoria adults showed 
Victoria adults to have somewhat greater mean years of education (t = 
2.49, p < .05). Moreover, the Victoria adult sample scored, on average, 
one standard deviation above the Annville older adults in a measure of 
recognition vocabulary (see Hultsch et al., 1987). Mean vocabulary in 
the Annville older adults was 35.11 (SD = 10.65), whereas the mean 
vocabulary score for the Victoria adults was 43.34 (SD = 7.71), which 
A. 
B 
1 . 0 ? 
Figure I. Two alternative methods of representing convergent validity 
in latent variable models. (In Panel A, two indicators load on a single 
factor. In Panel B, multiple indicators load on two different factors, with 
convergence reflected in the magnitude of the factor correlation.) 
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was a highly significant difference (1 = 100.37, p < .001). Additional 
details regarding the samples may be found in Hultsch et al. (1987). 
Measures and Procedures 
Participants from both samples completed a set of questionnaires and 
tasks measuring metamemory, social desirability, personal control, 
affective state, verbal comprehension, and memory performance (free 
recall of word lists and texts). These instruments were administered in 
two 2-hr sessions to small groups of 5 to 15 participants. In this report, 
we analyze data from the two metamemory questionnaires, which were 
given during the first session. The questionnaires were given in invariant 
order, with the MIA first and the MFQ second. Three affective state 
questionnaires were administered between the MIA and the MFQ: (a) 
the Spielberger State Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1969), (b) a reduced version of the Eight State Questionnaire (Curran 
& Cattell, 1976), and (c) a mood adjective rating scale, using adjectives 
from the Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr, & Droppelman, 1971) 
and from a scale developed by Lebo and Nesselroade (1978). 
The Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) scale (Dixon & Hultsch, 
1983, 1984) contained 108 items, in a 5-point Likert response format, 
from seven subscales. The Activity subscale was dropped from the origi-
nal 120-item scale. The remaining seven subscales are presented in Ta-
ble 1. Prior work with multiple samples has reported internal consis-
tency reliabilities ranging from .74 to .93 for the subscales (Hultsch et 
al., 1988). The Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ), developed 
by Gilewski et al. (1983; see Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986) contains 64 
items, in a 7-point Likert format, tapping multiple dimensions of meta-
memory. Gilewski et al. (1983) reported internal consistency reliability 
estimates ranging from .82 to .93 across MFQ scales. Table 2 presents 
descriptive information about the MFQ subscales. The MFQ focuses 
on memory problems and frequency of forgetting in specific domains 
(e.g., forgetting appointments). This results in primarily negatively 
worded items. The MIA requires ratings of a mixture of specific and 
general statements, using both positive and negative wording. The MIA 
Capacity scale, found by Hertzog et al. (1987) to be the best indicator 
of memory self-efficacy, uses mostly items with positive wording. 
Scoring for all scales was accomplished by summing Likert responses 
with reverse scoring of MIA items where appropriate (Dixon & Hultsch, 
1984). For this analysis, cases with missing data on item responses were 
handled in the following way. If the scale was missing roughly 20% of 
item responses, its scale score was coded as missing. If there were fewer 
missing responses, the item was assigned the sample item mean prior 
to scale score calculation. Specific criteria for missing value assignment 
for each scale are reported in Tables I and 2. Only cases with complete 
data on the scale scores were included in the analysis.' 
An examination of the MFQ items suggested that its General Rating, 
Frequency of Forgetting, and Remembering Past Events scales measure 
interrelated aspects of Memory Self-Efficacy. A separate section of the 
MFQ measures self-reported memory problems for reading materials. 
The items in this section also seemed to be related to Memory Self-
Efficacy, although it seemed plausible that their specificity would result 
in a less-than-perfect correlation between these items and Memory Self-
Efficacy. In their analysis, Gilewski et al. (1983) found one common 
factor with high loadings on the Frequency of Forgetting, Remembering 
Past Events, and General Rating indicators. In that analysis, the two 
separate reading sections of the MFQ (frequency of forgetting books, 
frequency of forgetting magazines) were combined into a single vari-
able. 
Independent of the Memory Self-Efficacy construct, there may be 
convergence between other pairs of scales from the two questionnaires. 
Two cases are important. First, both questionnaires contain a scale that 
asks individuals to assess perceived change in memory (the MIA Change 
and the MFQ Retrospective Functioning scales). Measures of perceived  
change in memory show larger age differences than other measures of 
metamemory (e.g., Hultsch et al., 1987). Therefore, although perceived 
change indicators may be primary markers of Memory Self-Efficacy, it 
is plausible that they would form a factor that is independent of Memory 
Self-Efficacy. Second, both questionnaires contain a self-reported strat-
egy use scale (the MIA Strategy and the MFQ Mnemonics scales). Our 
expectation on the basis of Hertzog et al. (1987) was that these scales 
would form a Memory Knowledge factor along with the MLA Task and 
Achievement scales. 
Statistical Procedures 
We evaluated convergent validity by conducting factor analysis using 
the LISREL vi program of Joreskog and Sorbom (1984). (Readers inter-
ested in an introduction to the use of LISREL for confirmatory factor 
analysis should consult Long, 1983, or Hayduk, 1987.) LISREL contains 
the following three relevant parameter matrices in its measurement 
model: (a) a factor pattern matrix, containing regressions of variables 
on factors (factor loadings), (b) a factor covariance matrix, and (c) a 
residual covariance matrix, containing residual (unique) variances and 
residual covariances. All models reported here fixed all residual covari-
ances to zero. In the analyses with entire samples, the model used a 
correlation matrix and standardized all three parameter matrices. The 
simultaneous factor analyses with multiple age groups analyzed covari-
ance matrices in order to get appropriate comparisons of model param-
eters across groups (JOreskog, 1971; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). 
The LISREL program provides maximum likelihood estimates for fac-
tor loadings, factor correlations, and unique variances, as well as stan-
dard errors for these estimates. It also computes a likelihood ratio chi-
square test of the goodness of fit of the model to the sample data. The 
null hypothesis for the chi-square test is that the sample covariance (or 
correlation) matrix is drawn from a population matrix that is deter-
mined by the factor model specified. With large samples, the chi-square 
test may be significant even when discrepancies between the fitted and 
observed covariance matrices are small. For this reason, LISREL also 
reports goodness-of-fit indices that are less heavily influenced by sample 
size. Our multiple groups analyses also report an analagous goodness-
of-fit statistic that is based on the Bender and Bonett (1980) normed-
fit indices. These indices reflect the proportion of information in the 
covariance matrix that is accounted for by the model (see Muiaik et al., 
1989, for more detail). Fit indices above .9 are often treated as accept-
able, although proper evaluation of a model also requires attention to 
the salience and interpretability of parameter estimates and the fit to 
each sample variance and covariance. 
Any application of LISREL or related techniques usually involves 
some combination of model testing and model development. As argued 
elsewhere (Hertzog, in press), it is appropriate to use LISREL for model 
development as long as (a) a clear distinction is maintained between 
confirmatory and exploratory research purposes, (b) tests of statistical 
hypotheses using LISREL are not necessarily treated as disconfirmation 
tests of substantive hypotheses formulated a priori, (c) models devel-
oped on the basis of sample data are cross-validated in one or more 
independent samples, and (d) substantive inferences from exploratory 
modeling are treated as provisional hypotheses to be subjected to later 
disconfirmation tests. 
Consistent with this perspective, the present analysis, conducted in 
three phases, combined exploratory and confirmatory approaches. 
First, we developed a model using LISREL to specify and test alternative 
models for the data from the Annville sample data. The purpose of 
this phase was to determine (a) if the MIA Memory Self-Efficacy - and 
' The sole exception was the single item General Memory Rating in 
the MFQ. Twenty-eight Annville and 23 Victoria participants who were 
missing this single item were assigned their respective sample mean. 
Knowledge and use of information about one's 
remembering abilities so that performance in given 
instances is potentially improved 
(+ = high use) 
Knowledge of basic memory processes, especially 
that are interesting as evidenced by how most 
people perform 
(+ = high knowledge) 
Perception of memory capacities as evidenced by 
rating of performance on given tasks 
(+ = high capacity) 
Perception of memory abilities as generally stable or 
subject to long-term decline 
(+ = stability) 
Feelings of stress related to memory performance 
(+ = high anxiety) 
Perceived importance of having a good memory and 
performing well on memory tasks 
(+ = high achievement) 
Perceived personal control over remembering abilities 
(+ = internality) 
Do you write appointments on a calendar to help you 
remember them? 
For most people, facts that are interesting are easier 
to remember than facts that are not. 
I am good at remembering names. 
The older I get the harder it is to remember things 
clearly. 
I do not get flustered when 1 am put on the spot to 
remember new things. 
It is very important that I am very accurate when 
remembering names of people. 
Even if I work on it, my memory ability will go 
downhill. 
Strategy (18, 3) 
Task (15, 2) 
Capacity (17, 3) 
Change (18, 3) 
Anxiety (14, 2) 
Achievement (16, 2) 
Locus (9, 2) 










Note. Based on Dixon and Hultach, 1983. The first number in the parentheses after each dimension represents the total items; the second number 
represents the missing items allowed (with item mean substitution). 
Table 2 
A Priori Subscales of the Memory Functioning Questionnaire 
Subscale 	 Sample item 
How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds of problems you have? 
(+ no problems) 
How is your memory compared to what it was . . . (a) 1 year ago? 
(+ - much better) 
How often do these present a memory problem for you . . . (a) names? 
(+ never) 
As you are reading a novel, how often do you have trouble remembering what you have 
read . . . (a) in opening chapters, once you have finished the book? 
(+ = never) 
When you are reading a newspaper or magazine article, how often do you have trouble 
remembering what you have read . . . (a) in the opening paragraphs, once you have 
finished the article? 
(+ never) 
How well do you remember things that occurred . . . (a) last month? 
(+ = very good) 
When you actually forget in these situations, how serious of a problem do you consider 
the memory failure to be . . . (a) names. 
(+ = not serious) 
How often do you use these techniques to remind yourself about things ... (a) keep an 
appointment book. 
(+ = never) 
General rating (1, 1) 
Retrospective functioning (5, I ) 
Frequency of forgetting (18, 2) 
Frequency of forgetting when reading novels (5, 1) 
Frequency of forgetting when reading newspapers 
and magazines (5, 1) 
Remembering past events (4, 1) 
Seriousness (18, 2) 
Mnemonics (8, 2) 
Note. Based on Gilewski, Zelinski, Schaie, & Thompson, 1983. The first number in the parentheses after each dimension represents the total items; 
the second number represents the missing items allowed (with item mean substitution). 
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Table 3 
Correlations Among Metamemory in Adulthood Scales for the Two Samples 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Strategy 0.20 -0.17 -0.17 0.32 0.29 0.03 
2. Task 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.02 
3. Capacity -0.07 0.00 0.65 -0.47 0.12 0.40 
4. Change -0.10 -0.15 0.62 -0.47 -0.05 0.42 
5. Anxiety 0.20 0.16 -0.51 -0.57 0.34 -0.15 
6. Achievement 0.28 0.28 0.16 -0.09 0.27 0.28 
7. Locus 0.10 0.02 0.31 0.43 -0.25 0.25 
Note. Correlations for the Annville sample are above the diagonal; those for the Victoria sample are below 
the diagonal. 
Knowledge factors that were identified by Hertzog et al. (1987) would 
be replicated, (b) if the hypothesized MFQ Memory Self-Efficacy factor 
would be found, and (c) if the convergent Strategy and Change factors 
could be estimated. Second, the accepted model for the Annville data 
was replicated (cross-validated) in the Victoria adult sample. The Victo-
ria student sample was excluded to avoid possible effects of pooling over 
a discontinuous age variable. Finally, a multiple-groups factor analysis 
was run on all participants to determine the age-related invariance in 
the joint factor structure of the two scales. 
Results 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 report zero-order correlations between the 
MIA and the MFQ scales in both samples. The MFQ Serious-
ness scale had near-zero correlations with all other scales and, 
hence, was eliminated from further factor analysis. An exami-
nation of the other correlations led to a reassessment of the hy-. 
pothesis that we would obtain the Memory Knowledge factor 
that was identified by Hertzog et al. (1987). The zero-order cor-
relations among the MIA Task, Strategy, Locus, and Achieve-
ment scales were lower than in the original Dixon and Hultsch 
(1983) validation samples. In fact, the low correlation of MIA 
Task with these MIA subscales and the MFQ Mnemonics sub-
scale was a telling finding, for it indicated that simply stripping 
off the affect-related MIA scales, such as Achievement, from the 
factor would not result in a well-defined Knowledge factor. 
This outcome made it necessary to explore a few alternative 
models that did not specify the Memory Knowledge factor. The  
revised model specified two Memory Self-Efficacy factors, one 
for each questionnaire, an MFQ Reading Self-Efficacy factor 
(marked by problems remembering novels and problems re-
membering newspapers and magazines), a Strategy Use factor, 
a Memory-Related Affect factor (marked chiefly by MIA 
Achievement), a Change factor (marked by MIA Change, MFQ 
Retrospective Functioning, and MIA Locus), and MIA Task 
(treated as a separate, single-indicator "factor"). During esti-
mation of the revised model, we encountered a negative unique 
variance for MIA Strategy. This phenomenon, termed a Hey-
wood case, is a familiar problem in latent variable modeling, 
especially when only two indicators are available for a factor 
(e.g., Van Driel, 1978). The residual variance for MIA Strategy 
was subsequently fixed to zero. Empirical identification of the 
Change factor, independent of Memory Self-Efficacy, was 
achieved by fixing correlations of Change with factors other 
than Memory Self-Efficacy to zero. 
The model fit the Annville sample data well. The likelihood 
ratio x2(57, N = 415) was 91.44 (p = .003), but the LISREL 
goodness-of-fit index (GFI) was .970. Given that the model had 
been modified on the basis of fit to the Annville sample, this 
excellent level of fit may have been spurious. Therefore, we 
cross-validated the model in the Victoria older adult sample. 
Again, the fit was good: x 2(57, N= 264) = 60.34, p = .36 (GFI = 
.969). Given that the LISREL GFI indices exceeded .9 in both 
samples, it seemed clear that the significance of x 2 in the Ann- 
Table 4 
Correlations Among Memory Functioning Questionnaire Scales for the Two Samples 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. General rating 0.24 0.39 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.04 -0.03 
2. Retrospective 
functioning 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.02 -0.00 
3. Frequency 
forgetting 0.45 0.29 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.11 -0.08 
4. Forgetting 
novels 0.37 0.13 0.55 0.73 0.40 0.05 -0.03 
5. Forgetting 
magazine 0.37 0.10 0.52 0.72 0.44 0.05 -0.05 
6. Past events 0.41 0.24 0.62 0.50 0.44 0.06 -0.06 
7. Mnemonics 0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.04 
8. Seriousness -0.15 -0.20 -0.24 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 -0.04 
Note. Correlations for the Annville sample are above the diagonal; those for the Victoria sample are below 
the diagonal. 
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Table 5 
Correlations Between the Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) and the Mental Functioning 
Questionnaire (MFQ) Scales for the Two Samples 
MFQ scales 
MIA scales 
Strategy Task Capacity Change Anxiety Achievement Locus 
General 
Annville sample 
rating -0.12 0.04 0.35 0.35 -0.33 -0.12 0.12 
Retrospective 
functioning -0.09 -0.08 0.26 0.36 -0.18 0.01 0.25 
Frequency 
forgetting -0.20 0.10 0.67 0.56 -0.60 -0.07 0.26 
Forgetting 
novels -0.06 0.20 0.52 0.33 -0.39 -0.05 0.16 
Forgetting 
magazines -0.11 0.11 0.49 0.28 -0.41 -0.06 0.14 
Past events -0.14 0.03 0.58 0.43 -0.38 0.07 0.20 
Mnemonics -0.72 -0.18 0.05 0.04 -0.17 -0.20 -0.03 
Seriousness -0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
Victoria sample 
General 
rating -0.05 0.04 0.35 0.39 -0.34 -0.05 0.22 
Retrospective 
functioning 0.04 -0.04 0.27 0.38 -0.14 0.04 0.24 
Frequency 
forgetting -0.09 0.02 0.64 0.57 -0.54 0.03 0.32 
Forgetting 
novels -0.09 0.00 0.51 0.34 -0.40 -0.03 0.20 
Forgetting 
magazines -0.10 0.01 0.43 0.32 -0.38 -0.08 0.14 
Past events -0.11 -0.01 0.60 0.47 -0.37 0.11 0.28 
Mnemonics -0.70 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.17 -0.14 
Seriousness 0.01 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 0.13 -0.05 -0.07 
Ville sample was a function of the larger sample size (and higher 
power). 
Table 6 reports the factor loadings and associated standard 
errors from this model. for both samples. The solutions were 
quite similar. Capacity had the highest loading on the MIA 
Memory Self-Efficacy factor, but Anxiety and Change displayed 
substantial loadings as well. MIA Locus loaded about equally 
on MIA Memory Self-Efficacy, Memory-Related Affect, and 
Change factors. Frequency of Forgetting produced the largest 
loading on MFQ Memory Self-Efficacy, followed by the Re-
membering Past Events and General Rating variables. The 
MFQ Reading Self-Efficacy factor was well-defined by the two 
MFQ Reading Frequency of Forgetting variables. The Memory-
Related Affect factor was defined almost exclusively by MIA 
Achievement. 
Table 7 reports the estimated factor correlations and stan-
dard errors for both samples. These factor correlations are dis-
attenuated for measurement error, so they have a true possible 
range of -1 to 1 and may be larger than would commonly be 
expected on the basis of empirically obtained zero-order corre-
lations among individual measures. Table 7 contains the crucial 
information regarding the question of convergent validity-the 
correlation between the MIA and the MFQ Memory Self-
Efficacy factors. If it were the case that the scales from the two  
questionnaires both measure the same Memory Self-Efficacy 
construct, then the correlation between the two factors ought to 
be 1. For the Annville sample, the estimated correlation was 
.99 and was within one standard error of 1.0. For the Victoria 
sample, the 99% confidence interval's upper bound was .97, so 
the hypothesis that the correlation of the two Memory Self-
Efficacy factors was 1.0 was rejected. 
The hypothesis of convergence can be put to a formal likeli-
hood ratio test by fixing the correlations between the two Mem-
ory Self-Efficacy factors to l and constraining the facto!' corre-
lations between each Memory Self-Efficacy factor and all other 
factors to be equal (Joreskog, 1974). The difference in chi-
square, between this more restricted model and the model that 
freely estimates the correlation (with no equality constraints on 
other factor correlations), tested the null hypothesis that the two 
factors were equivalent. For the Annville sample, the restricted 
model yielded a chi-square (df = 63, N = 415) of 107.55. There-
fore, the hypothesis test of equivalent factors was rejected, x 2(6, 
N = 415) = 16.15, p < .05. For the Victoria sample, the same 
difference was highly significant, x 2(6, N = 264) = 30.50, p < 
.01. Rejection of the equivalence hypothesis in the Annville 
sample was surprising, given the estimated correlation of .99 
between the factors (see above). Inspection of the factor corre-
lations in Table 7 suggested that questionnaire differences in 
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Table 6 
Factor Loadings of Metamemory Scales for the Two Samples 
Scale 
MSEMIA MSENFQ MSERD 
Annville Victoria Annville Victoria Annville Victoria 
A SE 	A SE A 	SE A SE A 	SE A SE 
Strategy 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
Task 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
Capacity 84 05 	84 06 - 0 0 0 0 
Change 51 06 61 08 - 0 0 0 0 
Anxiety —63 04 	—70 06 0 	— 0 0 0 
Achievement 0 - 	 0 — 0 — 0 0 0 
Locus 25 06 28 08 0 	— 0 — - 0 0 _ 
General 
rating 0 - 	 0 45 	05 54 06 0 	_ 0 _ 
Retrospective 
functioning 0 - 	 0 — 15 	06 22 08 0 	_ 0 _ 
Frequency 
forgetting 0 0 85 	04 85 05 0 	_ 0 — 
Forgetting 
novels 0 0 0 	— 0 — 86 	04 88 06 
Forgetting 
magazines 0 0 0 	— 0 — 85 	04 82 06 
Past events o 0 65 05 74 06 0 o — 
Mnemonics 0 0 0 	— 0 — 0 0 
Strategy Affect Change 
Annville Victoria Annville Victoria Annville Victoria 
Scale A SE 	A SE A 	SE A SE A 	SE A SE 
Strategy 1.0 1.0 0 0 0 — 0 
Task 0 0 0 0 0 — 0 
Capacity 0 0 24 07 31 08 0 — 0 
Change 0 0 0 0 50 07 51 10 
Anxiety 0 0 33 07 17 07 0 — 0 
Achievement 0 0 85 07 94 09 0 — 0 
Locus 0 0 34 05 30 06 34 07 34 09 
General 
rating 0 0 0 — 0 0 — 0 — 
Retrospective 
functioning 0 0 0 0 33 07 35 09 
Frequency 
forgetting 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 
Frequency 
novels 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 
Forgetting 
magazines 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 
Past events 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 
Mnemonics —72 04 —70 05 0 — 0 0 0 
Note. MSE = Memory Self-Efficacy; MIA = Metamemory in Adulthood scale; MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; RD = Reading. 
Decimals are omitted for SEs. Fixed parameters have no standard errors, which is indicated by a dash in the SE columns. Lambdas denote factor 
loadings. 
the correlation of Memory Self-Efficacy with Change may have 
been a primary source of the poorer fit of the factor-equivalence 
model. Either (a) the two factors are correlated, but different, 
or (b) the scales are, indeed, measuring the same construct, ex-
cept for the influence of questionnaire-specific sources of sys-
tematic measurement error (e.g., method variance). Given the 
high correlations between the factors in both samples, the latter 
alternative seemed more plausible. 
Other factor correlations reported in Table 7 merit discus- 
sion. Change correlated significantly with both Memory Self-
Efficacy factors, and in the expected direction (high Change 
with low Memory Self-Efficacy). The MFQ Reading Self-Effi-
cacy factor correlated highly with both Memory Self-Efficacy 
factors. Strategy had a modest but significant correlation with 
Memory Affect. The correlation of the other factors with Mem-
ory Self-Efficacy was relatively low. In particular, the MIA Task 
variable had nonsignificant correlations with both Memory 
Self-Efficacy factors. 
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Table 7 
Factor Correlations in the Two Samples 
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Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. MSEtAA 99 (03) 72 (04) –29 (06) –11 (11) 05 (06) 49 (08) 
2. MSEHFQ 87 (04) 77 (03) –22 (05) –08 (07) 11 (05) 31 (07) 
3. MSERD 67 (05) 75 (04) –09 (05) –07 (06) 19 (05) 0 (—) 
4. Strategy –22 (07) –12 (07) –11 (07) 34 (05) 20 (05) 0(—) 
5. Affect –17 (10) –06 (07) –06 (07) 30 (06) 19 (06) 0 (—) 
6. Task –12 (07) 04 (07) 01 (07) 08 (06) 30 (06) 0 (—) 
7. Change 34 (H) 31 (09) 0 (—) 0 (—) 0 (—) 0 (—) 
Note. MSE = Memory Self-Efficacy; MIA = Metamemory in Adulthood scale; MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; RD -= Reading. 
Correlations for the Annville sample are above the diagonal; those for the Victoria sample are below the diagonal. Decimals are omitted for all 
values. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Dashes denote fixed parameters. 
Multiple-Age-Group Analyses 
The next phase consisted of a simultaneous, multiple-groups 
analysis that enabled us to test the hypothesis of age differences 
in factor loadings. The two samples were each divided into two 
age groups. We split the Annville sample into an older group 
(56 to 78 years) and a younger group (20 to 55 years). In the 
Victoria sample, the student group was analyzed separately 
from the older adults. Thus, there were four age groups for the 
analysis. We analyzed covariance matrices so that between-
groups tests of invariance in factor pattern weights would be 
meaningful (Rireslcog, 1971; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). 
The first model used the same specification reported above 
for all four age groups. It placed no between-groups constraints 
on the model parameters. The second model tested the hypothe-
sis that all age groups had equivalent factor loadings by con-
straining this matrix equally across the four groups. As can be 
seen from the first model comparison in Table 8, Model 2 did 
not fit significantly worse than the Model 1, implying that the 
groups did not differ significantly in factor loadings. This result 
was somewhat surprising, for it disagreed with previous work 
where we found significant age group differences in the loadings 
of the MIA scales on a Memory Self-Efficacy factor (Hertzog et 
al., 1987). Model 3 suggested an explanation of the discrepancy. 
It forced age-group equivalence in the factor covariance matri-
ces. Comparison 2 in Table 8 shows that this model fit signifi-
cantly worse than the model with constraints on factor pattern 
weights alone (Model 2). We then tested the hypothesis that 
these differences were associated primarily with the Change fac-
tor by examining the group equivalence in Change factor vari-
ances and the covariances of Change with the Memory Self-
Efficacy factors. Model 4, allowing these variances and covari-
ances to differ across groups, fit better than Model 3. Thus, we 
concluded that there were significant age-group differences in 
the relationship of the Change factor to the Memory Self-Effi-
cacy factor. As might be expected, Change covaried more highly 
with Memory Self-Efficacy in the old groups. Inspection of the 
remaining factor variances from Model 2 suggested that the 
other significant differences were primarily associated with the 
factor variances in the Victoria younger group. They were much 
less variable in all three self-efficacy factors, but more variable 
in Strategy and Task. 
Table 9 reports the rescaled factor correlations for the four 
different age groups. Given that the Annville sample spanned a 
larger age range than the Victoria adult sample, it was possible 
that the near-perfect correlation between the two Memory Self-
Efficacy factors had been produced by age heterogeneity. As can 
be seen in Table 9, the factor correlations in the two Annville 
groups remained quite high. In general, the magnitude of corre-
lations was similar across the four groups and consistent with 
those reported in Table 7 for the entire sample, with the excep-
tion of the Change factor correlations with Memory Self-Effi-
cacy. The correlations involving MIA Memory Self-Efficacy 
and MFQ Memory Self-Efficacy ranged from .13 to .64 and 
from .11 to .49, respectively. Although there was a trend for the 
older groups to have higher correlations than the two younger 
groups, it was also the case that the correlations in the Annville 
old group were greater than the Victoria old group. 
Age and Sex Differences in Metamemory Factors 
As noted above, the analysis by Hultsch et al. (1987) sug-
gested that the MIA and the MFQ scales show differential sensi-
tivity to chronological age differences, with the MIA being more 
likely to show age differences than the MFQ. This result seems 
surprising in light of the high estimated correlation in this study 
between the two Memory Self-Efficacy factors. Although 
models specifying perfect 1.0 correlations between the two fac-
tors had been previously rejected, correlations in the high .8 to 
middle .9 range would seem, on the surface, to predict similar 
mean patterns. As a possible reconciliation, we examined the 
possibility that an MFQ Method factor caused the less-than-
perfect correlation of the two Memory Self-Efficacy factors and 
that this source of method variance also caused the discrepant 
pattern of age relationships between the MIA and the MFQ 
scales that was found by Hultsch et al. (1987). We reasoned that 
the weak age differences on MFQ scales (such as Frequency of 
Forgetting) was caused by combining negative age differences 
(old lower than young) in Memory Self-Efficacy with positive 
age differences on the MFQ Method factor. Given that Hultsch 
et al. (1987) had already analyzed the data for mean age differ-
ences, this analysis did not constitute an a priori hypothesis test. 
Nevertheless, the ex post facto hypothesis would be supported 
if the following could be shown: (a) that a common Memory 
Self-Efficacy factor, including both MIA and MFQ scales, could 
be successfully estimated; (b) that a MFQ method factor could 
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Table 8 
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Multiple-Groups Factor Analyses 
Model x 2 df p Sa 
I. No group constraints 287.97 224 .003 .936 
2. Equal factor loadings 324.33 263 .006 .928 
3. Equal factor loadings and equal 
factor covariance matrices 436.10 335 .000 .903 
4. Equal factor loadings and equal 
factor matrices (except Change factor) 412.46 326 .001 .908 
Model comparisons Source° X 2 df 
1. Ho : Equal factor loadings 2 and 1 36.36 39 ns 
2. Ho : Equal factor covariance matrices 3 and 2 111.77 72 <.01 
3. Ho : Equal variances and covariances for 
Change factor 3 and 4 23.64 9 <.01 
Note. Ho = null hypothesis. 
• Bentler-Bonett normed fit index. • Two models used to calculate differences in x 2 . 
be identified independent of this Memory Self-Efficacy factor, 
(c) that this specification gave a good fit to the covariances 
among the MIA and the MFQ scales, as well as to their covari-
ances with Age; and (d) that there would be large age differences 
on Change and Memory Self-Efficacy, but reversed age differ-
ences on the MFQ Method factor. The model specification 
forced the MFQ Method factor to be uncorrelated with the 
other metamemory factors. To identify the MFQ Method factor; 
it was also necessary to maintain the MFQ Reading Self-Effi-
cacy factor as distinct from general Memory Self-Efficacy, al-
though it was expected that its correlation with Memory Self-
Efficacy would be high. 
We ran a structural regression model on the factor solution in 
the Annville data, where the discrepant age differences had been 
Most pronounced (Hultsch et al., 1987). The regression model 
used Age and Sex as independent variables, with the metamemory 
factors serving as dependent variables. The polynomial regression 
analysis reported by Hultsch et aL (1987) produced linear age rela-
tionships to the MIA Capacity, Change, and Locus scales, so the 
regression approach that we used here was adequate to represent 
the age trends. Specification was based on the results reported by 
Hultsch et al. (1987). Age predicted Memory Self-Efficacy, the 
MFQ Method facto,; MFQ Reading Self-Efficacy, and Change. 
Gender predicted the Strategy Use factor. On the basis ofthe modi-
fication indices, we added Age and Gender effects on the MIA 
Anxiety residual. This final regression model fit the data about as 
well as the original factor model omitting Age and Gender; x 2(77, 
N = 415) = 124.81 (GFI = .964). 
Table 9 








(55-78 years) (56-78 years) (20-55 years) (20-26 years) 
MSENHA ,MSEIAFQ 88 96 1.04' 84 
MSEmm , MSExo 67 73 74 59 
MSEMFQ , MSERD 74 75 81 78 
MSEmm, Strategy -19 -37 -26 -18 
MSEMFQ , Strategy -12 -21 -23 -15 
MSERD, Strategy -11 -07 -12 -14 
MSENuA , Affect -10 -21 -13 -17 
MSEMFQ , Affect 09 -15 -01 1 I 
MSERD , Affect -06 -16 01 -03 
Strategy, Affect 32 29 27 38 
MSEmiA , Task 09 10 00 10 
MSEMFQ , Task 05 20 06 19 
MSERD , Task 01 23 14 24 
Strategy, Task 08 09 27 12 
Affect, Task 32 18 18 27 
MSENHA, Change 37 64 34 13 
MSEMFQ , Change 32 49 17 11 
Note. MSE = Memory Self-Efficacy; MIA = Metamemory in Adulthood scale; MFQ = Memory Function-
ing Questionnaire; RD = Reading. Decimals are omitted. 
• Estimated covariance, when rescaled, was greater than 1.0. 
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Table 10 
Unstandardized Factor Loadings for Memory Self-Efficacy and 
Memory Functioning Questionnaire Method Factors 
Factor 
MSE MFQ method MSEso Change 
SE SE SE a SE 
Capacity 1.0 0 0 0 
Change 0.700 0.074 0 0 1.0 
Anxiety —0.716 0.047 0 0 0 
Locus 0.165 0.034 0 0 0.183 0.055 
General 
rating 0.067 0.007 0 — 0 — 0 — 
Retrospective 
functioning 0.123 0.043 0.036 0.444 0 — 0.202 0.079 
Frequency 
forgetting 1.504 0.076 1.0 — 0 — 0 — 
Forgetting 
novels 0 0.693 0.538 1.0 — 0 — 
Forgetting 
magazines 0 0.704 0.493 0.893 0.052 0 — 
Past events 0.381 0.027 0.270 0.091 0 — 0 — 
Mnemonics 0 0.430 0.174 0 — 0 — 
Note. Dashes denote fixed parameters. MSE = Memory Self-Efficacy; MFQ = Memory Functioning Ques-
tionnaire; RD = Reading. Factor loadings that exceed their standard errors by a ratio of 2:1 or greater are 
different from zero at approximately. a 95% level of confidence. 
Table 10 reports the factor loadings for the Memory Self-
Efficacy and MFQ Method factors. Table 11 reports the regres-
sion coefficients for Age and Gender. The MFQ Method load-
ings were small but significant for several variables, and the re-
gression of MFQ Method on Age was significant and positive. 
Conversely, the regression of Memory Self-Efficacy on Age was 
significant and negative. The strongest relationship was for Age 
and Change, although in this case the relationship is indepen-
dent of the relationship of Age to Memory Self-Efficacy (where 
the MIA Change scale also loads). The fit to the covariances of 
the metamemory scales with Age was good, as reflected in low 
normalized residuals. This pattern indicated that it was reason-
able to model age differences in the metamemory scales in 
terms of age differences in the Memory Self-Efficacy and 
Change factors. The one exception was MIA Anxiety, given the 
significant regression of the Anxiety residual on Age. In sum, 
this model lends credence to the notion that there is a unique 
component to the MFQ scales that attenuates the observed age 
difference's  on these scales and produces the slight attenuation 
in the correlation between the MFQ Memory Self-Efficacy with 
MIA Memory Self-Efficacy factors. 
Discussion 
This study found that, despite differences in conceptualiza-
tion, wording, and response format between the two question-
naires, the Memory Self-Efficacy factor in the MIA that was 
found by Hertzog et al. (1987) and the Frequency of Forgetting 
factor in the MFQ that was found by Gilewski et al. (1983) cor-
relate nearly perfectly when the two scales are factored simulta-
neously. This finding, replicated in two independent samples, 
supports the hypothesis that scales from both questionnaires 
are measures of the Memory Self-Efficacy construct as dis- 
cussed by Cavanaugh et al. (1985), by West et al. (1987), and by 
us (Hertzog et al., 1987; Hultsch et al., 1985). There was a small, 
but statistically significant, loss of fit when the two factors were 
forced to be equivalent by setting their correlation to be 1.0. 
However, we were able to fit successfully a model that loaded 
scales from the two questionnaires on a single Memory Self-
Efficacy factor, provided that a separate MFQ Method factor 
was modeled that had an inverse relationship to chronologi-
cal age. 
How might the MFQ Method factor that we identified be de-
termined? One possibility is that this factor reflects a tendency 
by older persons to be less willing to endorse items that indicate 
memory problems. For example, the reverse age differences on 
the MFQ Method factor may represent a cohort difference in 
willingness to complain that is correlated with lower self-ratings 
of Neuroticism (see Costa & McCrae, 1980). Another possibil-
ity is that, regardless of item content, older individuals are 
loathe to use extremes of frequency rating scales. Moreover, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the Method factor arose be-
cause of reactive effects of responding to the mood state ques-
tionnaires prior to the MFQ. Nevertheless, the success of the 
model with Memory Self-Efficacy and the MFQ Method factor 
in accounting for age differences in the MIA and the MFQ 
scales enhances the argument for convergent validity. That is, 
one cannot argue that the two scales do not measure the same 
construct solely because they show differential sensitivity to age 
(Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986). 
Cavanaugh and Poon (in press) reported zero-order corre-
lations between the SIME Forgetting scale and the MIA Capac-
ity and Change scales that were similar in magnitude to the 
zero-order correlations of the MFQ Frequency of Forgetting 
scale and the MIA scales reported in Table 5. Therefore, it is 
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Table 11 





0 SE 01 0 SE 01 
MSE —0.115 0.034 —0.182 0 0 
MFQ Method 0.151 0.039 0.621 0 0 
MSEao 0.148 0.086 —0.390 0 0 
Strategy 0 0 —1.825 0.403 —0.201 
Achievement 0 0 0 0 
Task 0 0 
Change —0.223 0.032 —0.400 0 0 
Anxiety 
(residual) —0.078 0.027 —0.167 —1.480 0.335 —0.227 
Note. MSE = Memory Self-Efficacy, MFQ = Mental Functioning Questionnaire; RD = Reading. fl denotes 
LISREL estimate. Estimates exceeding their standard errors by a ratio of 2:1 or greater are significantly 
different from zero at a 95% level of confidence. 
' These values are standardized estimates. 
tempting to speculate that joint analysis of the three question-
naires would also show that a general Memory Self-Efficacy 
construct operates in all three instruments. 
As discussed earlie4 there are limitations to the use of zero-
order correlations in making inferences regarding convergent 
validity. In the present study, we were able to demonstrate that 
the observed correlations between measures of memory self-
efficacy reflected a near-perfect relationship between the under-
lying latent variables, although that need not have been the case. 
The advantage of the modeling procedures that we used here is 
that the convergence hypothesis is evaluated on the basis of the 
pattern of relationships among the entire set of metamemory 
scales. Our model fit this pattern well. Similarly, a strong test 
of convergent validity of the SIME, MIA, and MFQ requires 
evaluation of the factor equivalence hypothesis. 
We also found evidence for convergent validity of MIA and 
MFQ measures of strategy use and perceived change in mem-
ory. Scales from both questionnaires had significant loadings on 
Strategy and Change factors. However, there are qualifications 
regarding convergence for these scales. In the case of the Strat-
egy factor, there was a problem with a negative unique variance 
estimate for the MIA Strategy scale that was addressed by fixing 
the unique variance to zero. This Heywood case was probably 
a function of the fact that the MIA Strategy scale covers both 
external memory aids (e.g., use of lists and calendars) and mne-
monic strategies (e.g., rehearsal and use of imagery), whereas 
the MFQ Mnemonics scale measures primarily use of external 
aids.' Convergent validity of the MIA and MFQ measures of 
perceived change was evident in the pattern of zero-order corre-
lations in Table 5, but was ambiguous given the low (less than 
.4) correlations of MIA Change and MFQ Retrospective Func-
tioning in both samples. The significant loading of Retrospec-
tive Functioning on the Change factor, however, permits the in-
ference of convergence, qualified by the additional conclusion 
that the validity of Retrospective Functioning for measuring the 
Change construct is relatively modest. 
The correlations among metamemory factors support the 
conceptualization that there are multiple dimensions of meta- 
memory (Dixon, in press; Dixon & Hultsch, 1983). Across sam-
ples, there was a consistently small, negative relationship be-
tween Memory Self-Efficacy and Strategy Use, with individuals 
low in self-efficacy likely to report more strategy use. Both 
Memory Self-Efficacy factors had virtually zero correlations 
with the MIA Task scale. This latter finding supports the expec-
tation that it is possible to differentiate knowledge about how 
memory functions from memory self-efficacy beliefs. It should 
be noted, however, that we found no evidence for a higher-order 
memory knowledge factor in the MIA and the MFQ scales. 
Given Hertzog et al. (1987), we had expected to identify such a 
memory knowledge factor involving MIA Task, MIA Strategy, 
and MFQ Mnemonics. The correlations among these scales 
were lower in the present study than in Hertzog et al. (1987). 
Therefore, it now appears the MIA may contain only a single, 
robust indicator of the memory knowledge dimension (i.e., 
Task). 
The analysis of multiple age groups showed that the Memory 
Self-Efficacy factor was defined equivalently, in terms of factor 
loadings, across age levels. This finding suggests that quantita-
tive comparisons of derived Memory Self-Efficacy scores from 
the MIA or the MFQ across age are appropriate and justified 
(Labouvie, 1980; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). The results also 
showed that the variances and covariances for the Change factor 
differed across groups, with the highest correlation of Change 
and Memory Self-Efficacy in the Annville sample's old group. 
The finding of equivalent factor loadings suggests that the previ-
ous finding by Hertzog et al. (1987) of differences in Memory 
Self-Efficacy loadings across age groups actually was a function 
of age differences in the correlation of the Change factor with 
the Memory Self-Efficacy factor. In the Hertzog et al. (1987) 
analysis, only the MIA scales were available, and, consequently, 
MIA Change loaded only on the MIA Memory Self-Efficacy fac- 
2 An additional analysis showed that redefining the MIA Strategy 
scale to include only the external-aids items eliminated the Heywood 
case. Because the new solution did not alter the general pattern of re-
sults, we do not present it here. 
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tot In the present analysis, the availability of the MFQ Retro-
spective Functioning scale enabled us to find that Change is de-
fined equivalently in all age groups. As individuals grow older 
and perceive more change in memory, however, they are also 
more likely to report lower memory self-efficacy, resulting in an 
increased correlation between these factors. Some caution in 
interpretation is warranted here, however, because there ap-
peared to be differences between the two old groups in the mag-
nitude of this factor correlation. 
What are the implications of the present results for meta-
memory scales and questionnaires? The convergent validity of 
the MIA and the MFQ in measuring Memory Self-Efficacy re-
inforces earlier recommendations (Dixon, in press; Gilewski & 
Zelinski, 1986) that use of either questionnaire seems appropri-
ate. Given that there is not complete overlap in subscales, the 
selection might be made on the basis of matching specific re-
search questions to the available scales (e.g., the MIA explicitly 
measures affect regarding memory that is not assessed by the 
MFQ). However, if the goal is to obtain multiple indicators of 
Memory Self-Efficacy, it is advantageous to use scales from both 
the MIA and the MFQ. Use of the MIA by itself is limited by 
the fact that two of the three best indicators of Memory Self-
Efficacy in that scale are Change (which also relates, obviously, 
to the perceived Change factor) and Anxiety (which is arguably 
a distal outcome of low self-efficacy beliefs; see Bandura, 1986). 
Use of the MFQ by itself may be limited, given the results sug-
gesting an MFQ Method factor that prevented perfect conver-
gence of the two Memory Self-Efficacy factors. Therefore, using 
the MFQ scales alone might absorb a construct-irrelevant com-
ponent of variance into the latent variable. Considering also the 
benefits of breadth of definition of the Memory Self-Efficacy 
construct, a good latent variable could be formed by using MIA 
Capacity and MFQ Frequency of Forgetting (and, perhaps, a 
third indicator, such as MFQ General Rating or MFQ Remem-
bering Past Events). 
In conclusion, we have reported strong evidence in favor of 
the hypotheses (a) that the MIA and the MFQ questionnaires 
converge to measure a construct that we have labeled Memory 
Self-Ef icacy, and (b) that this factor has a very modest relation-
ship to Memory Knowledge, at least as measured by the MIA 
Task scale. As discussed above, convergent validity is only one 
aspect of construct validation. We are currently conducting 
analyses of (a) the discriminant validity of multiple dimensions 
of metamemory from related constructs (e.g., general self-
efficacy, personality, and affective states) and (b) the predictive 
validity of the Memory Self-Efficacy factor for actual memory 
performance. The self-efficacy perspective argues that predic-
tive validity of Memory Self-Efficacy for memory performance 
is an empirical question rather than a criterion for judging the 
construct validity of metamemory questionnaires. To be sure, 
modest predictive validity may argue against use of meta-
memory scales as proxies for memory assessment in clinical 
settings (e.g., Sunderland et al., 1986) but does not necessarily 
imply that metamemory questionnaires are invalid. It is possi-
ble that the predictive validity of Memory Self-Efficacy for ac-
tual memory performance, although probably a function of a 
number of factors (Dixon & Hertzog, 1988), is limited because 
self-efficacy beliefs are not necessarily veridical. In particular, 
the negative self-efficacy beliefs of some older individuals may  
be inaccurate. Indeed, as Zarit (1982) suggested, one major ben-
efit of memory training with the elderly may be to improve 
memory self-efficacy, even if objective memory performance 
and effective use of memory skills in everyday life do not im-
prove. 
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Measurement of Affective States in Adults 
Evaluation of an Adjective Rating Scale Instrument 
PAUL D. USALA 
CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
A cross-sectional sample of adults, ages 20-79, were administered a adjective rating 
scale instrument measuring multiple affective states, including items from the Profile 
of Mood States (POMS) instrument. Confirmatory item factor analysis supported, for 
the most part, a priori assignments of items to scales based upon prior research, but 
revealed a few small, additional item factors that were cross-validated in a second 
sample. Items measuring different aspects of psychological distress, including anxiety 
and depressive affect, showed appreciable skew and kurtosis, with a substantial 
proportion of respondents indicating no perceived distress. Items measuring psycho-
logical well-being tended to show more normal response distributions. Tests of 
age-related invariance in item factor structure indicated that the unstandardized factor 
pattern weights (loadings) were not fully equivalent across two age groups, but 
showed that the same configuration of items loading on factors was supported. The 
scales perform well enough to justify continued use in older populations, but further 
research on the contributions of item distributions to age differences in factor loadings 
is needed. 
MOOD STATE AND THE ELDERLY 
The relationship of aging, depression, and related affective disorders 
has been increasingly studied in recent years, with advances in our 
understanding of its epidemiology, correlates, and clinical manifesta-
tions (e.g., Gallagher 1986; Zarit et al. 1985). In contrast, relatively 
little is currently known about the relationship between normal varia-
tions in mood and affect in older populations, and the role affective 
states play in influencing behavioral patterns (Schulz 1985). 
RESEARCH ON AGING, Vol. 1 1 No. 4, December 1989 403426 
© 1989 Sage Publications, Inc. 
403 
404 RESEARCH ON AGING 
The most frequently researched question regarding the affective 
status of older persons is whether they are happy and satisfied with 
life, especially when compared to younger adults (e.g., Cameron 1975; 
Campbell et al. 1976; George 1981; Lawton 1983). Most of the 
research has focused specifically on the elderly and their adjustment 
to aging. Studies of life satisfaction, morale, happiness, and subjective 
well-being, using instruments such as Neugarten's Life Satisfaction 
Index (Hoyt and Creech 1983; Wilson et al. 1985), the Bradburn Affect 
Balance Scale (Lawton 1975), and the Philadelphia Geriatric Center 
Morale Scale (Lawton 1975; Morris and Sherwood 1975), have con-
sistently found significant correlations between well-being and health, 
socioeconomic status, social activity, and other variables for persons 
60 and older (Larson 1978; Lawton 1983). 
Some studies have also suggested age-related decreases in endorse-
ment of items reflecting feelings of well-being and happiness (e.g., 
Bradburn and Caplovitz 1965; Clark et al. 1981). However, Cameron 
(1975) conducted a large-scale investigation of positive moods in 
various settings, and found that age did not predict variation in mood. 
One interesting possible explanation of the discrepancy is that, unlike 
more traditional measures of perceived well-being, Cameron explic-
itly limited his questions to current or very recent affective state (e.g., 
"How would you characterize your mood over the last half hour?"). 
There is ample evidence that affective states can be differentiated 
from more enduring dispositions to experience specific affect across 
different situations (affective states; Fridhandler 1986; Nesselroade 
and Bartsch 1977). In the psychometric tradition, many personality 
traits have a state analogue, as with trait and state anxiety (Cattell 
1966; Spielberger 1966). Trait anxiety refers to the disposition of an 
individual to be anxious in multiple environmental contexts. State 
anxiety, in contrast, reflects the degree of anxious affect actually 
experienced in a given situation, which may not be perfectly predict-
able from the degree to which an individual usually experiences 
anxiety in that type of situation, or more generally, within the normal 
range of anxiety-eliciting conditions. 
The issue of time frame for assessing affective status is relevant for 
measurement of both affective disorders and nonclinical variations in 
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mood. For example, some screening measures for depression use an 
explicit time frame (e.g., the CES-D, Radloff 1977, asks for symptom 
endorsement over a one-week period) but others do not. Gurland 
(1976), in reviewing the early research on depression and aging, noted 
a discrepancy between estimated incidence rates for clinically diag-
nosed depressions and rates of depressive symptoms in older popula-
tions. The pattern of decreasing depressive affect from young adult-
hood through age 65, with an increase in depressive symptoms in late 
life, has been suggested by a number of epidemiological studies (e.g., 
Ensel 1986; Murrell et al. 1983). Gurland (1976) noted that rates of 
psychiatric diagnoses of depression did not mirror the late-life in-
crease in depressive symptoms, and cited the hypothesis that depres-
sive symptoms in the elderly may be transient and recurrent, thus often 
not leading to clinical diagnosis and hospitalization. 
In general, moods and emotions of older persons may significantly 
influence their behavior in particular situations. For example, cogni-
tive gerontologists have been concerned for some time that older 
persons' anxiety in assessment situations may lead to invalid infer-
ences about age changes in cognition (Botwinick 1984). Affective 
states are not necessarily just a methodological nuisance; understand-
ing their influences may help clarify relationships between age and 
multiple attributes, such as metacognition and cognitive performance 
(Cavanaugh, forthcoming; Dixon and Hertzog 1988). For example, 
several studies have reported significant correlations between state 
anxiety and perceived self-efficacy regarding memory in older sam-
ples (Cavanaugh and Murphy 1986; West et al. 1984). Rodin et al. 
(1988) demonstrated a relationship between depressive affect and the 
presence of certain sleep disturbances in the elderly. 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
Studies specifically demonstrating reliability and validity of state 
measures in older populations are a logical prerequisite to use of such 
scales in gerontological research. Nesselroade et al. (1984) adminis-
tered the state subscale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inven-
tory (STAI), alternate forms of the precursor to the Cattell 8-SQ 
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Anxiety subscale, and four other subscales of the 8-SQ (stress, regres-
sion, depression, and fatigue) to 111 persons from a senior citizens 
club. With two occasions of measurement (two to four weeks apart), 
high internal consistency and only moderate stability of individual 
differences was found. Moderate stability may actually be a favorable 
finding, given that one plausible criterion for construct validity of a 
state measure is that it demonstrate reliable fluctuation (lability) over 
time, at least under conditions where variation in state is expected. In 
addition, measurement equivalence over time for the fatigue and 
anxiety measures was indicated by the equivalence of state measures' 
factor loadings, estimated by maximum likelihood confirmatory factor 
analysis. A further analysis of these data by Hertzog and Nesselroade 
(1987) demonstrated that the two 8-SQ measures had equal within-
occasion factor loadings and error variances, establishing them as 
parallel forms (Joreskog 1971). The analysis also demonstrated that 
the forms maintained invariant error variances across occasions, indi-
cating little reactive effects on measurement properties at the second 
occasion. Such findings support the argument that state anxiety can 
be reliably and validly measured in older populations. 
One prerequisite to using a psychological instrument to compare 
and contrast different populations is the demonstration of measure-
ment equivalence of the instrument across such groups (Drasgow and 
Kanfer 1985; Schaie and Hertzog 1985). Studies like Nesselroade et al. 
(1984) support the utility of the affective state measures in an older 
population, but one cannot, in general, assume that the affective state 
measures have equivalent reliability and validity in younger and older 
populations (e.g., Labouvie 1980; Schaie and Hertzog 1985). The 
validity of comparative studies of affective states across age groups 
can be assured only by demonstration of invariant measurement 
properties via simultaneous analysis of item properties in multiple-age 
groups, showing that items are similarly meaningful in their represen-
tations of the latent constructs (Hertzog 1987; 1989). 
The present study investigates the factor structure of an adjective 
rating scale for multiple mood states in an age-heterogeneous sample. 
It addresses the following questions: Do the item factors converge to 
the same mood dimensions for such samples? Would the subscale 
item-scoring designations need to be revised? 
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Method 
SUBJECTS 
The principal sample consisted of 447 volunteers who were each 
paid $15 for their participation. They were obtained through a large 
family medical practice in the semi-urban community of Annville, 
Pennsylvania during the summer and fall of 1985. The subjects' ages 
ranged from 20-78, although the 20-35 age range was under-
represented in the sample. The sample was, like its parent population, 
heterogeneous in education, socioeconomic status, and vocabulary 
test scores. Participants' self-rated health was above average. Analyses 
were based on cases with complete item data on the mood question-
naire, resulting in a reduced sample of 352 subjects. 
Data for an independent cross-validation sample, collected in 1987, 
was composed of additional subjects assessed at the time of a longi-
tudinal retesting for the larger study. Subject enlistment procedures 
were similar to 1985, and measurement scales and procedures were 
the same. Complete item data was found for 287 of these subjects. 
Although the gender distribution was nearly identical to the 1985 
sample, the age distribution differed somewhat, with the 1987 sample 
generally being younger. Other demographic characteristics of the two 
samples were comparable. Table 1 reports relevant sample sizes and 
demographic statistics in specified age brackets. 
MEASURES 
The scales measuring affective states were drawn from a larger 
study designed to investigate the construct validity of self-reported 
metamemory questionnaires (Hertzog et al., forthcoming). The mood 
adjective rating scale questionnaire was constructed from the 65 
adjectives measuring anxiety, fatigue, depression, vigor (energy), and 
psychological well-being. In all, 38 of the items had been used in the 
POMS and 27 adjectives had been used by Lebo and Nesselroade 
(1978) in their Pregnancy Mood Checklist (PMcL). Table 2 shows the 
original source and order of administration for each adjective. All 10 
well-being adjectives were from the Lebo and Nesselroade study; the 
other subscales contain item descriptors from both sources. These 
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TABLE 1 
Mean Education, Vocabulary, and Self-Rated Health 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
1985 Sample 
Age Sex N Education Healtha Vocabulary 
20-29 M 13 13.69(3.47) 7.00(1.15) 27.77(7.69) 
F 12 13.33(2.19) 7.50(1.31) 30.75(7.41) 
30-39 M 22 16.50(3.42) 7.27(1.58) 37.48(7.88) 
F 34 14.47(2.44) 7.56(1.28) 36.29(7.95) 
40-49 M 28 13.86(3.49) 7.14(1.56) 32.67(10.99) 
F 46 13.50(2.82) 6.98(1.69) 32.87(10.19) 
50-59 M 24 13.70(3.14) 6.96(1.68) 34.46(10.19) 
F 46 12.40(2.04) 7.37(1.25) 34.02(9.32) 
60-69 M 47 13.96(3.04) 6.63(1.72) 35.66(9.66) 
F 43 14.02(2.95) 7.12(1.69) 38.60(7.41) 
70-79 M 18 12.94(2.96) 7.12(1.32) 35.67(10.83) 
F 19 13.89(2.11) 6.68(2.19) 40.79(7.03) 
1987 Sample 
20-29 . M 18 12.47(1.84) 6.88(1.32) 24.44(9.09) 
F 20 13.25(2.10) 7.00(1.81) 27.80(9.58) 
30-39 M 34 13.74(3.17) 7.45(1.35) 29.24(9.08) 
F 43 14.40(2.37) 7.60(1.53) 35.52(6.91) 
40-49 M 22 14.55(3.35) 7.29(1.27) 34.18(7.04) 
F 28 14.25(3.16) 7.64(1.10) 34.89(8.11) 
50-59 M 12 14.58(2.71) 7.18(1.08) 34.92(10.27) 
F 23 13.23(2.29) 7.27(1.20) 37.82(8.35) 
60-69 M 17 13.24(2.68) 7.76(1.03) 35.88(10.22) 
F 31 13.13(3.60) 6.27(1.96) 33.13(11.25) 
70-79 M 20 12.40(3.27) 7.32(1.34) 35.32(10.28) 
F 15 12.07(2.58) 6.60(2.13) 33.20(9.07) 
80-89 M 2 19.00(1.41) 8.50(0.71) 49.50(4.95) 
F 2 18.00(1.41) 6.50(3.54) 42.00(12.73) 
a. Rated on a 9-point Liken scale (OARS ladder), with 9 being excellent health. 
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subscales were chosen because of their relevance for the construct 
validation of metamemory. Subjects were asked to rate the extent to 
which each adjective reflected their current mood on a 5-point Likert 
scale. The instructions were as follows: 
Below is a list of words that describe feelings people have. Please 
read each one carefully. We would like you to decide how well each 
word describes your feelings at this moment. Don't answer according 
to how you usually feel, but rather how you feel right here and now. 
Read each word, and then circle the letter on the right that best 
describes how you are feeling now. 
PROCEDURE 
The questionnaire was administered as part of a larger assessment 
battery made up of measures for metamemory, social desirability, 
personality, affective states, personal control, memory performance, 
and vocabulary. Small groups of 5-15 subjects participated in two 
sessions of approximately two hours each. The mood adjective rating 
scale was the fifth questionnaire of the first session. 
Confirmatory factor analytic techniques were used to test item 
factor models, obtaining parameter estimates by using the maximum 
likelihood procedure of LISREL VI (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984). 
Indices of the fit of a model reported include the x 2 statistic and 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) provided by the LISREL program, as 
well as the Normed Fit Index (NFI) developed by Bentler and Bonett 
(1980). A model that fits the data (adequately reproduces the vari-
ance/covariance matrix) will have a low x' and high GFI and NFI. The 
x2 statistic is more sensitive to sample size than either the GFI or NFI. 
These indices can range from 0.0 to 1.0 with fits above 0.9 often 
considered to be excellent (see Marsh et al. 1988; Mulaik et al. 1989). 
Simultaneous multiple group comparisons between the younger 
Annville group and the older Annville group were made using the 
procedure outlined in Rireskog (1971). The multiple-groups analyses 
were conducted using covariance matrices in order to maintain equiv-
alent metrics across groups (Joreskog 1971; Schaie and Hertzog 
1985). 
Hypotheses about invariance in factor structure between groups can 
be evaluated by using a nested sequence of models and calculating 
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TABLE 2 
Item Origins 
ITEM e ITEM 5UBSCALZ SOURCE 
1 listless Fatigue POMS 
2 comfortable Well-Being PMCL 
3 unhappy Depressed POMS 
4 shakey Anxiety POMS 
5 glad Well-Being PMCL 
6 jittery Anxiety PMCL 
7 sorry for things done Depressed POMS 
8 vigorous Vigor POMS 
9 discouraged Depressed POMS 
10 lonely Depressed POMS 
11 elated Well-Being PMCL 
12 subdued Depressed PMCL 
13 carefree Vigor POMS 
14 blue Depressed POMS 
15 happy Well-Being PMCL 
16 relaxed Anxiety POMS 
17 bushed Fatigue POMS 
18 ecstatic Well-Being PMCL 
19 exhausted Fatigue POMS 
20 active Vigor POMS 
21 tired Fatigue PMCL 
22 hopeless Depressed POMS 
23 dull Fatigue PMCL 
24 panicky Anxiety POMS 
25 worn out Fatigue POMS 
26 anxious Anxiety POMS 
27 calm Well-Being PMCL 
28 depressed Depressed PMCL 
29 full of pep Vigor POMS 
30 weary Fatigue POMS 
31 aroused Vigor PMCL 
32 sad Depressed POMS 
33 restless Anxiety POMS 
34 regretful Depressed PMCL 
35 pleased Well-Being PMCL 
36 enthusiastic Vigor PMCL 
37 miserable Depressed POMS 
38 overjoyed Well-Being PMCL 
39 fearful Anxiety PMCL 
40 unworthy Depressed POMS 
41 uneasy Anxiety POMS 
42 glum Depressed PMCL 
43 sluggish Fatigue POMS 
44 alert Vigor POMS 
45 helpless Depressed POMS 
46 drowsy Fatigue PMCL 
47 gloomy Depressed POMS 
48 frightened Anxiety PMCL 
49 fatigued Fatigue POMS 
50 cheerful Vigor POMS 
51 contented Well-Being PMCL 
52 worthless Depressed POMS 
53 cautious Anxiety PMCL 
54 inadequate Depressed PMCL 
55 tense Anxiety POMS 
56 excited Vigor PMCL 
57 sleepy Fatigue PMCL 
58 lively Vigor POMS 
59 terrified Depressed POMS 
60 on edge Anxiety POMS 
61 forceful Vigor PMCL 
62 guilty Depressed POMS 
63 at ease Well-Being PMCL 
64 nervous Anxiety POMS 
65 energetic Vigor POMS 
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appropriate x2 tests. The x 2 obtained from fitting the base model can 
be compared to one (e.g., factor loadings) constraining a set of 
parameters to be equal across groups. If this difference in x, 2, which is 
also distributed x 2, is significant, it would indicate that the additional 
restrictions have substantially increased or decreased the fit of the 
model. Issues of age-related measurement equivalence can be directly 
translated into test of invariance in factor structure for items or scales 
(Rock et al. 1978; Schaie and Hertzog 1985). Nested models relevant 
to the issue of measurement equivalence include (1) a model where 
no constraints except the same factor pattern are specified across the 
groups, (2) specification of invariant factor loadings, (3) adding the 
specification of invariance for the factor variance-covariance matrix, 
and (4) adding the specification of equality for the unique variances. 
Test of each subsequent model is contingent upon acceptance of the 
previous, less constrained model (Alwin and Jackson 1981). The most 
crucial issues for measurement equivalence are invariance in the 
configuration of factors and equality of the unstandardized factor 
pattern weights (factor loadings) (Horn et al. 1984; Meredith 1964; 
Rock et al. 1978). 
The x2 tests identify sets of parameters that differ significantly 
between groups. Following a significant x', interest centers on identi-
fying parameters that are responsible for the group differences. In the 
present study, principal interest is on group differences in factor 
loadings. A group comparison of each loading may be calculated to 
identify significant group differences via a t-statistic (given large 
sample size, calculated as z = — k 2/(se + se 2 2)1/2 where k represents 
the factor loading of an item for each of the two groups, and se denotes 
the associated standard error). 
Results 
OVERVIEW 
The single group analysis, performed on the entire age range of 
subjects, began with an exploratory factor analysis to determine a 
general factor structure for the items. A series of confirmatory factor 
analyses of a model derived from an interpretation of the exploratory 
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analysis was then executed. Next, a multiple-groups analysis compar-
ing young versus old subsamples was performed. The total sample 
was divided into two age groups: a young group (age = < 54; n = 181) 
and an old group (age = >55; n = 171). Although finer gradations of 
age might have been desirable, the cut point at age 55 seemed appro-
priate and preserved sufficient sample size to enable meaningful 
LISREL analysis. Simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis was 
used to evaluate the instrument's factor structure properties concur-
rently for the separate groups. The factor model was then tested for 
cross-validation in a new, comparable sample obtained in 1987. Re-
vised subscales were created based on the single-group factor analysis 
results and an inspection of item-total correlations and internal con-
sistency estimates, and age differences in mean levels of affective state 
in the assessment situation were analyzed. 
SINGLE GROUP ANALYSIS 
Exploratory factor analysis. An exploratory factor analysis using a 
promax rotation was performed. Seven-, 8-, and 9-factor solutions 
were examined, with the 9-factor achieving the most interpretable 
results. Depression, Fatigue, and Anxiety factors fell out quite clearly. 
One factor seemed to be a combination of Vigor and Well-Being items, 
while another factor consisted of a subset of Well-Being items. The 
solution suggested some more narrowly defined factors not originally 
anticipated. One new factor was composed of a few Depression and 
Anxiety items (sorry for things done, regretful, fearful, unworthy, 
frightened, worthless, and guilty), and was labeled Guilt. The last three 
factors did not appear to correspond to any meaningful affect concepts, 
and all but one of the items forming them were excluded from the final 
revision of the instrument. 
Confirmatory factor analysis. The purpose of this analysis was to 
clarify ambiguities in item/scale assignments that were implied by the 
exploratory factor analysis. A model was constructed using both the 
exploratory results and a priori subscale assignments. The Guilt and 
Anxiety factors were specified as indicated by the exploratory results. 
A Depression factor was formed from the five items with the highest 
exploratory loadings, plus the item "worthless." This latter item was 
also loaded onto Guilt, per the exploratory results. Because the explor- 
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atory Vigor factor displayed a confusing combination of a priori Vigor 
and Well-Being items (considering item face validity), the Vigor and 
Well-Being factors were specified according to the a priori assignment 
of items to factors. The Fatigue factor was not included in this phase 
of confirmatory analysis because the Fatigue factor identified in the 
exploratory analysis so closely matched the a priori scale assignments 
that it was felt unnecessary to include it in the first phase of confirma-
tory analysis. 
The first LISREL model did not fit the data particularly well, with 
a goodness-of-fit index of 0.711 (x 2 = 2621.86, df = 808). Tests of 
subsequent models compelled significant changes in the Well-Being 
factor, most notably the extraction of a five-item "Calm" factor (a 
combination of Vigor and a reversed scored Anxiety items), and an 
"Elation" factor composed of three items: elated, ecstatic, and over-
joyed.' In addition, a three-item "Fear" factor was extracted from the 
Guilt and Anxiety factors. There were also six items that are loaded 
on more than one factor. The model also allowed for five pairs of 
correlated residuals, primarily among Well-Being items. The fit of this 
8-factor model was an improvement over the initial model (GFI = 
0.822, x2 = 1668.98, df = 821). 
A final factor model of nine factors, involving all the items of the 
revised factor arrangement plus the Fatigue items, was tested. The 
Fatigue factor was constructed based on the results from the explor-
atory factor analysis, which matched almost perfectly the a priori 
assignments. The goodness-of-fit index was 0.726 (x 2 = 3961.38, df 
= 1732), with only one correlated residual ("sleepy" and "drowsy"). 
A few modifications, in the forms of double-loadings and correlated 
residuals, were indicated and were theoretically sound. The final 
model tested allows five items to be double-loaded and has three pairs 
of correlated residuals. This model fit moderately well (GF1 = 0.747, 
x2 = 3606.44, df = 1725). Table 3 exhibits factor loadings and unique 
variances of the items. Most of the factor loadings range from 0.6 to 
a high of 0.878 for "energetic" on the Vigor factor. 
Factor correlations are reported in Table 4. Item factors can be 
conceptualized as representing latent scale true scores; therefore, the 
factor correlations are attenuated for measurement error and are 
somewhat higher than subscale correlations (see below). The correla-
tions of Well-Being with Vigor and with Calm, and of Depression with 
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TABLE 3 
Confirmatory Model: Factor Loadings (X) and Unique Variances (8) 




























































































































































































































































a. Indicates secondary loading, factor in parentheses. 
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Guilt, are the highest except for ones involving Elation (with Well-
Being) and Fear (with Anxiety and Guilt). 
MULTIPLE-GROUPS ANALYSIS 
The total exploratory sample was divided into two subgroups: a 
"young" group containing the subjects whose ages ranged from 20 to 
54 (n = 181), and an "old" group of subjects aged 55 to 78 (n = 171). 
The first model specified in this phase applied the final measure-
ment model achieved in the single group analysis to a simultaneous 
factor analysis problem between the two age subgroups. The model 
specified the same factor pattern but allowed different estimates of 
factor loadings in each age group. The overall x' statistic was 6471.66 
with 3450 degrees of freedom. The second model constrained the 
factor loadings to be invariant across the subgroups, generating a x 2 
 statistic of 6616.64 with 3507 degrees of freedom. The change in GFI 
was, however, relatively small. The older group's GFI was 0.635 in 
the unconstrained model and 0.628 in the constrained; the younger 
group's GFI indices were 0.651 and 0.647. The x' difference between 
the two models was significant (144.98 for a difference of 57 degrees 
of freedom). Nevertheless, the hypothesis of complete measurement 
equivalence across all factors was rejected. A post hoc series of models 
consecutively releasing factor loading constraints on single subscales 
(suspected from the pattern of estimates) was conducted to isolate the 
source of group differences in the factor loadings. The sequential 
procedure terminated following achievement of a nonsignificant x 2 
 difference. This approach identified the Fatigue, Fear, Anxiety, and 
Guilt subscales as having significant group differences. 
Many of the instrument items' response distributions were heavily 
skewed, which may have had a distorting effect on a model's x 2 fit 
statistic. Table 5 exhibits some sample Fatigue and Anxiety items and 
their mean response by age group. The post hoc t-tests of group 
differences in individual loadings revealed significant age group dif-
ferences on some but not all factor loadings for the offending items 
with the most salient degree of skew. The Fatigue subscales yielded 
the greatest degree of consistency in all age differences in both skew 
and factor loading. However, while skew may affect estimation of 
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TABLE 4 






















































factor loadings (Olsson 1979), it appears that at least some real age 
differences in relations of items to factors were uncovered. 
CROSS-VALIDATION 
The final single-group model was applied to the new sample of 287 
subjects in a LISREL VI confirmatory factor analysis for cross-
validation. The model did not fit this sample as well (x' = 3931.35; df = 
1728; GFI = 0.697). Table 6 displays factor loadings based on covar-
iance matrix analysis for both the 1985 and 1987 samples. The Fear 
and Guilt factors demonstrate the largest differences in loadings 
between the two groups, with sizable differences also for the Anxiety 
factor. An examination of the factor correlations for the 1987 analysis 
(Table 7) shows Guilt and Fear to be less differentiated from their 
parent factors (Depression and Anxiety, respectively) than in the 1985 
sample. Because the Guilt, Fear, and Anxiety factors were found to 
have some differences in item responding between old and young 
subgroups, univariate statistics for the 1987 data were examined. For 
several of the items for these factors, it was found that responding in 
the "old" subgroup for 1987 more closely resembled "young" re-
sponding for both years than "old" responding for 1985. The poorer 
model fit for the 1987 sample may be due to less age-related differ-
ences in responding than in the 1985 sample. For those items where 
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TABLE 5 
Univariate Statistics of Selected Fatigue and Anxiety Items 
Item Age Group N Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
Fatigue: 
sleepy old 171 1.39 .72 1.90 3.04 
young 181 1.90 .97 1.14 .92 
Anxiety: 
jittery old 171 1.25 .63 3.11 11.14 
young 181 1.30 .69 2.80 8.52 
shaky old 171 1.19 .46 2.41 5.25 
young 181 1.24 .59 2.94 9.43 
anxious old 171 1.54 .78 1.61 2.77 
young 181 1.60 .91 1.86 3.53 
the differences were reproduced, the difference in age distribution 
between the two samples may be another contributing factor. 
ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATIONS AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
Items were summed to form subscales using item/scale assignments 
implied by factor structure from the single-group confirmatory factor 
analysis. Items that had been excluded from the model were assigned 
on a theoretical basis. In all, 61 of the original 65 items were retained 
in the revised scale. Items that had been loaded on more than one factor 
were assigned to single factors based on face validity. Because the 
Elation factor scale has only three items and correlated highly with the 
Well-Being factor (.79), its items were subsumed in the Well-Being 
subscale for purposes of scale assignment. Item-total correlations by 
subscales and internal consistency reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) 
were calculated. Table 8 displays the number of items per scale and 
the unstandardized coefficient alpha for both the a priori and revised 
scales. Most of the coefficients increased after scale revision, and all 
remained acceptably high. The only exception was the new Fear 
subscale, which had only three items and poor internal consistency. 
Dropping this subscale's items from scale scoring should be consid-
ered as an option when using the instrument. 
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TABLE 6 
1985 and 1987 Unstandardized Factor Loadings 
Based on Analysis of Covariance Matrices 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
FACTOR ITEM 1985 Sample 1987 Sample 
ANXIETY nervous 1.257(.106) 1.130(.088) 
on edge 1.231(.104) 1.065(.088) 
tense 1.362(.115) 1.309(.101) 
uneasy .983(.087) 1.069(.087) 
jittery .936(.090) .766(.072) 
shaky .751(.072) .542(.062) 
anxious 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
panicky .313(.074) .581(.096) 
(excited) .696(.113) .309(.100) 
FATIGUE worn out .951(.044) .939(.043) 
fatigued .891(.042) .880(.042) 
tired 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
exhausted .964(.047) .880(.043) 
bushed 1.015(.052) .973(.048) 
weary .813(.044) .775(.042) 
sleepy .781(.047) .809(.050) 
sluggish .736(.044) .745(.041) 
drowsy .665(.045) .745(.043) 
listless .495(.047) .560(.046) 
DEPRESSED sad .915(.059) .987(.070) 
blue .979(.064) .988(.077) 
depressed 1.000(.066) 1.100(.081) 
gloomy .835(.055) .807(.063) 
glum .786(.054) .908(.068) 
hopeless .775(.053) .926(.071) 
discouraged 1.028(.070) .984(.076) 
miserable .786(.055) .947(.069) 
unhappy .906(.063) .868(.078) 
lonely 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
helpless .341(.061) .397(.078) 
WELL-BEING happy 1.107(.072) 1.259(.109) 
cheerful 1.067(.071) 1.282(.106) 
pleased .953(.066) 1.226(.108) 
content 1.036(.072) 1.204(.106) 
carefree 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
glad .901(.073) 1.086(.104) 
enthusiastic .554(.085) .773(.122) 
VIGOR energetic 1.123(.059) 1.002(.059) 
lively 1.015(.056) .927(.061) 
full of pep 1.113(.062) 1.157(.065) 
vigor 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
active .854(.058) .826(.061) 
excited .713(.063) .603(.069) 
alert .468(.058) .528(.069) 
forceful .492(.059) .470(.069) 
aroused .458(.062) .547(.067) 
(enthusiastic) .515(.079) .423(.088) 
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TABLE 6 Continued 
FACTOR ITEM 1985 Sample 1987 Sample 
GUILT worthless .839(.079) 1.652(.239) 
guilty .839(.080) 1.186(.182) 
inadequate 1.137(.109) 1.476(.227) 
regretful .942(.091) 1.628(.245) 
unworthy .902(.090) 1.718(.251) 
sorry for.. 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
CALM relaxed 1.061(.057) .976(.068) 
calm 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
at ease .961(.057) 1.049(.080) 
comfortable .811(.058) .802(.072) 
(alert) .296(.056) .355(.073) 
FEAR frightened .732(.046) 1.028(.069) 
fearful 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
terrified .532(.033) 1.034(.072) 
(panicky) .521(.074) .226(.098) 
(helpless) .517(.083) .100(.094) 
ELATION ecstatic 1.015(.060) 1.099(.079) 
elated 1.000(.000) 1.000(.000) 
overjoyed 1.019(.060) 1.034(.078) 
TABLE 7 
Factor Correlations 1987 Cross-Validation Sample 
(decimals omitted) 
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TABLE 8 
Coefficient Alphas (unstandardized) for the A Priori and Revised 
Subscales (number of items in parentheses) 
Subscale A Priori Revised 
Anxiety .901 (13) .916 (8) 
Fatigue .929 (11) .935 (10) 
Depression .935 (19) .939 (11) 
Well-being .905 (10) .923 (10) 
Vigor .908 (12) .881 (9) 
Guilt - .836 (6) 
Calm - .858 (4) 
Fear - .757 (3) 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN AFFECT 
The revised affect scale scores for the original 1985 sample were 
analyzed in a 2 x 2 (Age Group x Sex) MANOVA. In order to 
maximize N, subjects with less than 20% missing item responses on 
all scales were included in the analysis by assigning the sample item 
mean to the missing value prior to summing item responses. This 
procedure increased the N for the MANOVA to 438. 
There was a significant multivariate Age effect (F[7,428] = 6.48, 
p <.001), with significant (p < 0.01) univariate effects for Fatigue, 
Vigor, Well-Being, and Depression. The age difference on Anxiety did 
not approach statistical significance (F < 1). Older adults (age > 54) 
reported less fatigue, more vigor, greater well-being, and less depres-
sive affect than younger adults. The multivariate test for Sex failed to 
reach statistical significance (F[7, 428] = 1.94, p = 0.06), as did the 
Age x Sex interaction (F[7, 428] = 1.14, p > 0.25). 
Discussion 
Several important issues have been addressed by the present re-
search. One is the degree to which adjective self-ratings form coherent 
scales with acceptable psychometric properties. The present factor 
analytic study isolated nine distinct factors — Anxiety, Fatigue, De- 
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pression, Well-Being, Vigor, Guilt, Calm, Elation, and Fear—from 61 
items collected from the Profile-of-Mood-States (POMS) instrument 
(McNair et al. 1971) and the PMcL (Lebo and Nesselroade 1978), 
which were the basis for seven subscales with acceptable internal 
consistencies and sensible interscale correlations. A sound factor 
structure was supported. Of further importance is that these results 
were achieved on a sample consisting of young, middle-aged, and 
elderly persons from the general population, with an age range of 21 
to 78. Previously, the POMS had been validated on psychiatric patients 
and college students, while the PMcL was administered to young 
pregnant women. Similar work by the present authors on five sub-
scales of the Cattell Eight-State Questionnaire likewise demonstrates 
acceptable subscaling of mood adjectives administered to this sample 
(although subscale assignments require extensive revision). 
Issues regarding the resultant factor structure include the formation 
of two monopolar scales — Anxiety and Calm — rather than a common-
sense bipolar scale subsuming the two. This suggests that the two 
concepts, while highly negatively correlated, are construed by persons 
as related but distinct and not merely opposites. Another possibility 
for such a finding, though, is put forth by Meddis (1972), who claims 
that unbalanced Likert-format options (i.e., more acceptance than 
rejection categories) tend to suppress negative correlations and artifi-
cially produce monopolar factors. The current study involves an instru-
ment with one rejection option and four acceptance options of varying 
degree. Additional research involving varied response formatting 
using the present instrument is needed to investigate this issue further. 
Because the analyses here suggest some modification of item-to-
subscale assignments from the a priori designations of the POMS and 
the PMcL, one may ask which subscale structure should be used. 
Although the original two instruments were not validated on samples 
using elderly from the general population, the present analysis of this 
hybrid instrument using such a sample shows the original subscale 
structure to be basically retained. High correlations among the revised 
subscales (e.g., Well-Being with Vigor and Calm), which generally 
share items originally from one subscale, suggest that collapsing the 
appropriate items into their original scales is a viable alternative. In 
part, the revised structure may result from enhanced concept represen-
tation over the POMS due to the inclusion of the PMcL items. Overall, 
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the results support the original item structure of the instrument; 
adoption of the suggested modifications are appropriate for investiga-
tions concerned with still finer sensitivity to mood states, particularly 
to those scales uniquely formed by the revisions. 
The results of the multiple-groups analysis are cause for some 
caution in using the instrument. Measurement equivalence of the 
instrument was not fully supported in the comparison of young and 
old subgroups. This lack of measurement equivalence creates inter-
pretational problems for analysis of mean age differences in the 
summated scales (Baltes and Nesselroade 1973; Labouvie 1980). For 
example, the analysis of age differences in affect during the assess-
ment session showed that older persons reported less fatigue than 
young persons. However, the Fatigue item factor showed marked age 
differences in item factor loadings that appeared to be influenced by 
age differences in skew and kurtosis of the response distributions. The 
issue is whether the lack of metric invariance in the item factor 
loadings is principally a function of the nonnormal distributions, and 
in turn, whether the distributional differences reflect differences in the 
underlying affect construct. Response to an item such as "sleepy" may 
actually reveal that the elderly are less sleepy than are younger 
persons. However, the skew may also be determined by substantive 
influences on fatigue; younger subjects generally were employed and 
were more likely to participate after work hours, whereas elderly 
subjects were more available to participate earlier in the day. The 
presence of such differences, then, does not necessarily indicate a 
problem with the instrument. On the other hand, the skewed distribu-
tions may reflect age differences in willingness to endorse items 
measuring negative affect. An adjective such as "anxious" may have 
negative connotations for the elderly as symptomatic of old age, 
undermining their willingness to endorse it even if they are experienc-
ing anxiety. Another possibility is that of age differences in influences 
on affect-related manifestations: "shaky" may reflect an anxiety re-
sponse for the young, but it may be influenced by age-related somatic 
health changes for some older persons, attenuating its validity as an 
indicator of anxiety per se in an age-heterogeneous population. 
Clearly, resolution of measurement equivalence problem will require 
resolution of the issue of item skew and its effects on factor analysis 
parameter estimates (see Muthen and Kaplan 1985). 
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The pattern of age differences in means (greater self-reported 
well-being, vigor; less fatigue and depression) might be construed as 
implausible—and as a basis for questioning the validity of the adjec-
tive rating scales. However, epidemiological studies of depressive 
affect using the CES-D instrument have consistently shown older 
persons to report lower levels of depressive affect than do younger 
individuals (e.g., Ensel 1986)—a pattern consistent with CES-D re-
sponses in this sample, which we are reporting elsewhere (Hertzog 
et al. forthcoming). Nevertheless, the present volunteer sample may 
be positively selected for older persons with higher psychological 
well-being. Also, as noted above, age differences in time of assessment 
may have influenced the results. There may also be age differences in 
response criteria mapping Likert rating scale points to subjectively 
experienced affect. Nevertheless, the current study offers little support 
for the hypothesis that, on average, older persons experience lower 
levels of psychological well-being than do young to middle-aged 
adults. The present work leaves open the possibility that differences 
in measurement properties and the scales influence observed age 
differences in affect as further research questions. Until resolved, 
caution is suggested in use of the questionnaire to compare different 
age groups. 
The present research raises some relevant issues for the construc-
tion of scales appropriate for group score comparisons. We have 
identified relatively robust mood state factors in an adult population, 
and have shown in two independent samples that the basic configura-
tion of adjectives loading on affect to factors is replicable. On the basis 
of these factor analyses, a slightly revised set of mood adjective scales 
has been proposed. Further studies sensitive to the issues delineated 
above is required to determine whether (1) the scales can be con-
structed so as to yield equivalent psychometric properties across the 
adult life span, and (2) the scales have acceptable construct validity. 
NOTE 
1. The finding of an Elation factor replicates results from the Lebo and Nesselroade [1978] 
P-technique study using exploratory factor analysis; they designate it a secondary Well-Being 
factor. 
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Measurement Properties of the Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale (cEs-D) in Older Populations 
Christopher Hertzog., Judith Van Alstine, Paul D. Usala 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
David F. Hultsch and Roger Dixon 
University of Victoria 
Two cross-sectional samples of adults were administered the 20-item Center for Epidemiological 
Studies-Depression Scale (cEs-D). Confirmatory item factor analysis showed that Radloff's (1977) 
four factor model fit the data well, but that the four factors were highly intercorrelated. A simulta-
neous second-order factor model fitting a single second-order Depression factor also fit well. Multiple 
group analyses of the first-order solution yielded invariant unstandardized item factor loadings 
across samples and age groups. A Cohort (Age) X Sex ANOVA on the total and subscale scores re-
vealed lower total CES—D and subscale (Well-Being and Depressive Affect) scores for older persons. 
The Somatic subscale showed no significant age differences. The results support the measurement 
validity of the CES—D for depression screening in older adult populations. 
Although it is widely recognized that depression is the most 
common mental health problem in the elderly, there is some 
confusion regarding whether there is also an age-related in-
crease in the prevalence of depression. Recent studies have not 
supported the hypothesis of an age-related increase in either 
clinically diagnosed depression (Blazer, Hughes, & George, 
1987) or depressive symptoms in adulthood (e.g., Radloff & 
Teri, 1986). 
A major issue involves the measurement properties of instru-
ments assessing depression (Gallagher, Thompson, & Levy, 
1980; Zarit, Eiler, & Hassinger, 1985). For example, several 
studies suggest that self-report measures of depressiori that in-
clude items measuring somatic manifestations of depression 
(e.g., fatigue, poor sleep, listlessness) may be artifactually ele-
vated in the elderly because of somatic effects of physical illness, 
side effects of medications, and the like (Berry, Storandt, & 
Coyne, 1984; Blumenthal, 1975; Downes, Davies, & Copeland, 
1988; Steuer, Bank, Olsen, & Jarvik, 1980). 
The Center for Epidemiological Studies—Depression Scale 
(CES—D; Radloff, 1977) has been widely used in research on de-
pressive affect in community populations, including the elderly 
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(e.g., Krause, 1986; Lewinsohn, Fenn, Stanton, & Franklin, 
1986). Validation studies have shown that the CES—D correlates 
significantly with clinical ratings of depression (Roberts & Ver-
non, 1983; Weissman et al. 1977), suggesting its utility as a 
screening instrument. Several cross-sectional studies using the 
CES—D suggest higher prevalence rates of depression in young 
adults than in old adult samples (e.g., Craig & VanNatta, 1979; 
Clark, Aneshensel, Frerichs, & Morgan, 1981). However, Mur-
rell, Himmelfarb, & Wright (1983) report a late-life increase in 
prevalence of depression, with individuals 75 years old and 
older having higher mean CES—D scores than individuals of ages 
55-74. Age may ultimately be shown to interact with a number 
of other factors in determining risk for depression (Phifer & 
Murrell, 1986), but it appears that old age is not necessarily 
accompanied by increases in depressive affect. 
There remains some concern about the psychometric proper-
ties of the CES—D in older populations (Yesavage, 1986). One 
issue is that the CES—D is a multidimensional instrument. Virtu-
ally all the studies cited above have used a single, summated 
score from the 20-item CES—D to measure depression, in spite 
of the fact that exploratory factor analyses of the instrument 
have consistently found four separate factors: Depressive Affect, 
Somatic Symptoms, Well-Being, and Interpersonal Relations 
(Clark et al., 1981; Ensel, 1986; Radloff, 1977; Ross & Mirow-
ski, 1984). As Gatz and Hurwicz (in press) pointed out, differ-
ential age patterns on subscales of the CES—D may be obscured 
by use of the total score. Given the literature on other depres-
sion scales showing age-related increases in somatic symptoms, 
this issue seems of special concern. Gatz and Hurwicz (in press) 
found a curvilinear age pattern of CES—D total scores, but the 
primary source of the age differences was lower positive well-
being in the elderly, not higher endorsement of somatic symp-
toms. 
There are two possible arguments against partitioning the 
CES—D into multiple subscales for screening and research 
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purposes. First, the different scales may all be conceptualized 
as subdimensions of a higher-order depression construct (e.g., 
Radloff, 1977). Second, there may be little empirical differenti-
ation among the four subscales, so that correct classification of 
persons is not materially enhanced by partitioning the scale into 
multiple subscales oflower reliability. Indeed, there are only two 
Interpersonal Relations items and four Well-Being items in the 
CES—D, which is probably too few items to have confidence in 
the corresponding subscales unless these items were supple-
mented with additional items. 
A second methodological issue regarding the CES—D is its 
measurement equivalence across different age populations. Is 
the ces—D measuring the same construct(s), with equivalent 
quantitative relations of depression to scale scores, at different 
ages (Liang, Van Tran, Krause, & Markides, 1989)? As pointed 
out by several developmental methodologists, quantitative com-
parisons of scale scores across different age groups is justified 
only if the underlying scales have equivalent measurement prop-
erties in the groups (Baltes & Nesselroade, 1970; Labouvie, 
1980; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). 
Empirical leverage on these issues can be gained by applying 
confirmatory factor analysis to the item data. Previously, Anes-
hensel, Clark, & Frerichs (1983) used confirmatory analysis to 
factor the CES—D subscales and other scales measuring aspects 
of psychological distress and well-being. It is also possible to 
use higher-order confirmatory factor analysis to simultaneously 
evaluate (a) the validity of the four factor structure for the CES-
D items and (b) the extent to which these four item factors map 
onto a single higher-order depression factor (e.g., Hertzog, 1989; 
Marsh, 1985). 
The first goal of this research was to test the four factor model 
for the CES—D in a cross-sectional sample of adults. The second 
goal was to determine the adequacy of a single second-order 
Depression factor in fitting correlations among the four first-
order item factors. The third goal was to determine whether the 
CES—D factor structure is invariant across different age groups. 
The fourth and final goal was to estimate the cross-sectional age 
pattern in CES—D subscale means. 
Method 
Subjects 
The two samples of subjects participated in a study designed to vali-
date two metamemory questionnaires (Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 
1989). The subjects in both samples were paid for their participation. 
The first sample consisted of 447 community-dwelling adult volunteers, 
ages 20-80 who belonged to a large family medical practice in Annville, 
Pennsylvania. Although questionnaire data were obtained on all partici-
pants, a few subjects omitted one or more item responses. Only the 437 
subjects with complete item data on the CES—D were used in the item 
factor analyses. The second sample consisted of a group of older, com-
munity-dwelling, Canadian adults from Victoria, British Columbia. 
The 278 persons in the Victoria sample ranged in age from 55 to 78. Of 
these participants, 270 had complete item data on the CES—D. 
Data regarding the demographic characteristics of both samples may 
be found in Hertzog et al. (1989). Both samples contained individuals 
with a range of background education and cognitive abilities, although 
the majority of individuals reported themselves to be in good to excel-
lent physical health. Both samples are therefore probably more select 
than their parent populations. 
Measures 
Subjects from the two samples completed questionnaires and tasks 
designed to assess metamemory, locus of control, affective states, per-
sonality, and memory performance. The tests were administered in two 
separate sessions to small groups of subjects. The CES—D scale was ad-
ministered during the first session. 
The 20-item CES—D scale is designed to measure depression in the 
general population (Radloff, 1977; Weissman et al., 1977). Respondents 
rate the frequency with which they have experienced particular depres-
sive symptoms during the past week. The possible responses range from 
0 (less than 1 day) to 3 (5-7 days). The Appendix gives the specific items 
and the labels used to report results. 
Statistical Procedures 
Confirmatory factor analysis parameter estimates were obtained us-
ing maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL VI (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
1984). The LISREL measurement model regresses observed (or empiri-
cally measured) variables, x, on latent variables (factors), t, through the 
regression parameter matrix, A, with regression residuals, 6: 
x At + 8 
The model assumes that the covariance matrix of the x, Z, is 
z = 	+ 0, 
where A is the matrix of factor pattern coefficients, or factor loadings, 
is the covariance matrix of t , and 6 is the covariance matrix of b. 
Indexes of a model's fit include the likelihood ratio )(2 statistic, LISRECS 
goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the normed fit index (NF1; Bentler and 
Bonett, 1980). A model that fits the data well will have a low x2 and high 
GFI and NFL The x2 statistic is more sensitive to sample size than the 
OFI and NFL These indexes can range from 0.0 to 1.0, with fits above 
.9 often considered to be excellent (Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988). 
Simultaneous factor analyses for multiple age groups were also con-
ducted in LISREL, using covariance matrixes to maintain equivalent 
metrics across groups (Joreskog, 1971; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). The 
relative fit of the multiple groups model can be evaluated using a nested 
sequence of model tests. A significant difference in x2 between nested 
models indicates that the hypothesized specification of the more re-
stricted model (e.g., age group equivalence in factor loadings) would be 
rejected (Joreskog, 1971). 
A second-order factor analysis allows one to investigate the relation-
ship between hierarchically nested factors (Rindskopf & Rose, 1988). 
In the present case, our first-order models tested the four factor solution 
for CES—D items proposed by Radloff (1977). The second-order models 
evaluated the ability of a single second-order Depression factor to ac-
count for the covariances among the four first-order factors. The fit of a 
second-order model is relative to the fit of the first-order model on which 
it is based (Hertzog, 1989). In Bentler & Bonett's (1980) terms, the first-
order model is the saturated model for the second-order model, which 
attempts to fit the first-order factor covariance matrix by means of sec-
ond-order factor loadings, second-order factor variances, residual vari-
ance for first-order factors, and (if necessary) residual covariances 
among first-order factors. Any second-order factor model can therefore 
be tested for lack of fit to the second-order model specification by com-
puting the difference in x2 between first- and second-order models (see 
Hertzog, 1989; Rinciskopf & Rose, 1988). 
It is also possible to calculate a relative fit index that reflects the degree 
of fit of the second-order model to the first-order covariance matrix. The 
null second-order model is a model fixing all first-order factor covari-
ances to equal zero (i.e., a model specifying no association between the 
first-order factors). Then the relative normed fit index (RNFI) of the 
second-order model is 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings of CES-D Items for Annville (ANN) and Victoria (VIC) Samples 
CES—D item 
Depressive 
affect Well-Being Somatic Interpersonal 
ANN VIC ANN VIC ANN VIC ANN VIC 
Bothered 0 0 0 0 56 54 0 0 
Appetite 0 0 0 0 46 52 0 0 
Blues 69 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Good 0 0 47 35 0 0 0 0 
Mind 0 0 0 0 56 63 0 0 
Depress 85 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Effort 0 0 0 0 76 82 0 0 
Hopeful 0 0 64 54 0 0 0 0 
Failure 65 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fearful 52 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sleep 0 0 0 0 55 46 0 0 
Happy 0 0 87 88 0 0 0 0 
Talk 0 0 0 0 48 43 0 0 
Lonely 77 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unfriend 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 55 
Enjoy 0 0 85 77 0 0 0 0 
Cry 52 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sad 83 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dislike 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 71 
Getgoing 0 0 0 0 64 69 0 0 
Note. Decimals omitted. All 0 loadings and standardized factor variances were fixed by hypothesis. All 
nonzero parameter estimates were significantly different from 0 beyond the .1% level of confidence. 
RNFI =(Fa — F2)/(F.2 — F1) 
where F.2 is the null second-order model's LISREL fitting function value, 
F 1 is the LISREL fitting function value for the corresponding first-order 
(saturated) model, and F2 is the fitting function value for any second-
order model to be evaluated. 
Results 
Item Factor Analyses 
The first series of analyses attempted to validate the four fac-
tor model described in Radloff (1977). This model, depicted in 
Figure 1, fit well in the Annville sample, x 2(164) = 343.84, 
GFI = .925, and NFI = .908, and was replicated in the Victoria 
sample, x2(164) = 280.79, GFI = .909, and NFI = .886. The 
standardized factor loadings and the factor correlations for the 
two samples are provided in Table 1. The item factor loadings 
were very similar in the two samples, with perhaps some salient 
but small differences on the Well-Being factor. The factors were 
more highly intercorrelated in the Annville sample than in the 
Victoria sample, although the pattern of correlations was quite 
similar (see Table 2). 
A second-order confirmatory analysis, as depicted in Figure 
2, was performed to determine whether or not the four first-
order dimensions could be modeled using a single second-order 
depression factor. The fit of the second-order model on the Ann-
ville sample was very good, x2(166) = 350.55, GFI = .923. The 
loss of fit from the first-order model with unconstrained factor 
correlations was not significant at the 1% level of confidence, 
and the RNFI of .995 indicated that most of the information 
in the first-order factor correlations was accounted for by the  
second-order factor loadings. In the Victoria sample, the fit of 
the second-order model was also very good, x 2(166) = 282.43, 
GFI = .909, with a nonsignificant difference in x2 and an 
RNFT = .990. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the standardized second-order 
factor loadings relating the first-order factors to the general De-
pression dimension were quite similar in the two groups, with 
the Interpersonal Affect factor loading considerably less than 
the Affect, Well-Being, and Somatic factors. 
Item and Scale Distributions 
The distribution of responses to the CES—D items were highly 
skewed and kurtotic, with a substantial number of respondents 
failing to endorse any CES—D item. Such a pattern may reflect 
an underlying non-normal distribution of depressive affect in 
the general population. However, it could also be the case that 
the scale may not be sensitive to the lower levels of depressive 
affect, such that the distribution of depression scale scores is 
truncated. The CES—D'S use of frequency ratings (how often the 
subject has felt depressed in the past week) may contribute to 
the skew. 
We therefore reestimated the second-order factor model, ex-
cluding subjects who had used the lowest frequency category on 
all the items. The solutions were very similar to the original 
results, indicating that the substantial number of persons at or 
near the minimum scale score did not materially affect the fac-

























Figure I. Four factor model for the CES-D. 
Multiple Groups Analyses 
To evaluate both age and sample differences, we split the 
Annville sample into two age groups. Individuals age 20-54 
formed one group (N = 217), and those age 55 and over formed 
the second group (N = 230). This second group represented the 
same range of ages present in the Victoria sample, thus allowing 
for sample comparisons based on individuals of the same age. 
Comparisons were then made between these three groups (Ann- 
Table 2 
CES-D Item Factor Correlations 
Factor 	Affect 	Well-Being 	Somatic 	Interpersonal 
Annville sample 
Affect 
Well-Being 	- 8 5 
Somatic 83 	-73 
Interpersonal 
	




Somatic 71 	-55 
Interpersonal 	54 -41 	47 









Figure 2. Second-order factor model for the CES—D with estimated load-
ings for the Annville and Victoria (in parentheses) samples. 
ville younger, Annville older, Victoria older) to determine 
whether or not the groups had equivalent factor structures. 
A nested series of hierarchically organized models tested 
group equivalence in multiple parameter matrixes (see Jore-
skog, 1971; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985). The first model, M I , spec-
ified the same first-order factor model in all three groups, but 
did not impose any between-group equality constraints on the 
parameters. The second model, M2, forced the elements of the 
factor pattern matrix to be equal across the three groups. The 
differences in fit between M2 and M, tested whether or not the 
groups had invariant factor loadings of items on factors. The 
nonsignificant change in x2 indicated that the hypothesis that 
the groups were equivalent in terms of their factor pattern was 
not rejected (see Tables 3 & 4). 
The next set of models tested whether or not the factor covari-
ance matrix was equivalent for the three groups. First, model 
M3, which constrained the entire factor covariance matrix for 
the two groups of older individuals to be equal, was tested. The 
significant loss of fit from model M2 indicated that the two older 
groups were not equivalent. Next, model M4 constrained the 
two Annville samples to be equal, testing the hypothesis that the 
two age group subsamples constructed from the total Annville 
sample had equivalent factor covariances. The model also fit 
significantly poorer than did model M2. 
Two additional models determined whether the lack of fit in 
the factor covariance matrix across the three groups reflected 
only group differences in factor variances. Model M5 con-
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Table 3 
Models Testing Group Equivalence 
Model 	 X2 	 df 	NE' 
M I 	A. unconstrained 954.46 492 .841 
M2 	Ai = A2 = A3 991.54 524 .835 
M3 	Ai = A2 = A3 
4ANOLD = 4VICOLD 1027.67 534 .829 
M4 	Ai = A2 = A3 
4'ANYOUNG = 4ANOLD 1073.78 534 .821 
M5 	A t = A2 = A3 
4'1 = 4'2 = 4)2 1097.28 544 .818 
M6 	AI = A2 = Ay 
covariances 43 = 1058.18 536 .824 
Normed fit index (see Method section). 
all three groups; Model M6 constrained the factor covariances 
to be equal across the three groups, while allowing the variances 
to differ. Model M6 fit more poorly than did model M5, suggest-
ing that neither the factor variances nor the covariances were 
equivalent across the three groups. 
Table 5 shows the differences in depression factor variances 
and covariances across the three groups. The younger group 
had greater variance than both older groups on all but one of 
the factors. The Annville and Victoria older groups differed sig-
nificantly in variance on the Depression and Well-Being factors, 
but not on the Somatic and Interpersonal Affect factors. 
Age Differences in CES-D Scale Scores 
To examine age differences in the CES-D subscales, we classi-
fied participants into six age and birth year cohort groups (birth 
years 1906-1915 [ages 70-79]; 1916-1925 [60-69]; 1926-1935 
[50-59]; 1936-1945.[40-49]; 1946-1955 [30-39]; and 1956-
1965 [20-29]. A nonorthogonal Cohort X Sex ANOVA of the 
total CES-D score revealed only a significant Cohort effect, F(5, 
427) = 3.90, p < .01. Figure 3 plots the least squares adjusted 
marginal means for Cohort across the six groups. Bonferroni-
adjusted post-hoc comparisons showed that the 20-29 year-old 
and 40-49 year-old group had significantly higher depression 
scores than did the two oldest cohorts. Other contrasts did not 
achieve the 1% level of confidence. 
Using a cutoff of CES-D scale scores of 16 or greater for possi-
ble depression (Weissman et al., 1977), 19% of the men and 23% 
of the women in the total Annville sample were classified as 
depressed. However, only 28 of the 204 individuals 60 and older 
(13.7%) had CES-D scores of 16 or greater. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the four 
subscales produced a significant multivariate Cohort effect, 
which was manifested in significant univariate effects for De-
pressive Affect, F(5, 428) = 4.17, p < .001; Well-Being, F(5, 
428) = 3.96, p < .01; and Interpersonal Affect, F(5, 428) = 3.25, 
p < .01: There were no significant cohort differences on the So-
matic subscale (p > .25). As shown in Figure 4, the three scales 
with significant effects followed the same general pattern as the 
overall CES—D scale. 
Discussion 
This study is encouraging regarding the measurement prop-
erties of the CES—D in age-heterogeneous samples. These results  
replicate the four factor solution for the CES-D items originally 
proposed by Radloff (1977) on the basis of exploratory factor 
analyses. The present confirmatory factor analysis differs, how-
ever, in that it conclusively demonstrates that the four item fac-
tors are highly intercorrelated, a fact obscured by past studies 
using orthogonal rotations. Moreover, a model with a single sec-
ond-order Depression factor fit the first-order item factor co-
variances relatively well in both samples. This pattern of results 
justifies use of the total CES—D score on empirical as well as 
conceptual grounds, although there is sufficient variance in the 
item factors not determined by the second-order factor to war-
rant concern about whether items from subscales like Interper-
sonal Affect ought to be used for initial screening for depression. 
This study also found invariant factor pattern weights across 
two different older samples as well as between the middle-aged 
group and the two old groups. The first finding—invariance in 
raw score regression weights across two older samples—sug-
gests that the minor differences in standardized factor loadings 
reported in Table 2 reflect unimportant sampling variability in 
the weights, combined with sample differences in variances of 
items and factors. The second finding—age-related invariance 
in the unstandardized factor loadings—is crucially important. 
It indicates probable age equivalence in the measurement prop-
erties of the CES-D, justifying use of the scale for quantitative 
comparisons across age levels. These results are inconsistent 
with recent findings of Liang et al. (1989), who found genera-
tional differences in CES—D item factor loadings in a Mexican-
American population. Given the present findings of invariance 
in factor loadings for predominantly Caucasian, semiurban 
Pennsylvania, and urban Canadian populations, the lack of age-
related equivalence in factor structure found by Liang et al. 
(1989) may be specific to their Mexican-American population. 
There were significant age differences in the variances and 
covariances among CES-D factors. These differences were not a 
simple function of age (cohort) group membership, since the 
Victoria old and Annville old groups differed significantly. 
Given the skewed distribution of CES—D scores, the greater vari-
ance in the young Annville group may reflect a higher preva-
lence of depressed persons. Application of alternative tech-
niques for analyzing non-normal ordinal rating scale data (e.g., 
Muthen & Kaplan, 1985) may be needed to determine whether 
group differences in factor covariances reflect influences of non-
normal distributions or differences in relations among the four 
CES—D item factors. 
Table 4 
Model Comparisons 
Comparison Ax 2 Adf p 
M2 - M1 37.08 32 ns 
My - M2 38.13 10 <.001 
MI 	M2 82.24 10 <.001 
M5 	M2 105.74 20 <.001 
M5 - M3 67.61 10 <.001 
M5 	M4 23.50 10 <.01 
M6 	M2 66.64 12 <.001 
M5 	M6 39.10 8 <.001 
Note. Models in column 1 are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 5 
CES—D Variance/Covariance Matrixes for the Three Groups' 
Depression 	 Well-Being 
	
Somatic 	 Interpersonal 










259 (043)• 152 (033)c 
	
259 (051)" 
Annville (age 55+) 
210 (026)" 
	
197 (025) b4 
	
277 (035)• 
201(026) b 210(029) b 
	
286 (040) 
072 (013) b 
	
077 (015) b 063 (015) b 
	
051 (015) b 
Victoria (age 58+) 
346 (037) 1'4 
293 (034) 1'4 
	
432 (047)" 
239 (029) b 209(031) ° 	 335 (039) 
089(015) b 
	
078(017) b 076 (015) 	 087(017) b 
Note. Decimals omitted for clarity. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Significance tested with a normal deviate, computed as z = (01 - 952)/ (seF sei). 
b Significantly different from the Annville (age 20-54) group. 
Significantly different from the Annville (age 55+) group. 
Significantly different from the Victoria (age 58+) group. 
This study found only minor differences in age -related pat-
terns on the four CES-D subscales. There were age -related de-
creases from middle to old age in Depressive Affect, Well-Being, 
and Interpersonal Affect subscales, but there were no significant 
age differences on the Somatic scale. These results show more  
coherence in subscale means than found by Gatz and Hurwicz 
(in press), although we also found no evidence of age-related 
increases in Somatic scale scores. This finding may indicate that 
the biasing influence of somatic symptomatology is reduced in 









20-29 	30-39 	40-49 	50-59 60-69 	70-79 
Age Group 













70 	 HERTZOG, VAN ALSTINE, USALA, HULTSCH, DIXON 
Age Group 
Figure 4. Mean CES—D subscale scores across Age (Cohort) groups (SM = Somatic; 
DP = Depression; WB = Well-Being; IP = Interpersonal Relations). 
ever, it is still possible that elevated Somatic scale scores could 
produce false positive initial depression diagnoses when the to-
tal CES—D score is used. For example, one of our elderly men 
had a total CES—D score of 17 that was heavily influenced by a 
Somatic subscale score of 14. It is possible that classifications 
requiring the use of cutoffs on both the total cEs—p and Depres-
sive Affect subscale score would improve the accuracy of initial 
classification of unipolar depression in the elderly. 
It is interesting to note that this study replicates recent find-
ings on age differences in the CES—D in spite of the fact that it 
uses a volunteer (nonprobability) sample. Moreover, despite the 
likelihood of reduced volunteering behavior in depressed indi-
viduals, over 20% of the present sample had CES—D scores 
greater than the cutoff of 16. This pattern of results is encourag-
ing to psychologists seeking to use volunteer samples to study 
relationships between affective status and other variables in 
adulthood, although the observed prevalence of depression in 
older persons in this sample is lower than would be expected 
from data reported by Murrell et al. (1983). Moreover, we can-
not rule out the possibility that there are subtle selection effects 
(e.g., differences in the type of persons with depressed affect 
who volunteer versus those who do not) that may affect relation-
ships of CES—D scores with other variables (see Nesselroade, 
1988). 
Although the preceding discussion has treated the age differ-
ences in CES—D scores as if they reflect aging effects, it is crucial 
to note that such age differences might reflect true generational 
(birth cohort) differences in (a) prevalence of depression and 
depressive affect, (b) willingness to endorse items measuring 
negative affect, or (c) both. Use of long-term sequential studies 
would be required to address this issue. 
There is some question as to whether the second-order factor 
from the CES—D is best interpreted as a measure of depression 
or more broadly as a measure of general psychological distress. 
There is strong evidence that individual differences on self-re-
port depression scales relate highly to other affective dimen-
sions such as Anxiety (Aneshensel et al., 1983; Tanaka & Huba, 
1984; Veit & Ware, 1983). The literature on subjective well-be-
ing also shows that measures of negative and positive affect are 
highly and negatively related, but that these two dimensions are 
not perfect polar opposites (Diener, 1984; Lawton, 1983). One 
might therefore be justified in treating the second-order CES-
D factor combining Well-Being and Depression subscales as a 
composite scale combining aspects of positive and negative 
affect (Aneshensel et al., 1983; Roberts and Vernon, 1983). In 
any event, the present study suggests that both the CES-D total 
scale and its subscales have age-invariant measurement proper-
ties, justifying their use for assessment purposes with older pop-
ulations (Radloff & Teri, 1986). 
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Appendix 
Items from Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES—D) 
I. I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me. (Bothered) 
2. 1 did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. (Appetite) 
3. 1 felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends. 
(Blues) 
4. 1 felt that I was just as good as other people. (Good) 
5. 1 had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. (Mind) 
6. I felt depressed. (Depress) 
7. 1 felt that everything I did was an effort. (Effort) 
8. 1 felt hopeful about the future. (Hopeful) 
9. 1 thought my life had been a failure. (Failure) 
10. 1 felt fearful. (Fearful) 
I I. My sleep was restless. (Sleep) 
12. I was happy. (Happy) 
13. I talked less than usual. (Talk) 
14. I felt lonely. (Lonely) 
15. People were unfriendly. (Unfriend) 
16. I enjoyed life. (Enjoy) 
17. I had crying spells. (Cry) 
18. I felt sad. (Sad) 
19. I felt that people dislike me. (Dislike) 
20. I could not get "going." (Getgoing) 
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Relationships Between Metamemory, Memory Predictions, an_ d 
Memory Task Performance in Adults 
Christopher Hertzog 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Roger A. Dixon and David F. Hultsch 
University of Victoria 
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada 
A cross-sectional sample of adults recalled categorized word lists and narrative texts. Subjects gave 
performance predictions before each of 3 recall trials for each task. Older subjects had poorer mem-
ory performance and also predicted lower performance levels than did younger subjects. The LISREL 
models suggested (a) direct effects of memory self-efficacy (MSE) on initial predictions; (b) upgrad-
ing of prediction—performance correlations across trials, determined by direct effects of perfor-
mance on subsequent predictions; (c) significant effects of a higher order verbal memory factor on 
MSE; and (d) an independent relationship of text recall ability to initial text recall performance 
predictions. These results lend support to the theoretical treatment of predictions as task-specific 
MSE judgments. 
Many psychologists interested in age-related changes in 
memory have focused their attention on the role that meta-
memory plays in memory task performance and everyday 
memory behaviors (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Dixon & 
Hertzog, 1988; Zelinski, Gilewski, & Thompson, 1980). Meta-
memory, defined broadly as cognitions about memory (e.g., 
Wellman, 1983), is a multifaceted domain that includes such 
constructs as strategy selection and utilization, knowledge 
about how memory functions, and memory self-efficacy (beliefs 
about one's own ability to remember; Berry, West, & Dennehey, 
1989; Dixon, 1989; Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1989). 
A common technique for operationally defining meta-
memory in the early developmental literature was prediction 
of memory task performance (Schneider, 1985). The original 
theorists treated metamemory as knowledge and awareness of 
memory processes (Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Wellman, 1983), 
and memory predictions were often conceptualized as an index 
of knowledge about one's own memory (Cavanaugh & Perlmut-
ter, 1982; Schneider, 1985). Cavanaugh (1989) interpreted pre-
dictions as an aspect of awareness of memory functioning, a 
construct closely tied to the concept of memory monitoring 
(knowledge about current memory use, contents, and states). 
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Much of the early literature on adult age differences in meta-
memory involved some type of memory prediction paradigm 
(e.g., Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 1982; Murphy, Sanders, Ga-
briesheski, & Schmitt, 1981). A common procedure is to give 
subjects a description of a task with examples, or limited experi-
ence with the task, followed by a request to predict perfor-
mance. The central question is usually whether there are age 
differences in the accuracy of performance predictions. Several 
studies have suggested that older subjects overestimate their per-
formance on cognitive tasks, although not necessarily in all con-
ditions (Bruce et al., 1982; Coyne, 1985; M. E. Lachman & 
Jelalian, 1984; Lovelace & Marsh, 1985; Murphy et al., 1981). 
In contrast, other studies have found relatively accurate mem-
ory task predictions by older adults (Camp, Markley, & Kramer, 
1983; M. E. Lachman, Steinberg, & Trotter, 1987). 
Recently, M. E. Lachman et al. (1987) reported results sug-
gesting that older persons can upgrade the accuracy of their pre-
dictions after task experience. They found a significant relation-
ship between prior recall performance and predictions of a sec-
ond recall trial. Moreover, there seems to be relatively little age 
difference in either (a) accuracy of predictions of future perfor-
mance in the form of item-by-item ratings of memorability 
(Lovelace & Marsh, 1985; Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, & 
Hinchley, 1982) or (b) feeling-of-knowing judgments collected 
during or after the study phase of a memory task but prior to 
recall (e.g., Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988; J. L. Lachman, 
Lachman, & Thronesbery, 1979). The different pattern of age 
effects suggests that performance predictions after instructions 
or practice, but prior to the study of memory task materials, 
may tap a different aspect of metamemory than other predic-
tion paradigms (Lovelace & Marsh, 1985). 
What, then, is the relationship between performance predic-
tions and metamemory? Along with others (e.g., Berry et al., 
1989; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989), we have argued that memory 
self-efficacy represents an important unifying construct for un-
derstanding metamemory (Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & David-
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of scales from both the Metamemory in Adulthood question-
naire (MIA; Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1988) and the Memory 
Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986) 
converge on a strong memory self-efficacy factor. A major goal 
for further empirical research is to examine the relationship of 
memory self-efficacy, as measured by metamemory question-
naires, with memory task predictions. 
To accomplish this goal, one needs to distinguish general or 
global memory self-efficacy beliefs from local efficacy judg-
ments in a particular context (i.e., a particular memory task, 
the testing environment, and the concurrent physiological and 
psychological state of the rememberer, Dixon & Hertzog, 
1988). Memory self-efficacy is probably a highly schematized 
system of beliefs regarding one's ability to use multiple types of 
memory in various contexts. Questionnaires such as the MIA 
and MFQ measure memory self-efficacy by aggregating ratings 
of memory capacity and forgetting across several specific mem-
ory functions (e.g., remembering names, faces, and telephone 
numbers). The items are generalized in that they are divorced 
from a specific temporal and physical context. 
Performance predictions, on the other hand, may be concep-
tualized as self-efficacy judgments in the context of a specific 
memory task (e.g., Berry et aL, 1989). We propose that a perfor-
mance prediction is based on (a) global and local memory self-
efficacy, (b) an appraisal of the memory task, and (c) an as-yet 
unspecified set of processes translating one's memory self-
efficacy into a prediction estimate by using a representation of 
the distribution of task performance derived from the task as-
sessment (see also Cavanaugh, 1989). A performance predic-
tion will be based on a global memory self-efficacy belief in the 
absence of specific, local experience in the memory domain as-
sessed by the task or on more specific beliefs about one's mem-
ory self-efficacy in familiar situations. In either case, however, 
the belief system must be combined with the task appraisal to 
produce a performance estimate. 
This conceptualization of beliefs and efficacy judgments has 
important implications for explaining prediction behavior as 
well as prediction accuracy. It suggests three classes of possible 
reasons for inaccurate performance predictions: (a) inaccurate 
memory self-efficacy, either global or local; (b) inaccurate ap-
praisal of the memory task and, by implication, inaccurate rep-
resentation of the distribution of task performance; and (c) 
faulty mapping of memory self-efficacy beliefs onto the perfor-
mance distribution. Shaw and Craik (1989) recently reported 
results that can be interpreted as indicating faulty memory task 
appraisal by subjects. They found that performance predictions 
of both older and younger subjects were insensitive to experi-
mental manipulations known to affect cued-recall perfor-
mance, even though subjects were informed of the manipula-
tions. As was the case in several studies cited earlier, Shaw and 
Craik's (1989) older subjects overestimated their recall perfor-
mance, predicting recall performance approximately equiva-
lent to that of the younger subjects, but performing more poorly 
than the younger adults. Thus, overestimation of performance 
by older persons might not reflect overconfidence in memory 
ability, but rather, inaccurate task appraisal—for example, an 
inaccurate estimate of how well the average individual performs 
on that memory task. 
This study used structural regression models to address the 
nature and degree of relationships between metamemory, 
memory predictions, and memory performance. The primary 
focus was on modeling individual differences in these variables, 
although hypotheses about mean age differences more typical 
of the existing literature were also examined. Adult participants 
performed three times on two different memory tasks: free re-
call of words (nouns from multiple taxonomic categories) and 
free recall of narrative texts. They also predicted performance 
levels before each recall task. Two types of memory task were 
used because the issue of whether there are differential relation-
ships of performance on different memory tasks to memory 
self-efficacy and to task-specific predictions is still unresolved. 
Some have argued that memory self-efficacy beliefs will relate 
more highly to tasks that assess memory as it is used in everyday 
life (Berry et al., 1989). Although significant metamemory-
memory task performance relationships are not always found, 
most studies using text recall tasks have detected significant re-
lationships of text recall with questionnaire measures of mem-
ory self-efficacy (e.g., Cavanaugh & Poon. 1989; Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983; Sunderland, Watts, Baddeley, & Harris, 1986; 
Zelinski et al., 1980). Perhaps the need to recall information 
from text materials occurs relatively often in everyday life, en-
hancing the accuracy of self-efficacy beliefs. However, Zelinski 
et al. (1980) and Cavanaugh and Poon (1989) reported signifi-
cant memory self-efficacy relationships with both text recall 
and word-list recall. 
The prediction paradigm was designed to minimize the in-
fluence of individual differences in task assessments on memory 
task predictions by giving subjects prior information about av-
erage performance levels on the task. Assuming multiple influ-
ences on memory predictions, we reasoned that the correlation 
between general memory self-efficacy beliefs and predictions 
would be maximized when individuals already possess, or are 
explicitly given, information about normative levels of task per-
formance. Moreover, given task experience, individuals should 
use memory-monitoring skills to form task-specific perfor-
mance evaluations and self-efficacy beliefs (Cavanaugh, 1989; 
Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). This process should improve 
prediction accuracy over recall trials (Herrmann, Grubs, Sig-
mundi, & Grueneich, 1986; M. E. Lachman et al., 1987) but 
lower the correlations of performance predictions on later trials 
with more general memory self-efficacy beliefs. We therefore 
hypothesized (a) a significant relationship between memory 
self-efficacy, as measured by the MIA and MFQ, and memory 
task performance predictions; (b) significant relationships be-
tween memory self-efficacy and memory task performance; (c) 
higher relationships of text recall to memory self-efficacy and 
text predictions than of word recall to memory self-efficacy and 
word-list predictions; and (d) significant increases in the corre-
lation of predictions with performance across trials. In addi-
tion, we assigned subjects to prediction and no-prediction con-
ditions to assess possible reactive effects of making predictions 
on recall performance. 
Method 
Subjects 
The sample consisted of adults, aged 20 to 79, drawn from the greater 
Lebanon Valley of Pennsylvania. The total sample included 422 com- 
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Table 1 
Demographic Data for Prediction and No-Prediction Groups 
Group 
Age Education Vocabulary 
Self-rated 
health' 
SD M SD M SD M SD 
Younger 
Prediction 
Men 34 35.9 7.2 14.4 3.6 32.8 9.2 6.9 1.0 
Women 51 37.3 6.0 13.7 2.5 33.8 10.2 7.6 1.2 
Middle-aged 
Men 22 52.6 4.6 13.9 3.8 32.9 8.4 6.6 1.0 
Women 31 54.1 4.1 12.3 2.1 31.4 11.1 6.7 1.5 
Older 
Men 41 65.6 5.2 13.1 2.8 34.1 10.9 6.0 1.3 
Women 46 67.0 5.5 12.7 2.4 36.2 9.4 5.8 1.7 
No prediction 
Younger 
Men 24 38.0 5.6 14.5 4.0 32.4 11.7 6.8 1.3 
Women 40 36.8 5.8 14.4 2.9 34.1 8.4 7.5 1.2 
Middle-aged 
Men 19 52.2 4.5 13.4 2.7 34.8 10.4 6.7 1.5 
Women 38 53.2 4.1 12.6 2.4 34.2 8.6 6.7 1.5 
Older 
Men 32 68.4 5.0 13.7 3.4 35.8 9.8 6.0 1.3 
Women 44 67.6 5.0 13.4 3.3 38.3 8.9 5.7 1.9 
' Rated on a 1-9 scale, with 1 = poor and 9 = excellent. 
munity-dwelling adults. The sample was recruited by mail from the 
membership of a large medical family practice located in Annville, 
Pennsylvania, and was supplemented by a snowballing technique. The 
recruitment letter and telephone script informed potential participants 
that tests of memory would be part of the study. Subjects were paid a 
nominal fee of $ 15 for their participation. 
Subjects were assigned to either a memory task prediction or no-pre-
diction condition (see below). For some analyses, the sample was divided 
into three age groups (20-45, 46-59, and 60-79). Descriptive statistics 
on age, education, vocabulary scores, and self-rated health for subjects 
in the Prediction x Age Group x Sex factorial design are shown in 
Table 1. The sample was relatively heterogeneous in vocabulary and 
educational attainment. Participants generally reported themselves to 
be in good health. There were more women than men, and there were 
relatively few young adults (under age 30) in the sample. 
Measures 
Metamemory. Metamemory was measured with multiple scales from 
the MIA and MFQ. The construct of memory self-efficacy was the pri-
mary aspect of metamemory emphasized in this study. Memory self-
efficacy was measured by the Capacity scale of the MIA and by the 
Frequency of Forgetting scale from the MFQ. Both have high reliability 
and have been shown to be convergent measures of a higher order mem-
ory self-efficacy factor (see Hertzog et al., 1989). The MIA Capacity 
scale requires Likert scale ratings of statements like, "I am good at re-
membering names." The MFQ Frequency of Forgetting scale requires 
frequency judgments on how often one forgets specific types of informa-
tion (e.g., names and appointments; Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986). 
The remaining metamemory scales from the 108-item version of the 
MIA were also administered: Strategy (use of mnemonics and external 
memory aids in everyday life), Task (knowledge of memory processes 
and functions), Achievement (achievement motivation regarding mem- 
cry), Anxiety (degree of anxiety involving memory), and Locus (per-
ceived control over memory). Additional information regarding these 
scales may be found in Dixon et al. (1988). 
Vocabulary. A vocabulary test was formed by pooling 54 items from 
the ETS Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, 
Harman, & Dermen, 1976), measures of V2, V4, and V5. Subjects were 
given 15 min to take the test. 
Categorized free recall. Three lists of 30 nouns were constructed. 
with 6 words from each of five taxonomic categories. All exemplars were 
highly typical of their category, according to norms established by How-
ard (1980). Categories were assigned to lists so as to maximize category 
distinctiveness (i.e., avoiding joint testing of categories such as trees and 
fruits). The List 1 categories were metals, animals, trees, sports, and 
flowers. The List 2 categories included relatives, fruits, birds, furniture. 
and weapons. List 3 was vegetables, insects, fish, jobs, and toys. The 
order of words in each list was randomized, under the constraint that 
exemplars from the same category could not be adjacent in the list. The 
same word lists were presented to all subjects. 
Two measures were used for each list: the total number of words re-
called and the adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) developed by Roenker, 
Thompson, and Brown (1971). The ARC reflects degree of clustering 
of words by categories during recall. Random clustering is reflected by 
a score of 0; perfect clustering is indicated by a score of 1.0. For purposes 
of data analysis, undefined ratios were treated as missing data. 
Text recall. Three narrative stories were constructed and analyzed 
according to a hierarchical propositional system developed by Kintsch 
(1974). Stories 1, 2, and 3 contained 149, 154, and 158 propositions, 
respectively. Recall protocols were scored for presence of each proposi-
tion, with the criterion that a proposition was scored as present if the 
gist of its meaning was expressed correctly, irrespective of the words 
used to express it (Turner & Greene, 1977). Although differential recall 
of propositions from different organizational levels of texts is a well-
established phenomenon (e.g., Hultsch & Dixon, 1984; van Dijk & 
218 	 C. HERTZOG, R. DIXON, AND D. HULTSCH 
Kintsch, 1983), this study measured text memory by proportion of total 
propositions recalled. There were several reasons for this decision. First, 
this study is primarily concerned with prediction—performance rela-
tionships instead of text recall per se. Second, an analysis of variance 
(ANOvA) differentiating levels as a within-subject factor showed typical 
levels effects but no interactions of levels with other factors (including 
age and prediction condition). Third, examination of correlations of 
text recall and text prediction suggested little variation in correlations 
across levels. 
Recall protocols were stratified by age of respondent and then as-
signed at random to one of three raters. Rater reliabilities were obtained 
by having all three raters score data for 10 subjects (30 stories), distrib-
uted over the entire age range. Interrater reliability, estimated by using 
repeated measures ANovA to estimate reliable and unreliable variance 
components, was .93. 
Predictions. Before each memory task, subjects in the memory pre-
diction condition were given a brief description of the task. They were 
then told: "Before you actually do the task described above, we would 
like to ask you to tell us how well you think you will do. It may help you 
to know that on this task the average person is able to remember about 
[15 of 30 words on the categorized word recall task or 25 of 50 ideas on 
the text recall task]." These values were arbitrarily selected to anchor 
predictions in the middle of the range of possible responses. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested in small groups consisting of between 5 and 15 
persons. The data were collected as part of a larger construct validation 
study of the MIA and MFQ (Hertzog et al., 1989). All questionnaires 
and tasks were given in two separate sessions lasting approximately 2 
hr. Subjects were scheduled in sessions separated by exactly 1 week, with 
few exceptions, although individuals unable to attend the scheduled sec-
ond session were retested whenever possible. The metamemory ques-
tionnaires were given in the first session, along with several other ques-
tionnaires. The second session began with the vocabulary test, followed 
by the memory task booklet. 
Memory task booklets either did or did not request predictions and 
confidence levels. Groups of subjects were assigned in advance to re-
ceive one type of booklet. Assignment of groups was made randomly 
under the constraint that an attempt was made to get a similar age distri-
bution in each condition. To achieve this goal, deliberate assignment of 
some groups to prediction conditions was necessary during the latter 
stages of data collection. 
Recall test booklets were arranged with memory tasks in invariant 
order. Word List 1, Story I, Word List 2, Story 2, Word List 3, and Story 
3. Memory tasks were paced by the experimenter. Subjects were allowed 
2 min for study and 5 min for recall of each word list. They were given 
3 min to read and 7 min to recall each story. Word lists and texts were 
presented in invariant order to facilitate individual differences analyses. 
This design has the disadvantage of confounding list (or text) with trial, 
but counterbalancing order across subjects would have allowed order 
effects to influence the correlations of recall measures with other vari-
ables. 
Statistical Procedures 
Analysis of (a) reactive effects of predictions on memory task perfor-
mance and (b) age and sex differences in predictions used repeated mea-
sures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOvA) with orthogonal poly-
nomial contrasts to analyze the within-subject trials factor of the multi-
ple recall trials (Hertzog & Rovine, 1985). 
Relationships among metamemory, predictions, and performance 
were analyzed with the LISREL vi program (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1984). 
LISREL uses full-information maximum likelihood methods to estimate  
parameters of structural regression models (Hayduk, 1987). Identifica-
tion is achieved by placing sufficient restrictions on the parameters, of-
ten in the form of fixed coefficients (e.g., fixing the regression of two 
unrelated variables to 0). LISREL produces parameter estimates, stan-
dard errors, and associated fit statistics. The overall fit of the model is 
evaluated by a likelihood ratio chi-square test and by a goodness-of-fit 
index (GFI). The GFI ranges from 0 to 1.0, with values greater than 0.9 
traditionally considered good (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Competing 
models may be compared in terms of the fit indexes, plausibility and 
parsimony of parameter estimates, and additional model diagnostics. 
such as residuals (differences between predicted and observed variances 
and covariances) and modification indexes indicating fixed parameters 
that are possible sources of poor model fit. 
Results 
Reactive Effects of Predictions 
Reactive effects of predictions were analyzed in a2 X 3x2x 
3 (Prediction X Age X Sex X Trial) MANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the trial variable. Table 2 provides the means and 
standard deviations for the 417 subjects with complete data on 
all three dependent measures: word recall, ARC scores, and text 
recall. 
The MANOVA showed neither significant prediction effects 
nor significant interactions involving Prediction X Trial effects 
for any of the dependent measures. In particular, the between-
groups effect of prediction and age was not significant (Wilks's 
A = 0.975), multivariate F(6, 806) = 1.69, p > .10, indicating 
no significant impact of making predictions on age differences 
in memory performance. Although all individuals had been as-
signed to either the prediction or no-prediction condition, the 
group testing environment allowed some individuals to omit us-
able predictions. Sixty-five of the 225 persons assigned to the 
prediction group were missing at least one prediction (usually 
the first word recall prediction). Age-group membership related 
to the frequency of missing data, x 2(2, N = 225) = i8.90, p < 
.001; 60% of the cases with missing predictions were age 60 or 
older. Subjects omitting predictions also had significantly fewer 
years of education, as well as significantly lower word and text 
recall performance than those subjects making all predictions. 
However, the two groups did not differ significantly in meta-
memory scales from the MIA and MFQ. An analysis excluding 
subjects with missing data produced a modest univariate Pre-
diction X Age interaction for word recall, F(2, 341) = 3.75, p < 
.03, but not for text recall (p > .10). The marginal means for 
word recall showed larger age differences in the no-prediction 
condition (older subjects recalled 4.25 fewer words than did 
younger subjects) than in the prediction condition (older sub-
jects recalled 3.29 fewer words). Although this result might indi-
cate a true differential impact of predictions (e.g., making pre-
dictions increases motivation in older persons), it is also consis-
tent with the hypothesis that persons omitting predictions are 
less cognitively able and that exclusion because of missing data 
positively biased the older prediction group (presumably, low-
education and low-memory-ability subjects who would have 
been at risk for omitting predictions remained in the no-predic-
tion group). 
In contrast to the lack of salient prediction effects, the analy-
sis produced strong effects of age (Wilks's A = 0.751), F(6, 
Dependent variable Dependent variable 
Age group 
(Years) 
Word recall ARC 
M SD M SD 
20-45 
Men (n = 33) 
Prediction 
Trial 1 19.27 3.50 .489 .371 
Trial 2 19.97 4.56 .722 .224 
Trial 3 20.03 4.39 .592 .332 
Women (n = 51) 
Trial 1 20.63 3.96 .531 .341 
Trial 2 21.71 4.20 .771 .243 
Trial 3 20.90 4.80 .583 .316 
46-59 
Men (n = 22) 
Trial 1 16.32 4.40 .364 .395 
Trial 2 15.96 4.46 .521 .353 
Trial 3 15.82 4.10 .291 .295 
Women (n = 31) 
Trial 1 17.00 4.97 .419 .426 
Trial 2 18.65 4.39 .685 .268 
Trial 3 19.16 5.11 .577 .274 
60-79 
Men (n = 40) 
Trial I 15.78 4.74 .523 .316 
Trial 2 14.46 4.56 .598 .442 
Trial 3 14.28 4.57 .421 .431 
Women (n = 44) 
Trial 1 17.09 3.48 .542 .289 
Trial 2 17.25 4.07 .710 .237 
Trial 3 16.64 4.41 .533 .325 
Age group 
(Years) 
Word recall ARC Text recall 
M SD M SD M SD 
20-45 
Men (n = 24) 
No prediction 
Trial 1 18.96 3.95 .450 .353 .286 .113 
Trial 2 20.92 5.05 .618 .491 .237 .108 
Trial 3 19.88 5.76 .514 .384 .267 .109 
Women (n = 40) 
Trial 1 19.80 3.61 .470 .348 .373 .111 
Trial 2 21.18 4.60 .618 .328 .320 .125 
Trial 3 20.55 4.21 .493 .381 .358 .153 
46-59 
Men (n = 19) 
Trial I 17.79 5.95 .584 .370 .272 .088 
Trial 2 18.58 6.18 .579 .362 .251 .106 
Trial 3 17.47 6.02 .430 .374 .269 .119 
Women (n = 38) 
Trial I 19.63 4.50 .572 .266 .310 .088 
Trial 2 20.61 3.98 .724 .225 .285 .092 
Trial 3 20.34 4.36 .605 .268 .272 .100 
60-79 
Men (n = 31) 
Trial 1 14.94 4.70 .553 .359 .247 .079 
Trial 2 15.74 5.45 .661 .351 .210 .081 
Trial 3 14.97 4.87 .531 .360 .212 .106 
Women (n = 44) 
Trial 1 16.27 4.49 .510 .369 .270 .079 
Trial 2 17.09 4.38 .650 .257 .227 .073 


























Recall Performance for Prediction X Age X Sex Groups 
Note. ARC = adjusted ratio of clustering. 
806) = 20.67, p < .001, and sex (Wines's A = 0.952), F(6, 
678) = 6.75, p < .001. There was an age-related decrease in 
word recall and text recall performance, but there were no age 
differences in clustering behavior. Women performed signifi-
cantly better than men on both recall tasks, and women clus-
tered responses more during word recall, F(1, 405) = 4.92, 
p < .05. 
The MANOVA tests for the within-subject effects of trial, F(6, 
400) = 30.63, p < .001, and the Age x Trial interaction, F(6, 
400) = 3.53, p < .001, were also significant. Polynomial trend 
contrasts showed salient quadratic effects for all three depen-
dent variables. The quadratic trend for ARC scores was signifi. 7 
cant, F(1, 341) = 106.19, p < .001. All groups showed greater 
clustering for List 2 than for List 1 or 3, which did not differ, 
and there was a matching, weaker trend in word-list recall, with 
highest performance on List 2. Significant linear, F(1, 405) = 
31.91, p < .001, and quadratic, F(1, 405) = 43.30, p < .001, 
effects for text recall reflected higher overall performance on the 
first story. The overall Age X Trial interaction was isolated to a 
significant difference between younger and older participants in 
the linear trend across trials for text recall, F(1, 405) = 10.81, 
p < .001. Older subjects showed significantly lower recall than 
did younger subjects on the third text relative to the first text. 
Given the focus of the study on individual differences in 
memory and metamemory, we tested the homogeneity of covar-
iance matrices for the nine performance measures (word recall, 
ARC, and text recall) between the prediction and no-prediction 
groups. Box's test approximated its expected value under Ho, 
x2(45, N = 353) = 44.41, ns, justifying acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of equality of the prediction-group covariance ma-
trices. 
Age Differences in Predictions 
Word and text recall predictions for the 157 subjects with 
complete data were analyzed in a 3 X 2 X 3 (Age X Sex x Trial) 
MANOVA. There were significant multivariate age differences, 
F(4, 306) = 4.98, p < .001, with increasing age associated with 
lower predicted performance levels for both text and word re-
call. 
The analysis also revealed significant trial and Sex x Trial 
effects. The trial effect was restricted to a significant linear in-
crease in the word recall predictions, F(1, 154) = 13.20, p < 
.001, and a weak linear trend for increase in text recall predic-
tions, F(1, 154) = 4.11, p < .05. The Sex X Trial interaction 
involved only the linear trend for word recall predictions. Fig-
ure 1 shows the unweighted marginal means for word recall pre-
dictions separately for men and women, as well as the average 
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Figure 1. Word-list predictions and performance for men and women. 
word recall performance (pooled over trials). The pooled stan-
dard deviation across all cells was 4.1 words. The significant 
interaction reflected a disordinal increase in women's predic-
tions across trials. Women and men alike underestimated their 
performance on List 1, probably because they had been told 
that average performance was 15 words recalled, although the 
empirically observed mean recall was approximately 18 words. 
Women predicted lower performance than did men for List 1 
but actually outperformed them. Subsequently, women's pre-
dictions showed significant increases over time, presumably be-
cause they were able to monitor their performance and update 
their predictions. 
Figure 2 provides the unweighted marginal means for the 
three age groups in word recall predictions, along with the aver-
age word recall performance (pooled over trials). All three age 
groups increased their performance estimates slightly, but the 
age differences in the amount of increase were not significant, 
in spite of the fact that younger adults' performance levels were 
considerably higher than their initial prediction. 
Figure 3 shows the unweighted marginal means of the text 
recall predictions for three age groups. To facilitate compari- 
Figure 2. Word-list predictions and performance for three age groups. 
sons with recall performance, predictions were rescaled as pro-
portion of the 50 idea units given to subjects as total number of 
ideas in the text.' The pooled standard deviation across cells 
was 0.14 (14%). Text recall predictions showed virtually no 
change across the three trials. Indeed, even though average per-
formance levels were lower than predicted levels, text recall pre-
dictions increased slightly over trials. 
Prediction-Performance Differences 
Most previous studies of prediction accuracy have analyzed 
difference scores between predictions and actual performance 
(e.g., Bruce et al., 1982; cf. Shaw & Craik, 1989). An ANOVA of 
recall-prediction difference scores for the 164 cases with com-
plete data for word-list recall produced significant effects for 
sex, F(1, 158) = 9.21, p < .01; age, F(2, 158) = 3.47, p < .05; 
and the Age X Sex interaction, F(2, 158) = 4.02, p < .05. There 
were no interactions involving the trial variable, and the main 
effect for trial did not achieve statistical significance (p > .05). 
The difference scores on Trial 1 for word recall for all Age x 
Sex groups are shown in Table 3. Women underestimated per-
formance more than men did, but the differences were inconsis-
tent across age groups. Older women's predictions were signifi-
cantly closer to actual performance than were younger women's 
predictions, but the same comparison was not significant for 
men (and indeed, the trend was in the opposite direction). The 
provision of prior normative information that was graded by 
neither age nor sex, given significant age and sex effects in recall, 
complicates interpretation of the difference scores, as discussed 
later. The corresponding analysis of recall-prediction difference 
scores for text recall produced a different pattern of results. 
There were no effects associated with age, but women were 
more accurate than men, F(1, 172) = 5.18. p < .05. Accuracy 
increased linearly across trials, F(1, 172) = 5.55, p < .05, but 
the modest improvements did not interact with either age 
or sex. 
The performance benchmark in Figure 3 is somewhat arbitrary, 
given the lack of perfect correspondence between text propositions as 
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(n = 164) (n = 178) 
Group M SD M SD 
Men 	. 
Young .09 .17 .21 .12 
Middle-aged .02 .17 .20 .10 
Old .11 .13 .18 .10 
Women 
Young .19 .18 .14 .14 
Middle-aged .15 .19 .15 .16 
Old .09 .13 .15 .13 
Structural Models of Performance 
Zero-order correlations. Correlations of metamemory scales 
and the memory performance predictions for the 155 subjects 
with complete data on all metamemory, prediction, and perfor-
mance variables are shown in Table 4. Note the significant cor-
relations of MIA Capacity, MIA Change, and MFQ Frequency 
of Forgetting scales with word and text recall predictions. These 
scales relate to the higher order memory self-efficacy factor 
identified by Hertzog et al. (1989). In contrast, the correlations 
of other MIA scales (Strategy, Task, and Achievement) with per-
formance predictions were small and generally nonsignificant. 
This finding suggested that predictions were related primarily 
to the memory self-efficacy factor. The correlations between 
memory self-efficacy measures were largest for the first predic-
tion but then declined slightly across trials. 
Table 5 shows the correlations of memory performance pre-
dictions and actual memory performance for word and text re-
call. There was a significant but modest correlation of the first 
word recall task with the first word recall prediction, but subse-
quent correlations between predictions and word recall perfor-
mance increased dramatically. The highest sample correlations 
were associated with the immediately prior task performance  
with the subsequent prediction. For example, performance on 
Trial 1 correlated .58 with the prediction for Trial 2, whereas 
predicted Trial 2 performance correlated .52 with actual Trial 
2 performance. Correlations of text recall predictions and text 
recall task performance were initially higher than the corre-
lations between word prediction and recall, but those between 
text prediction and recall showed less increase across trials, 
Initial regression analyses. Hierarchical regression analysis 
was performed to determine whether there were interactions 
between age, metamemory, and predictions. The analysis en-
tered (a) the MIA Capacity, Task, and Strategy scales; (b) age 
and sex; (c) the three MIA Scale X Age interactions; and (d) the 
three MIA Scale X Sex interactions into an equation using the 
first word recall prediction as the dependent variable. In Stage 
1, the three MIA scales related significantly to the first word 
recall prediction (R2 = .18), F(3, 151) = 10.93, p < .001. The 
MIA Capacity scale produced the only significant regression co-
efficient (# = .42, t = 5.43, p < .001). 
Although significant age differences in the word recall predic-
tions had been observed (see earlier text), age was not a signifi-
cant predictor of word recall predictions when added to the 
equation in the second hierarchical stage, F(1, 150) = 1.07, p > 
.05. This outcome suggested that age differences in predictions 
may be mediated by age differences in memory self-efficacy. 
There were no significant interactions involving age or sex, sug-
gesting no age differences in the relationships of MIA scales to 
predictions. Similar analyses showed no interactions of age and 
metamemory measures in relation to word-list recall, as well as 
no interactions of age and recall in determination of the second 
word-list performance prediction. Subsequent LISREL models 
were therefore conducted without using multiplicative interac-
tion terms associated with age. 
The LISREL model for word prediction and recall_ The first 
model used the word recall data to identify the relationship be-
tween age, sex, predictions, ARC measures of clustering, and 
word recall. The major issue was whether predictions reflect an 
upgraded efficacy judgment on the basis of past performance or 
whether predictions reflect upgrading of an efficacy judgment 
on the basis of both past performance and concurrent evalua-
tion of present state (e.g., level of fatigue prior to memory per-
formance). Cross-lagged regression models were used to deter- 
Table 4 
Correlations Among Metamemory and Memory Predictions 
Metamemory 
scale 
Prediction 1 Prediction 2 Prediction 3 
Word Text Word Text Word Text 
Strategy .06 .16* .17* .18* .25** .13 
Task .14* .20** .07 .22** .14* .17* 
Locus .14* .06 -.04 .01 -.01 -.07 
Achievement .03 .08 -.03 .09 .01 .02 
Anxiety -.25** -.14* -.10 -.11 -.08 -.10 
Capacity .39** .37** .20** .32** .33** .27** 
Change .41** .38** .25 ** .31** .27** .26** 
Frequency of 
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Table 5 
Correlations of Recall Predictions With Recall Performance 
Trial Performance 	Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
Recall 
Word recall prediction 
.24* .58' .62' 
1 ARC .08 .35' .40' 
2 Recall .24' .52' .71 * 
2 ARC .11 .30' .40* 
3 Recall .29' .52* .62' 
3 ARC .07 .20* .35' 
Text recall prediction 
1 Recall .44' .54* .51 * 
2 Recall .50' .54' .54' 
3 Recall .58' .58* .58' 
Note. ARC = adjusted ratio of clustering. 
•p<.01. 
mine whether the lagged effect of past performance on the next 
prediction was sufficient to account for the correlations among 
predictions and memory performance (Schaie & Hertzog, 
1985). 
We initially specified a first-order autoregressive model in 
which each variable determined itself over time. For example, 
word recall for List I determined recall for List 2, which in turn 
determined recall for List 3. However, we found that we needed 
to add second-order lagged regressions for all three sets of per-
formance measures (e.g., recall of List 1 predicting recall of List 
3 independent of the mediated effect through recall of List 2) 
in order to fit the data. The model's standardized regression 
coefficients clearly demonstrated upgrading of performance es-
timates on the basis of prior performance (Figure 4). The model 
yielded roughly equal stability for prediction and lagged deter-
mination of prediction by prior recall performance (e.g., 
amount of recall of List 1 determining prediction for List 2). 
However, an alternative model adding concurrent predictions 
of recall by the immediately preceding prediction did not im-
prove the fit. 
Given the relative absence of relationship between clustering 
and all variables .except recall performance, the clustering mea-
sures were dropped from subsequent LISREL models. 
Structural model for word and text recall. The next set of 
models used (a) three word recall predictions, (b) three word 
recall performances, (c) three text recall predictions, (d) three 
text recall performances, and (e) two measures of memory self-
efficacy (i.e., MIA Capacity scale and MFQ Frequency of For-
getting scale). A central question was whether text recall influ-
enced subsequent text recall performance predictions, as was 
the case for word recall, and if so, would it be statistically inde-
pendent of the upgrading of word recall predictions? An initial 
model specifying simultaneous autoregressive sequences for 
text and word recall measures was rejected because it provided 
very poor fit to the correlations between text and word recall 
measures and text and word predictions. This result led us to 
reconsider the conceptual basis for modeling relationships 
among prediction and performance measures. 
One possibly faulty assumption of the autoregressive model 
was that each recall performance can be treated as a separate 
variable with a direct influence on subsequent performance. It 
was more parsimonious to assume no causal relation between 
recall over trials, and instead we assumed that recall of each 
word list reflects an underlying latent ability for free recall of 
words from a categorized list and that recall of each text mea-
sures a latent text recall ability. If each performance is an ob-
served measure of an underlying memory ability construct, 
then any attempt to fit a first-order autoregressive model to co-
variances actually determined by a latent variable would result 
in residual covariances between the Trial 1 and Trial 3 mea-
sures. Similarly, the strong residual relationships between text 
and word recall measures suggested that the sizable correlation 
of the text and word recall latent variables could not be fit ade-
quately by an autoregressive model, which mediates the rela-
tionship between text and word recall through a correlation of 
recall of the first word list with recall of the first story. 
This alternative perspective led us to test a model with only 
latent variables for predictions and recall performance, ignor-
ing trial-specific relationships and changes in individual differ-
ences across trials. We anticipated that such a pure latent-vari-
able model would inadequately represent the upgrading of per-
formance predictions so clearly evident in the zero-order 
correlations, especially for word recall. At issue, however, was 
(a) how well the latent variable model would fit the recall perfor-
mance correlations and (b) whether, subsequently, more com-
plex models would provide an even better fit to the data. The 
first pure latent-variable model specified five factors: Word Re-
call Prediction, Word Recall Performance, Text Prediction, 
Text Performance, and Memory Self-efficacy. This model actu-
ally fared relatively well, x 2(67, N = 155) = 142.94, p < .001, 
GFI = 0.884. However, the factor loadings on the Word Recall 
Prediction factor differed substantially, with the lowest loading 
for predictions of Trial 1 performance, and there were some 
large modification indexes. One obvious source of stress was a 
.08 
Figure 4. Autoregressive model for word recall prediction and perfor-
mance. (WP = word recall prediction; ARC = adjusted ratio of cluster-




high residual between the first word recall prediction and the 
metamemory measures. A model adding factor loadings of the 
first word recall prediction and the first text recall prediction on 
the Memory Self-efficacy factor still contained an implausible 
pattern of factor loadings and some large residual correlations 
between predicted and actual recall measures, confirming the 
expectation that memory ability and memory prediction latent 
variables alone could not fully account for the data. 
Another possible problem with the original autoregressive 
models involved the direction of effects specified in the model. 
The regression approach had been driven implicitly by the pre-
dictive validity question: Are recall predictions statistically as-
sociated with recall? However, we thought it more parsimonious 
to assume that latent text and word recall abilities cause mem-
ory self-efficacy beliefs, which in turn influence task perfor-
mance predictions. A second problem derived from the need 
for a latent-variable specification for recall performance. How 
should the phenomenon of upgraded performance predictions 
across trials be modeled in the context of a latent ability frame-
work for memory? We reasoned that the proximal cause of the 
predictions in the later trials of a multitrial design is not the 
latent ability to recall text or words per se, but rather the actual 
performance on the task. One evaluates the performance on the 
current task and revises subsequent estimates accordingly. This 
perspective suggested that latent memory ability determines 
memory self-efficacy and, indirectly, initial performance pre-
dictions, but that actual performance on a particular recall trial 
determines changes in predictions between trials. 
We executed a series of models implementing this alternative 
perspective. The first model, M,, was actually a measurement 
model similar to the pure latent-variable models previously es-
timated, but it allowed each prediction variable to be a separate 
factor. This model formed the baseline for evaluating any struc-
tural equation model using it as the base measurement model 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The model fit well, x 2(47, N = 
15.5) = 72.13, p = .01, GFI = 0.938, confirming the hypothesis 
that much of the poor fit of the pure latent-variable models de-
rived from between-trials differences in the correlations of pre-
dictions and performance variables. 
The second model, M2, specified an endogenous Memory 
Self-efficacy factor, determined jointly by latent Text Memory 
and Word Memory factors. Memory Self-efficacy, in turn, in-
fluenced performance predictions. M2 also specified both auto-
regressive relations among text and word predictions and lagged 
influences of word predictions on immediately following text 
predictions (e.g., first word recall prediction influencing first 
text recall prediction). M2 fit slightly better than the pure latent-
variable model but fit significantly poorer than M L , difference 
in x2(19, N = 155) = 59.95, p < .001. A salient improvement 
in fit was achieved by adding a direct path of the latent Text 
Memory factor to the first text recall prediction in the third 
model, M3, difference in x 2(1, N = 155) = 33.59, p < .001. 
Indeed, the difference in fit between M3 and M I became small 
relative to the difference in degrees of freedom. A major prob-
lem with M3, however, was apparent multicollinearity between 
the Text Memory and Word Memory factors in their determina-
tion of Memory Self-efficacy, evident in the low regression 
weights but high correlations among the three factors. The esti-
mated correlation of .68 between the Text Memory and Word 
Memory factors indicated that a higher order Verbal Memory 
factor may have been determining both memory factors and 
mediating the relationship of latent memory ability to memory 
self-efficacy. 
Model M4 added a higher order Verbal Memory factor but 
maintained an independent path from Text Memory to the first 
text recall prediction. M., fit approximately the same as M3, 
X2(67, N = 155) = 100.38, p < .01, GFI = 0.913, suggesting 
little cost in specifying the higher order Verbal Memory factor. 
We next attempted an alternative specification, in which an or-
thogonal Prediction factor was added to the model. This factor 
was intended to account for systematic individual differences in 
prediction behavior (for example, individual differences in the 
tendency to under- or overestimate performance). The model 
still allowed autoregressive coefficients among the text and word 
recall predictions but accounted for all correlations between 
text and word predictions in terms of the latent Prediction fac-
tor. The model specified Memory Self-efficacy to influence the 
first word recall prediction and first text recall prediction. It also 
specified an independent, direct effect of Text Memory on the 
first text prediction. This model, M5, fit about the same as 
model M4. Modification indexes suggested further paths of text 
recall variables to the immediately following word recall predic-
tion. The paths of the first text recall performance to second 
word recall prediction and the second text recall performance 
to third word recall prediction were added, generating model 
M6. It fit better than did its predecessors, x 2(61, N = 155) = 
83.54, p = .03, GFI = 0.931, and did not differ appreciably from 
model M 1 , difference in x 2(14, N = 155) = 11.41, ns. 2 
The final model included age and sex as exogenous variables. 
The model fit well, x 2(85, N = 155) = 117.51, p = .01, GFI = 
0.92, in spite of a highly restricted specification of relationships 
of age and sex with the other latent variables. The standardized 
regression coefficients (factor loadings and structural regression 
coefficients) are shown in Figure 5. There are several notewor-
thy features of the model. First, the latent variables were well 
defined, as shown by (a) high loadings of the Text Memory and 
Word Memory factors on the second-order Verbal Memory fac-
tor and (b) strong relationships of the Memory Self-efficacy fac-
tor to the MIA Capacity and MFQ Frequency of Forgetting 
scales. Second, the model suggests that the modest correlation 
between the first word recall performance and the first word 
recall prediction was actually mediated by a salient path from 
Verbal Memory to Memory Self-efficacy and, in turn, a sim-
ilarly salient path from Memory Self-efficacy to the first word 
recall prediction. Third, the relationship of Memory Self-effi-
cacy to the first text recall prediction, although statistically sig-
nificant, was relatively weak. Instead, there was a direct effect 
2 We attempted to fit two alternative models using the orthogonal pre-
diction factor specification. A model removing the path from text mem-
ory to text prediction and forcing this relationship to be mediated by a 
path from the first word recall performance to the first text recall predic-
tion fit worse than did M6. A second alternative model mediating the 
text recall to first text prediction effect through the higher order verbal 
memory factor was rejected because the estimated factor loading of text 
memory on the higher order factor increased to 0.95. Thus, there was a 
specific relationship between text memory and the first text recall pre-
diction independent of word recall performance. 
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Figure 5. Structural regression model for recall performance and predictions (standardized solution). (w = 
word recall; CAP = Capacity scale; FOF = Frequency of Forgetting scale; WP = word recall prediction; MEM 
WORD = Word Memory factor, MEM = higher order Verbal Memory factor, MSE = Memory Self-efficacy 
factor, PRED = Prediction factor, MEM TEXT = Text Memory factor, IT = text recall prediction; T = text 
recall.) 
of Text Memory to the first text prediction. Fourth, all loadings 
of the predictions on the Prediction factor were statistically sig-
nificant, but the first two predictions (word recall and text re-
call) had the largest loadings. Fifth, there was evidence of up-
grading of performance predictions, in the form of low autore-
gressive coefficients for predictions and salient lagged 
coefficients from prior recall performance to the next recall pre-
diction, for both the word recall and text recall variables. The 
lagged effects were much larger for word recall, however. Finally, 
sex, but not age, had a direct effect on Memory Self-efficacy 
independent of Verbal Memory, with women demonstrating 
lower Memory Self-efficacy than that of men. On the other 
hand, covariances of predictions with both age and sex were 
mediated by Memory Self-efficacy and Text Memory. 
Discussion 
Several findings of this study support the thesis that memory 
performance predictions should be viewed as task-specific 
memory self-efficacy judgments (Berry et al., 1989; Cavanaugh, 
1989). First, metamemory scales known to relate principally to 
memory self-efficacy (Hertzog et al., 1989) correlated signifi-
cantly with predictions for both word recall and text recall. Sec-
ond, measures of memory self-efficacy correlated more with 
predictions than did metamemory scales largely independent 
of memory self-efficacy, including Achievement, Strategy, and 
Task scales. Third, the LISREL models successfully represented 
the covariances between the MIA Capacity and MFQ Fre-
quency of Forgetting scales as a direct effect of a Memory Self- 
efficacy latent variable on predictions. Fourth, there was no di-
rect influence of age, sex, and memory performance on the first 
word recall prediction when Memory Self-efficacy was statisti-
cally controlled. 
The age differences in memory task predictions merit addi-
tional discussion. Unlike many previous studies that showed 
older subjects predict equal or higher performance than do 
younger adults, older adults in this study predicted poorer recall 
than did younger adults. This pattern of mean age differences 
in predictions covaries with the patterns of age differences seen 
for questionnaire measures of memory self-efficacy (e.g., 
Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987). This result may be a direct 
consequence of this study's alternative method for obtaining 
performance predictions—providing participants with prior 
information about normative levels of task performance. The 
rationale for this procedure was that normative information 
would reduce the influence of individual differences in memory 
task appraisal, in terms of likely levels of performance, on pre-
dictions. Thus, this study was not designed to determine the 
relative influences of task appraisal and memory self-efficacy 
on actual predictions. However, the fact that older persons in 
this study did not differ from younger persons in the degree of 
prediction accuracy leads to the speculation that previous find-
ings of overestimation of performance levels by older adults 
may be influenced by inaccurate task assessments. At a mini-
mum, age differences in overestimation shown by other studies 
should not necessarily be interpreted as higher task-specific 
efficacy beliefs on the part of older individuals. 
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We did not experimentally manipulate the nature and the 
accuracy of information about task performance provided to 
subjects. Indeed, we emphasize that the average performance 
information provided to subjects was neither accurate, in terms 
of actual performance levels of the sample, nor age graded. This 
design feature was appropriate for the individual differences 
analyses that were the primary focus of the study, but it creates 
problems for interpreting mean age differences in discrepancies 
between predictions and performance. The degree to which the 
relationship between memory self-efficacy measures and per-
formance predictions would vary as a function of prior knowl-
edge and amount of experimenter-provided information about 
the distribution of task performance is not yet known. Never-
theless, our results, when contrasted with those of previous 
studies, suggest that new experiments manipulating informa-
tion given to subjects in prediction paradigms may prove useful 
in teasing apart the influences of memory self-efficacy and task 
evaluation on task-specific efficacy judgments. 
We found no evidence for reactive effects of predictions on 
individual differences in memory task performance and little 
evidence of effects of making predictions on mean levels of 
memory task performance. There was also no evidence of pre-
diction effects on text recall. A marginal trend for an Age X 
Prediction interaction in word recall was detected when sub-
jects missing one or more valid prediction responses were ex-
cluded from the analysis, but the mean differences were small 
and consistent with the hypothesis that the effect was an artifact 
of differential subject selection resulting from omission of pre-
dictions. These results support the generalizability of previous 
prediction studies that have opted not to include a no-predic-
tion control group. 
The results partially supported the hypotheses regarding rela-
tionships of memory self-efficacy and memory performance. 
One important unanticipated finding was that there was rela-
tively little difference between the two types of memory tasks in 
the magnitude of their relationship to memory self-efficacy, as 
measured by the two metamemory questionnaires. We were 
able to model the relationship of both types of memory tasks to 
the Memory Self-efficacy latent variable through a higher order 
Verbal Memory factor that had equally high loadings on both 
the Text Memory and Word Memory factors. Moreover, there 
was no direct effect of either Text Memory or Word Memory on 
Memory Self-efficacy independent of the higher order Verbal 
Memory factor. This finding is consistent with reports of rela-
tionships of both types of recall task with metamemory scales. 
(e.g., Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989). It is inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that discrepancies in the literature regarding memory-
metamemory relationships are attributable to a higher associa-
tion of text recall with metamemory. 
The higher order Verbal Memory factor significantly influ-
enced the latent Memory Self-efficacy factor, with a standard-
ized regression coefficient of .54. This relationship is higher 
than might be expected from the previous literature (e.g., Dixon 
& Hultsch, 1983; Sunderland et al., 1986). One reason is that 
the LISREL estimate of the structural regression coefficient is 
disattenuated for measurement error in both the recall tasks 
and the metamemory scales. The salient but moderate relation-
ship between the two latent variables supports the position that  
memory self-efficacy beliefs are based in part on actual memory 
ability but are not necessarily veridical (Hultsch et al., 1988). 
Despite the equivalent relationship of text and word recall 
to general memory self-efficacy, the structural equation models 
demonstrated a salient influence of Text Memory on the first 
text performance prediction, independent of the relationship of 
Verbal Memory to text predictions via general Memory Self-
efficacy. This specific relationship is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that individuals have more implicit knowledge about their 
text recall abilities (e.g., Dixon, 1989). Note that in our study. 
all participants received the word recall measures first. We 
tested—and rejected—several models that attempted to repre-
sent the differential relationship of text recall to text predictions 
as being mediated by prior exposure to the word recall task 
(given the high correlation of word and text recall). 
The two types of memory tasks also differed with respect to 
both initial magnitude and subsequent degree of change in their 
relationship with performance predictions. As in previous stud-
ies (Herrmann et al., 1986; M. E. Lachman et al., 1987), predic-
tions of word recall performance showed strong upgrading in 
degree of accuracy across trials, manifested as substantial in-
creases in the correlations of predictions with performance. 
The structural equation models showed that this relationship 
was best represented as a lagged effect of word recall perfor-
mance on subsequent performance predictions. There was no 
discernible direct influence of predictions on recall within the 
same trial, even though recall immediately followed predic-
tions. Text recall produced lagged effects on text predictions 
that were much weaker in magnitude. Indeed, the effect of the 
second text recall on the third text prediction was not statisti-
cally reliable. 
The upgrading of accuracy was more subtle in mean levels of 
predictions. There was a significant Sex X Trial interaction for 
word recall predictions but not for text recall predictions. Ini-
tially, women predicted lower word recall than did men; women 
subsequently increased their predicted performance more than 
men so that by the third trial, the sex differences in predictions 
were consistent with the sex differences in performance (women 
recalled more words than did men). All three age groups in-
creased mean levels of predicted word recall performance to-
ward actual performance levels, even though the prior informa-
tion that average recall performance level is 15 words was re-
peated at each trial. In contrast, the mean story estimates show 
little movement toward the actual mean performance. 
The most plausible explanation for this pattern of prediction 
upgrading is that individuals could more easily monitor their 
own performance levels on the word recall task. This accuracy 
in memory monitoring could be due to concurrent awareness 
of the status of the memory system (e.g., Cavanaugh, 1989) or to 
some kind of postrecall performance evaluation not necessarily 
associated with conscious awareness of the contents of memory 
(e.g., counting words recalled before the end of the time allotted 
for recall). The upgrading observed is consistent with results 
from other prediction paradigms, in which item-specific pre-
dictions of recall after words are studied are more accurate than 
initial predictions (Lovelace, 1984; Lovelace & Marsh, 1985). 
Additional studies will be required to identify the psychological 
mechanisms responsible for the upgrading of prediction accu-
racy. The reduced level of upgrading for text recall predictions 
226 	 C. HERTZOG, R. DIXON, AND D. HULTSCH 
probably reflects the greater difficulty in gauging how well one 
is doing on that task. 
There was no evidence of age differences in prediction accu-
racy or in relation of memory self-efficacy to performance pre-
dictions, which is generally consistent with lack of age differ-
ences in other types of performance prediction and memory-
monitoring paradigms (e.g., Butterfield et al., 1988; Lovelace & 
Marsh, 1985). The inferences that can be drawn from this study 
are limited, however, by the provision of average performance 
levels to subjects. The norms provided did not reflect actual 
mean recall performance in this sample and may have therefore 
influenced age-group differences in prediction accuracy. The 
presentation of the same average performance levels to the sub-
jects on each trial may also have reduced the amount of mean 
upgrading (e.g., by increasing the probability that individuals 
would dismiss high or low scores as chance occurrences). 
The modest sex differences, favoring women, found on both 
text recall and word recall were not consistent with an absence 
of sex differences in questionnaire measures of memory self-
efficacy found by Hultsch et al. (1987), as well as with the lower 
initial performance predictions by women in this study. This 
discrepancy is manifested in the structural equation model 
shown in Figure 5 as a direct, negative effect of sex on Memory 
Self-efficacy. When Verbal Memory was modeled as a direct 
cause of Memory Self-efficacy, women's perceived self-efficacy 
is seen to be low relative to their actual memory ability. 
The set of structural equation models could be criticized on 
several grounds: (a) We conducted extensive model develop-
ment without a cross-validation sample, (b) we modeled the re-
lationships between memory self-efficacy and memory perfor-
mance solely in terms of an effect of Verbal Memory on Mem-
ory Self-efficacy, and (c) we modeled the text and word recall 
measures as stable indicators of underlying memory ability con-
structs. With respect to Point a, there is nothing inappropriate 
about developing a new model in the context of analyzing a data 
set (see Hertzog, in press), but the model ultimately requires 
replication in a new, independent sample. Regarding Point b, 
the memory-to-prediction direction of effects might seem in-
consistent with the idea that low self-efficacy beliefs adversely 
influence performance, perhaps indirectly by increasing test 
anxiety or reducing motivation (Bandura, 1986). This study 
showed no direct effect of predictions on recall. That is, there 
was no effect independent of the lagged relationship between 
past recall and predictions, as would be expected if self-efficacy 
judgments influence contiguous recall performance via affect, 
motivation, and the like. With respect to Point c, the specifica-
tion of stable latent memory factors was consistent with the 
large correlations of each memory task with itself across trials, 
as well as the large and stable correlations between text recall 
and word recall. The stability , of individual differences in cogni-
tive performance is not surprising. For example, Hertzog and 
Schaie (1986) found high stability of individual differences in 
psychometric intelligence over 7-year retest intervals. 
Although our results justify specification of the memory la-
tent variables, one should not rule out the type of self-efficacy 
and performance relationship hypothesized by Bandura (1986) 
and others in the domain of memory. Perhaps inhibition of per-
formance would be more readily observed for individuals with 
very low levels of self-efficacy (or very high levels of negative  
affect), resulting in a weak degree of association when calcu-
lated across the entire range of self-efficacy beliefs and affect. 
Or perhaps individuals at highest risk for poor performance, 
and with lowest prior self-efficacy beliefs, are much less likely 
to volunteer for memory experiments. Finally, a full examina-
tion of the inhibitory effects of self-efficacy on memory perfor-
mance probably requires concomitant measurement of proba-
ble intervening variables such as task-specific performance anx-
iety. 
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1 
Changes in Text Memory 
Abstract 
Patterns of change and variability in text recall 
performance were assessed in seven elderly women by testing them 
weekly for up to two years. Results showed markedly different 
patterns of intraindividual change in gist recall performance for 
different participants. The two women whose performance declined 
were characterized by deteriorating physical health. Texts 
having female protagonists yielded superior recall performance. 
There was significant intraindividual variability after 
adjustment for text effects, which may indicate that weekly 
fluctuations in psychological states of the participants 
influenced their memory performance. 
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Introduction 
Memory for prose has played an increasingly important role 
in research on normative and pathological changes in verbal 
memory in adults. Cognitive psychologists studying normal aging 
have found a complicated pattern of age differences in story 
recall, and have focused on a number of variables that influence 
text recall performance (Meyer, 1987). In neuropsychological 
assessment, memory for paragraphs has been successfully used to 
discriminate normal adults from other populations such as 
amnesics (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989), Alzheimer's 
disease (Flicker, Ferris, Crook, Bartus, & Reisberg, 1986), 
multiple sclerosis (Grant, McDonald, Trimble, Smith, & Reed, 
1984; Rao, Leo, & St. Aubin-Faubert, 1989), and Huntington's 
disease (Caine, Banford, Schiffer, Shoulson, & Levy, 1986). 
Several neuropsychologists have recommended inclusion of text 
memory measures in general neuropsychological assessment 
batteries (e.g., Egelko et al., 1988; Kopelman, 1986; Wilson, 
1987). 
Current theories in cognitive psychology posit that memory 
for stories requires an active interplay between prior knowledge 
and new information. Reading and understanding text requires 
access to information held in long-term semantic memory and the 
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use of this information in constructing an active representation 
of new information through the processes of verbal comprehension. 
Comprehension is characterized by the construction of integrated 
representations of old and new information in the form of new 
idea units, often termed propositions, about the content of the 
passage (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). These idea units represent 
abstract concepts that are not necessarily expressed solely in 
terms of the surface structure of the text. Remembering a story 
is typically characterized by recall of concepts and relations 
among concepts even when retention of the actual words used in 
the passage is limited. For this reason, some cognitive research 
with both normal and disadvantaged populations has focused on the 
gist recall of various types of idea units, not just the quantity 
of word-for-word reproductions. Gist recall performance has been 
shown to be influenced by a number of characteristics of both the 
reader (e.g., ability) and the story (e.g., structure; see 
Hultsch & Dixon, 1984). 
The Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) Logical Memory scale is a 
frequently used measure of story recall (Erickson & Scott, 1977). 
It contains two simple paragraphs, each with approximately 20 
segments. Performance on this task is measured in terms of the 
total number of segments recalled verbatim, although some 
investigators give partial credit for gist recall. The Logical 
Memory scale has several advantages in clinical applications. It 
4 
Changes in Text Memory 
is easy to administer and score, and its widespread use has 
generated considerable normative data on performance levels in 
different populations. However, the scale may have limitations 
for some applications. The idea units of Logical Memory scale 
stories are not grounded in any formal theory of text 
representation in memory. Consequently, rules governing the 
segmentation of the text are not explicitly stated, the 
differences across segments in terms of importance for the 
story's theme are unknown, and the scoring criteria regarding 
verbatim and gist recall do not necessarily reflect the nature of 
propositional units stored in memory. Moreover, the brief length 
and structural simplicity of the stories may not afford 
differentiation of subtle distinctions in memory dysfunction in 
special populations. 
Several authors have commented on the value of integrating 
recent trends in cognitive psychology--and, in particular, 
cognitive discourse analysis--with neuropsychology and cognitive 
aging (e.g., Kahn, Joanette, Ska, & Goulet, 1990). Recent 
research in these areas has begun to address the problem of how 
to best represent story structures and score story recall in 
special populations. As is known from basic cognitive 
psychological work with complex stories (e.g., Kintsch, 1974) it 
is possible to measure not only the quantity of idea units 
(number of propositions or segments) recalled, but also 
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qualitative differences in the types of ideas recalled such as 
level of importance in the story and type of recall errors 
(Dall'Ora, Della Sala, & Spinnler, 1989; Dixon, Hultsch, Simon, & 
Von Eye, 1984; Kopelman, 1987). Schultz, Schmitt, Logue, and 
Rubin (1986) explicitly examined the idea units in Russell's 
(1975) revision of the WMS Logical Memory scale. They found 
quantitative differences in recall among multiple patient groups 
accompanied by similar profiles of variation in recall of each 
idea unit aggregated within the groups. 
Recent research on normal adult populations has employed 
more complex stories based upon formal theories of text 
representation. Reliable age differences favoring younger adults 
have been found for recall of information from multiple kinds of 
text (Hultsch & Dixon, 1984; Meyer, 1987; Zelinski & Gilewski, 
1988). Indeed, several studies have examined age differences in 
recall as a function of level of thematic importance of the idea 
units. Adults of all ages show strong influences of level of 
importance on recall, but Age X Levels interaction effects are 
inconsistent and may depend upon other variables (Dixon et al., 
1984). In general, text recall performance appears to be 
influenced by a number of individual differences characteristics, 
such as previous knowledge about the story's subject matter, 
verbal ability, education, and reading comprehension (Hartley, 
1986; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1984, in press). In some cases 
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age differences have been found to interact with such variables 
(Hultsch et al., 1984; Meyer, 1987). 
Although individual differences in cognitive performance 
have received a fair amount of study, the issue of 
intraindividual (within-person) variability over time is rarely 
addressed, despite informal observations of clinicians that there 
are fluctuations in the functional competence of elderly 
individuals. Indeed, as Kaszniak (1990) noted, lack of 
consistency over time in certain behaviors and constructs can be 
expected for elderly persons. Such intraindividual variation in 
performance is not merely a reflection of unreliability in the 
task, but rather is determined both by imprecision of measurement 
and lawful but unstable influences on performance. Moreover, 
fluctuations in intraindividual performance levels will influence 
individual differences as measured in a cross-sectional design. 
In the case of memory performance, intraindividual variability 
may occur lawfully as a function of intraindividual state changes 
and shifting environmental influences (Dixon & Hertzog, 1988). 
Individual differences in memory performance within a population 
(e.g., older normals or patients) will reflect (a) stable 
individual differences in memory ability, (b) current status of 
the individual (e.g., health, mood), and (c) random measurement 
error. It is a largely untested assumption that the magnitude of 
within-group error in older samples reflects sources (a) and (c), 
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but not (b). 
What if it were the case, however, that a meaningful 
proportion of between-persons variance in memory was due to 
intraindividual influences that were unstable over time? 
Researchers examining mood states have shown that substantial 
proportions of variance in state measures are in fact unstable, 
such that test-retest correlations are low even though the 
reliability of the measures is relatively high (e.g., 
Nesselroade, Jacobs, & Pruchno, 1986; Spielberger, 1977). 
Indeed, several studies of intraindividual variation in affect 
suggest coherent patterns of flux in mood that relate to 
variables such as perceived stress and social behavior (Watson, 
1988; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). There is evidence for effects of 
physiological and psychological states on cognition, including 
mood (e.g., Bower, 1981; Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1989; 
Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Sutton, Teasdale, 
& Broadbent, 1988). Intraindividual variation in mood and other 
variables may therefore produce intraindividual variation in 
memory performance. 
Substantial intraindividual variability in text memory 
performance could have implications for clinical memory 
assessment. It could materially increase the variance within 
normal control groups, reducing statistical power and requiring 
larger sample sizes to obtain sensitive tests of patient group 
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differences. More important, intraindividual variability could 
harm the validity of cross-sectional, age-stratified norms on 
tests like the Logical Memory scale for diagnosis of memory 
impairment in the elderly. Benign senescent forgetting (Kral, 
1962) or the more recently proposed syndrome of age-associated 
memory impairment (AAMI; Crook et al., 1986) is characterized by 
poor memory performance that is not secondary to a pathological 
physical process (e.g., Alzheimer's disease or cerebral infarct). 
One proposed criterion for AAMI is memory task performance that 
is one SD below norms for young adults (Crook et al., 1986). 
Intraindividual variation in'performance might cause an elderly 
individual to be classified as having AAMI one day, but to be 
judged to have normal memory functioning another day. 
Use of between-persons group norms for standardized memory 
tests to aid in the diagnosis of AAMI or other age-related, 
progressive pathologies of memory requires the assumption that 
low norm-referenced performance indicates within-person decline. 
It is true that the expected value of an individual's performance 
is the age-group mean, and that performance below the cutoff has 
a higher probability of being influenced by age-related decline, 
but there are other influences on performance. Reports from the 
Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging show normative age changes 
in visual and verbal memory performance (Arenberg, 1982), but 
individual differences in the amount of longitudinal change are 
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not highly correlated with initial status (Alder, Adam, & 
Arenberg, in press). Moreover, the estimated magnitude of mean 
intraindividual changes with increasing age in those studies is 
relatively small when scaled against the distribution of 
individual differences. One cannot be certain that an individual 
exhibiting low performance has actually declined over time if one 
has not directly or indirectly estimated change from pre-morbid 
status. Alternatively, age-related decline in an individual with 
high pre-morbid memory ability might go undetected if assessment 
were based only on between-subjects norms. 
Given these concerns, short- and long-term longitudinal case 
studies may be a valuable method for assessing both normative and 
pathological decline in older persons' memory function. In such 
designs each individual serves as his/her own control, and change 
over time can be evaluated against a standard error of 
measurement based upon observed intraindividual variability in 
performance (Hertzog & Schear, 1989). There are, however, two 
major potential obstacles to implementation of such designs in 
assessment contexts. The first problem involves the magnitude of 
intraindividual variability relative to true, long-term 
intraindividual change (Nesselroade, 1986). To the extent that 
variability in performance is large, long periods of observation 
may be required to detect statistically reliable decrement 
(Salthouse, Kausler, & Saults, 1986). The second obstacle is the 
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high likelihood of practice effects on memory task performance, 
even in the elderly (Hultsch, 1974). This problem would be 
especially acute if the same instrument were repeatedly 
administered over short time periods. In the extreme, practice 
effects could lead to ceiling effects in performance, especially 
on measures of memory for simple materials, such as in paragraph 
recall. One could therefore wonder whether longitudinal case-
study designs are feasible for evaluating change in cognitive 
performance in the elderly and whether the pattern of decline 
across multiple cognitive attributes has diagnostic value (with 
respect to either etiology or long-term prognosis). 
The present study was designed with three major purposes in 
mind. First, we wished to investigate the extent of 
intraindividual variability in story recall performance in normal 
Older adults. Second, we wanted to determine whether reliable 
intraindividual change in text memory could be detected over a 
relatively short time period (one to two years) given the 
magnitude of background intraindividual variability. Finally, we 
wanted to investigate the implications of short-term 
intraindividual designs for assessment of story memory. In order 
to accomplish these goals, it was necessary to measure 
individuals frequently over a relatively extended period of time. 
Frequent measurement required, in turn, the use of a large number 
(25) of parallel stories which could be administered in blocks in 
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order to minimize practice effects, thus enhancing our ability to 
estimate age-related decline in text recall performance. The 
stories we used were developed using a propositional coding 
system that enabled standardization of story recall scoring 
according to gist criteria (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1989). 
The goal of evaluating the assessment implications of 
intraindividual case-study approaches was addressed by obtaining 
an initial norm-referenced assessment of text recall, using 
similar texts. Performance was compared to normative data on 
these stories collected on a cross-sectional sample from the same 
geographic region. The norm-referenced assessment data was then 
compared to the data obtained from the intraindividual panel 
design, thus determining the degree of consistency in initial 
performance and subsequent change in text recall over time. 
Method 
Subjects 
A panel of seven older women was recruited in two phases 
from a retirement community in central Pennsylvania. Three older 
women (IDs P01, P02, and P03) were recruited in the first phase 
in late 1985; four women (IDs PO4 through P07) were recruited in 
spring, 1986. The women were all over the age of 65 at initial 
assessment (M = 75.4). 
A deMographic questionnaire and a vocabulary test were 
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administered to PO4 through P07 at the time of intake, and 
retrospectively to P03. P02 was unavailable for this assessment, 
and data for POl's interview were lost. The questionnaire 
provided information about the background characteristics of the 
participants, self-rated physical health status, and self-
reported medication profiles. We used the background information 
to calculate an estimate of premorbid intelligence (Wilson, 
Rosenbaum, and Brown, 1979). Table 1 provides some relevant data 
regarding the background characteristics of all seven 
participants, including measures of state anxiety (Spielberger, 
1983) and depression (Radloff, 1977) collected at the initial 
testing session. For comparison purposes, Table 1 reports data 
on the same measures from a similar sample of 64 elderly women 
from the same geographic area (age range 65 - 78, mean age 70.4) 
studied by Hertzog et al., 1990). 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
One subject, P02, was providing care for a spouse 
afflicted with Alzheimer's Disease. As can be seen in Table 1, 
P02 functioned at a normal level in vocabulary (and in text 
memory; see below) but would be classified as possibly depressed 
on the basis of a CES-D scale score of 28 (Radloff, 1977). Her 
spouse's relocation to the retirement community's intermediate 
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care facility -- and its influence on her psychological distress 
-- appeared to cause her withdrawal from the study after 25 
occasions of measurement. 
The physician of the retirement community gave all potential 
participants a physical health examination and an extensive 
vision screen (including range of visual field, glaucoma, 
cataracts, visual acuity, and accomodation). The physical exam 
was designed to maximize the probability that participants could 
continue over the expected two-year duration of the project. The 
vision assessment was needed to insure that the participants were 
not likely to experience difficulties viewing computer screens or 
written tests and questionnaires. One subject's test sessions 
were delayed in order to obtain a new set of eyeglasses. 
Data on the self-reported health and medication profiles of 
each subject are contained in Table 2. The participants were 
relatively healthy older adults, with some normal aging-related 
symptoms and medications. Overall, the subjects reported that 
their status had very little impact on their daily lives. Two 
cases should be noted. First, P03 was under medication for high 
blood pressure and coronary artery disease. Second, P06 had an 
active case of tuberculosis, which was under medical management. 
At the onset of the study, however, both participants reported no 
health-related impact on their daily lives and no alterations of 
behavior due to medication. 
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Insert Table 2 About Here 
Measures 
Text recall was measured by administration of twenty-five 
structurally equivalent texts developed by Dixon et al. (1989). 
The texts were designed to contain approximately equal numbers of 
words, sentences, and basic idea units. All texts had about 300 
words in 24 sentences. The structure of each text was defined 
according to a hierarchically organized network of propositions, 
as defined by Kintsch (1974; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). A basic 
proposition contains a predicate (usually a verb) and one or more 
concepts such as an actor and an object (e.g., DESERVE, 
PROFESSOR, RAISE). Subordinate propositions may qualify or 
elaborate upon predicate or word concepts of basic propositions. 
Propositions are hierarchically organized to reflect centrality 
to the story theme. The twenty-five stories all contained 
approximately 160 propositions, ranging from level 1 to level 7 
in organizational hierarchy, and were comparable in percentage of 
propositions at each hierarchical level. They all presented 
propositions in an approximately linear sequence, that is, in 
order according to their relevance to the organizational 
structure of the text. The average reading difficulty of the 25 
stories was seventh grade level. 
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The stories were explicitly designed to include plots 
thought to be generally relevant and appealing to older persons, 
and generally described positive outcomes of individuals or 
couples encountering salient events, such as a family reunion, 
retirement, and vacation plans. Story attributes such as age and 
gender of principal characters and geographic location of the 
event were explicitly varied across the texts. In particular, 
the stories included 9 plots involving female protagonists, 9 
plots involving male protagonists, and 7 plots involving couples 
as protagonists. Additional details regarding story 
characteristics may be found in Dixon et al. (1989). 
Procedure 
General design. The text recall task was part of a larger 
data collection performed on a weekly basis. Subjects also 
completed self-ratings of affective states and metamemory, and 
performed on a computer-administered test of recognition memory 
for words. These data are not reported here. The text recall 
task was administered after the self-rating questionnaires and 
before the recognition memory task. 
Subjects were tested weekly, on the same day (although the 
day occasionally changed to accomodate subject requests) by the 
same experimenters (which also changed due to personnel changes 
and needs). In the event of illness, testing days were altered 
or postponed one or more weeks, as needed. Gaps in testing were 
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infrequent and short, generally, although one subject (P05) 
experienced a major illness that caused a 17 week delay in 
testing and reduced the total number of occasions of measurement. 
Gaps in testing had no appreciable impact on the temporal pattern 
of text recall performance, and were hence ignored in data 
analysis. 
Subjects were tested in a laboratory office located above 
the general health clinic at the retirement community. The women 
came to the laboratory for testing; during winter periods, or at 
their request, the participants were transported by retirement 
community staff from their residence to the laboratory. P06's 
respiratory disorder worsened midway through the study, and this 
confined her to her residence in order to be able to use an 
oxygen tank. She was tested at home thereafter. 
Prior to assessment with the twenty-five stories, subjects' 
text recall performance was assessed using the three texts from 
Hertzog et al. (1990). The purpose of this assessment was to 
compare participants' initial text recall performance to norms 
derived from same-aged peers. Each subject received one of the 
comparative stories in each of the first three testing sessions, 
with the order of administration the same as used in the larger 
validation study. The three baseline stories were also given to 
the first three subjects (P01 through P03) during occasions 4 
through 9, so that assessment with the 25 stories for these 
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subjects began at the tenth occasion of testing. 
Each subject received multiple blocks of the twenty-five 
stories; most subjects received three complete administrations of 
the twenty-five story set. Each subject received an independent 
random order of texts within blocks under the constraint that two 
stories could not be repeated as the,last story of a block and 
the first story of the subsequent block. 
Methods of obtaining text recall data were invariant across 
both the comparison and parallel story types. Subjects were 
given a text recall booklet, including instructions, the text, 
and two pages of lined paper upon which to recall the story. 
They were instructed to recall as much of the story as they 
could, but that they could respond in their own words, not 
necessarily the words used in the actual story. They were given 
five minutes to read and seven minutes to write what they could 
recall from the story. Previous work with similar stories had 
demonstrated that this amount of response time was sufficient to 
obtain complete recall protocols (Hertzog et al., 1990). 
Text scoring. Scoring of the stories was done by using a 
gist criterion to judge the presence of a proposition in the 
recall protocol, adapting scoring methods for the Kintsch 
propositional system developed by Turner and Green (1977). 
Propositions were scored as present if the idea represented by 
the proposition was present in the protocol, irrespective of 
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wording or order of recall. Measures used in the present study 
were proportion of correctly recalled propositions at each 
hierarchical level (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or greater), as well as the 
total proportion of propositions recalled. We also obtained 
three additional measures of recall behavior for verbal responses 
not directly related to specific propositions: macrostatements 
(summary statements describing gist-consistent aspects of the 
text which combined multiple propositions), elaborations 
(statements consistent with the gist of the text but not 
explicitly presented in the story), and metastatements 
(statements concerning the cognitive or affective state of the 
participant). 
Four raters were trained for purposes of text scoring using 
the twenty-five stories. After training to criterion, the raters 
were given the first recall protocols from P01, P02, and P03 for 
a randomly selected set of 5 of the 25 stories, which they scored 
blind to each other for the purpose of computing interrater 
reliability. The raters achieved 92% agreement on propositional 
scoring, averaged over raters. 
Results 
Representativeness of Sample 
In order to test the extent to which these participants were 
representative of their population in story recall ability, Table 
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3 reports the aggregated recall performance for the comparison 
stories administered on the first three occasions, using both (a) 
raw proportion of propositions correctly recalled at each 
hierarchical level of text organization, using a gist criterion, 
and (b) z-scores scaled from the normative subsample of elderly 
women. Performance by the present sample varied within normal 
ranges, establishing that the panel is essentially representative 
of their population in story recall. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Performance on the 25 Stories 
Table 4 reports the performance of all seven subjects across 
the main set of text recall trials, aggregated across occasions 
(and stories). There were large individual differences in 
overall text recall performance, with total recall ranging from 
56% (PO4) to 21% (P03). Table 4 also demonstrates the expected 
effects of hierarchical idea structure; recall is highest for 
Level 1'propositions, drops off for Levels 2 and 3, and plateaus 
thereafter. 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Figure 1, panels A through F, plots the data for each 
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subject against occasion of measurement. Two aspects of the data 
are evident for all subjects. First, there is substantial 
intraindividual variation in performance for all subjects. For 
example, performance by P01 ranged from 14% to 64% of total 
propositions recalled. Second, the trends of performance over 
time clearly differ across subjects. This divergence can be 
summarized by the correlations of total propositions recalled 
with occasion of measurement (see Table 5). P03 and P06 showed 
significant negative correlations, indicating decline in 
performance over time, but P01 and PO4 showed significant 
positive correlations. Correlations of occasion of measurement 
with propositions recalled from hierarchical levels 2 through 4 
were highly consistent with each other and with the total number 
of propositions recalled. Correlations were much lower for 
Levels 1 and 5, reflecting a tendency toward ceiling and floor 
effects, respectively. Given these findings, the remainder of 
the analyses of change and variability in recall relied solely on 
total proportion recall as the dependent variable. 
Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 About Here 
In order to analyze trends in performance over time, we 
conducted separate polynomial regression analyses for each 
subject, using linear and quadratic trend components in 
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regressions of recall on occasion. Subjects P01 and PO4 showed 
robust linear increment over time, and subjects P03 and P06 
yielded robust decrement. In addition to significant linear 
effects, the analysis detected significant curvature for P05, 
whose plot was mildly concave downward. Other subjects did not 
produce significant quadratic trends. 
Much of the variance in story performance remained 
unexplained by the polynomial regression on occasion. The 
remaining variance might represent a number of influences, 
including mood states, transient changes in motivation, and other 
organismic and environmental influences. An alternative source 
of variation is differential recall of the 25 stories. We used 
24 dummy variables to capture the different story effects using 
hierarchical multiple regression. Substantial increments in R2 
 indicated differences between the stories in average recall, 
adjusted for time-related trends, for all subjects (see Table 6). 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
Although the magnitude of story effects varied somewhat 
across subjects, several stories were consistently recalled 
better or worse than average. Mean story effects, aggregated 
across subjects, ranged from .09 (Story 13) to -.08 (Story 5). 
Thus, Story 13 yielded 9% more propositions recalled than the 
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occasion-adjusted grand mean. In addition to Story 13, Sto 
1, 11, 14, and 16 yielded significant positive story effects 
.05). In addition to Story 5, Stories 10, 19, and 25 had 
negative story effects, reflecting below average recall 
performance. There was no obvious association of structural 
characteristics of the stories with the empirically obtained 
differences in recall performance. For example, Flesch-Kincaic 
readability ratings, derived from structural characteristics of 
the texts (Dixon et al., 1989), correlated -.13 with the 
estimated story effects. Considering that the texts had been 
constructed to be approximately parallel with respect to 
structural characteristics (e.g., number of words, number of 
propositions at each hierarchical level, linearity of plot 
sequence), this result was not surprising. However, there was a 
clear association between gender of the protagonist and the 
magnitude of story effects. Estimated story effects for the nine 
stories with female protagonists (M = .031, SD = .042) were 
significantly higher than both (a) effects for the nine stories 
with male protagonists (M = -.019, SD = .036; t = 2.71, p < .01), 
and (b) effects for the seven stories in which couples were 
protagonists (M = -.013, SD = .022; t = 2.70, p < .01). In 
addition, an analysis of the stories' plots suggested that 
exceptions to this trend (e.g., poorer recall of a story with a 
female protagonist) could probably be explained in part by 
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gender-based relevance of the story line. For example, Story 4, 
which described an older woman attending a western rodeo, was the 
only story with a female protagonist producing a negative story 
effect. Similarly, Story 24 produced a positive story effect for 
a male protagonist cast in a story about a family holiday. Both 
stories describe older protagonists in nontraditional (although 
not exceptional) activities. 
Even after accounting for story effects, large proportions 
of variance in performance remained unexplained for five of the 
six subjects. Total R2 for the intraindividual variation was .6 
or less for all subjects except P03 (R2 = .769). These text 
recall measures have been shown to have high factor loadings and 
communalities when between-person correlations are factor 
analyzed (Hertzog, et al., 1990; Hultsch et al., 1984). These 
communalities reflect high reliability in between-person 
differences in text recall (between .8 and .9). Assuming these 
reliabilities generalize to intraindividual consistency in 
measurement, then between 20 to 30% of the intraindividual 
variation in'story performance found in this study is reliable 
variance which remains to be explained by other variables. 
Figure 2 gives some graphic evidence of the partition of variance 
for subject P01. Panel A plots predicted scores from the 
polynomial regression, including story effects. Panel B plots 
the regression residuals. Note that, even after controlling for 
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story effects, there are interesting fluctuations in performance, 
even among adjacent occasions (e.g., occasions 34 through 40). 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
We hypothesized that intraindividual variability in text 
performance would correlate with variability in affective states, 
especially after text recall was de-trended for systematic 
intraindividual change. However, measures of self-rated 
depression, anxiety, fatigue, vigor, and well-being exhibited few 
significant correlations with either overall text recall 
performance or residualized recall, controlling for systematic 
time-related trend and story effects. 
Initial Status Versus Intraindividual Change 
Table 7 presents the fitted linear slopes for occasion 
of measurement and the fitted intercepts from the intraindividual 
regression equations, along with the z-scores from the first 
validation text presented to all subjects. The normal deviates 
are directly comparable to data that would be obtained in a 
single assessment of memory functioning, followed by rescaling 
according to age-stratified norms. There was a relatively high 
level of rank-order agreement between the three variables, 
although the opportunity for disagreement given only six 
individuals with widely separated initial scores is minimal. 
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Note that disagreements in rank between the intercepts and the 
normal deviates are small, and occur where the intercepts are 
virtually equivalent (subjects P01 and P05). There is less 
agreement between the slopes and the initial text recall scores. 
Both P03 and P06 show negative initial scores (although neither 
scores are 2 standard deviations below the age group mean). 
However, P06 showed roughly comparable linear decline, in spite 
of an initial .75 SD difference between P03 and P06. P01 showed 
the most gain, however, even though she was third out of six in 
initial text recall. 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
Discussion 
In this study we employed a series of stories constructed on 
the basis of contemporary cognitive psychological theories of 
discourse to investigate intraindividual cognitive change in 
seven older women. The value of integrating cognitive psychology 
with research questions concerning special populations (e.g., 
older normal adults) has been emphasized in the cognitive 
neuropsychology and aging literature (e.g., Kahn et al., 1990). 
Overall, we have shown that long-term intraindividual panel 
designs (a) can be successfully implemented, and (b) provide 
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useful information for the purpose of cognitive assessment of 
normal older persons. All but one of the seven older 
participants completed at least seventy weekly test occasions, 
lasting well over one year. 
The first major purpose of this study was to investigate the 
extent of intraindividual variability in text recall performance. 
We found dramatic variability in performance in all seven 
participants. In addition, and relevant to the second major aim 
of the study, there were marked differences between panel members 
in the long-term pattern of intraindividual change. Two panel 
members showed significant increases, two showed relative 
stability, and two showed significant decline over the time 
interval studied. These change patterns were related to, but 
were not fully predictable from, initial performance levels. Use 
of cross-sectional norms to evaluate the initial text recall 
scores would not have predicted the significant decline in one 
subject (P06) nor have anticipated the significant 
curvilinearity, reflecting decline late in the sequence of 
testing, for another subject (P05). 
Although this set of results is not conclusive, the mixed 
pattern of change over time reinforces the concern that an 
important benchmark for assessing cognitive decline in the 
elderly, either for clinical or research purposes, may be the 
establishment of an intraindividual performance baseline. To be 
27 
Changes in Text Memory 
sure, standard use of cross-sectional norms would have correctly 
identified P03, the subject experiencing the most dramatic 
cognitive decline, as performing significantly below age and 
gender-specific norms. However, the major advantage of an 
intraindividual panel design with regular assessments is that it 
becomes possible to detect subtle changes in the trajectory of 
cognitive performance, as in the case of subject P05 in the 
present study. The sensitivity of the intraindividual design 
stems from the power of the repeated measures design to detect 
small amounts of change. In essence, one is able to compute an 
intraindividual standard error of measurement for each person, 
based upon their own baseline variability in premorbid 
performance, and then to use this standard error as the basis for 
inferring the onset of significant cognitive decline. 
This finding may be contrasted to those of Salthouse et al. 
(1986). They administered cognitive tasks twice within a single 
test session to a large cross-sectional sample of adults, and 
found moderate correlations between the two scores for each task. 
Given the relative magnitude of (a) mean cross-sectional age 
differences in the tasks with (b) within-session differences in 
performance levels for individuals, they argued that it would 
take decades to detect age-related change at the level of 
individual subjects. Their argument is based upon assumptions 
which cannot be fully critiqued here (e.g., that the difference 
28 
Changes in Text Memory 
score between alternative administrations of a task, within a 
single multiple-task test session, is a valid estimator of 
intraindividual variability across different sessions). The 
present study clearly shows that change in at least some 
individuals can be reliably detected over short periods of time, 
given sufficient density of observations. 
Intraindividual designs may be well suited for the early 
detection of pathological or nonnormative change in the elderly. 
Two subjects who experienced significant linear declines in 
performance may have been experiencing terminal decline. P06's 
tuberculosis worsened, and she eventually withdrew and died 
shortly thereafter. Although she completed the study, P03 also 
died a few months afterwards from her cardiovascular disease. 
Furthermore, the one subject (P05) showing significant curvature 
in change (reflecting decline late in the study) experienced 
health problems that caused her to miss several test sessions in 
the second year of the study. Such evidence suggests the 
potential importance of intraindividual panel designs for early 
detection of cognitive decline in the elderly. It was possible 
to chart a negative trend in P03's performance over a year in 
advance of her death. 
The present study has several characteristics which limit 
our inferences regarding intraindividual variability and change 
in text recall. First, we selected subjects who were initially 
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in relatively good health. We did not seek to examine cognitive 
change in well-identified patient populations, and did not obtain 
data that could definitively establish the causes of cognitive 
change in our older panel. We recommend the use of such 
intraindividual panel designs in future studies of cognitive 
change in clinical populations. Second, we selected female 
participants, in part because of their longer expected longevity, 
and also restricted the sample to older adults. Given the nature 
of our sample, additional research will be needed to address the 
issue of adult age and gender differences in intraindividual 
variability and change. 
A third issue is the mixing of positive gains due to 
practice effects with declines in performance due to normal and 
pathological age-related factors. One expectation, based upon 
learning to learn research (e.g., Hultsch, 1974), might have been 
that all older persons would show increments in text recall 
performance. Indeed, one possible concern about such panel 
studies is that large practice effects would create problems for 
interpretation of performance, possibly due to ceiling effects. 
It appears that our use of the large number of stories, 
characterized by (a) a wide range of possible recall scores, and 
(b) sensitivity to recall of both basic and low-level 
propositions represented in the texts, successfully avoided the 
risk of ceiling effects and enabled us to detect performance 
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declines in several panel members. Two panel members (P01, PO4) 
showed significant improvements in performance, suggesting 
positive learning-to-remember effects. One can hypothesize, 
then, that such positive effects might counteract small age-
related declines, producing stable levels of performance. If so, 
then declines in panel designs may have considerable clinical 
significance, but it may also be the case that failure to improve 
indicates more subtle effects of normal aging or age-related 
pathology. This hypothesis could be addressed in the future by 
conducting age comparative studies that feature experimental 
variation of the amount and frequency of testing (which will 
affect the magnitude of learning effects). Ideally, this design 
could be combined with more systematic assessment of 
physiological and neurological functioning. Such a comprehensive 
design could establish both: (a) the frequency of observations 
needed to minimize practice effects while still estimating a 
sensitive intraindividual baseline (in terms of both level and 
intraindividual variability in cognition), and (b) the diagnostic 
value of failure to increase performance as a function of 
repeated testing. 
Systematic variation in text recall by story was sizable, 
and showed an interesting pattern. For the female subjects in 
this study, stories with female protagonists and gender-
appropriate themes were recalled better, on average, than stories 
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with males or couples as protagonists. This finding therefore 
suggests that the 25 stories, although structurally equivalent, 
may vary in recallability as a function of relevance of material 
for the individual reader. Several studies have shown that text 
recall performance is influenced by knowledge and belief 
structures of the rememberers (e.g., Hultsch & Dixon, 1984), and 
there is some suggestion in the literature that pre-existing 
cognitive schemata can influence memory performance (Sherman, 
Judd, & Park, 1989; Hess, in press). Herrmann and Crawford 
(1989) had male and female subjects read ambiguous instructions 
using differentially gender-relevant titles (directions for 
making a shirt versus directions for making a workbench). They 
obtained Gender X Title interactions in recall of the 
instructions, with members of each sex recalling more 
instructions when paired with the sex role-consistent title. We 
hypothesize that older men would perform better on the stories 
with male protagonists and male-relevant themes. Such effects 
may have implications for assessment inferences based on a single 
administration of a differentially schema-relevant passage, such 
as the passage used frequently in the WMS Logical Memory task. 
An advantage of the present set of 25 structurally equivalent 
stories (Dixon et al., 1989) is that investigators may select 
from a variety of stories differing in schema relevance. 
Even after accounting for story effects and occasion- 
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specific trends, substantial proportions of variance in text 
recall performance remained. Because our interrater 
reliabilities are high and we typically observe substantial 
within-session correlations of text recall across different 
stories (e.g., Hertzog et al., 1990), it is implausible that the 
magnitude of residual variance is caused solely by measurement 
error. It appears that there is residual within-person variation 
that remains to be explained by states of the rememberet (Sutton 
et al., 1988). Our initial evaluation of the covariation of text 
recall with concurrently rated mood states was disappointing, in 
that self-rated mood states did not correlate with performance. 
There can be a number of reasons for a negative finding here, 
including limited validity of self-ratings due to stereotyping of 
responses and lack of self-insight into concurrent affect. It 
remains to be seen whether residual intraindividual variance in 
text recall performance will covary with other measures of the 
concurrent state of the rememberer. 
In sum, the present study encourages the use of the 
intraindividual panel design with elderly populations. Such 
designs, which are particularly useful for charting the course of 
cognitive change, may also assist in the assessment of impending 
cognitive decline. 
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Table 1 
Participant Characteristics on Background Variables 
Subject 
P01 	P02 	P03 	PO4 	P05 	P06 	P07 
Variable  
Age 	 74 	76 	80 	83 	73 	67 	75 
CES-Da 	 4 	28 	16 	6 	13 	2 	0 
SSAb 30 	44 	28 	16 	24 	34 	20 
Premorbid IQ 	 117 	123 	125 	117 	125 
Vocabularyd 	 113 	100 	116 	114 	116 
Educations 	 12 	12 	17 	13 	18 
Abbreviations: CES-D: Community Epidemiological Survey - 
Depression scale; SSA - Spielberger State Anxiety scale. 
a Norm sample: M = 7.46 (SD = 6.46). 
b Norm sample: M = 30.09 (SD = 7.88). 
• Denotes missing data. 
d Test based upon ETS Vocabulary (Hertzog et al., 1990). Scores 
are scaled relative to Norm sample (M = 100, SD = 15). 
• Norm sample: M = 12.92 (SD = 2.88). 
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Table 2 
Self-reported Health and Medication Profiles 
P03 	PO4 	P05 	P06 	P07 
Self-reported Health  
Perceived Health 
(1-9 scale; 9= excellent) 	4 	8 	8 	6 	7 
Total Number of Illnesses 
(Max. 29) 	 5 	3 	2 	5 	4 
Physical Symptoms 
(Max. 40) 	 8 	11 	2 	7 	7 
Perceived Impact on Life None 	None 	a None None 
Number of Bedridden Days 
(past year) 	 0 	0 	0 	0 	1 
Health-related Behaviors  
Regular Health Checkups? 	Yes 	Yes 	Yes 	Yes 	Yes 
Number of Physician Visits 
(past year) 	 9-10 	10+ 	3-4 	3-4 	5-6 
Medication Usage  
Number of Medications 
(Max. 16) 	 4 	4 	0 	4 	3 
Alter Behavior? 	 No 	No 	No 	No 	Yes 
a Denotes missing data. 
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Table 3 
Average Text Recall Performance on Initial Stories 
Sub . ect 
for All Participants (Proportion Correct [P(c)] and 
Normal Deviate [z]) 
Total 	Level 1 	Level 2 	Level 3 	Level 
P01 P(c) 0.26 0.43 0.28 0.22 0.20 
z 0.37 0.28 0.75 0.58 0.10 
P02 P(c) 0.45 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.31 
z 2.68 1.37 2.62 2.97 1.29 
P03 P(c) 0.17 0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 
z -0.79 -0.33 -0.64 -0.73 -0.80 
PO4 P(c) 0.46 0.77 0.53 0.37 0.32 
z 2.74 2.67 2.93 2.34 1.83 
P05 P(c) 0.26 0.49 0.27 0.21 0.21 
z 0.33 0.71 0.11 0.48 0.30 
P06 P(c) 0.18 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.10 
z -0.59 -0.58 -0.46 -0.17 -1.27 
P07 P(c) 0.31 0.40 0.38 0.24 0.26 
z 0.96 0.08 1.26 0.63 0.83 
4+ 
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Table 4 
Proportion of Text Proposition Recalled by each Participant 
Subject Total Ll L2 L3 L4 L5+ EL MAC 
P01 M .444 .926 .588 .454 .373 .323 2.22 3.04 
SD .093 .263 .122 .110 .108 .165 1.64 1.84 
P02 M .555 1.00 .609 .562 .514 .504 2.81 1.81 
SD .094 .000 .129 .089 .111 .249 1.64 1.72 
P03 tof .205 .683 .300 .204 .161 .137 2.32 3.42 
SD .075 .458 .124 .080 .091 .097 1.38 1.83 
PO4 M .556 .856 .636 .558 .516 .493 2.47 2.55 
SD .083 .340 .126 .102 .101 .158 2.47 1.62 
P05 M .360 .788 .471 .354 .308 .293 4.15 4.17 
SD .077 .404 .120 .086 .085 .150 1.84 1.99 
P06 M .251 .797 .322 .259 .202 .191 3.27 2.23 
SD .063 .385 .109 .082 .079 .124 1.64 1.37 
P07 M .329 .671 .407 .334 .291 .252 2.69 3.67 
SD .079 .465 .130 .086 .085 .132 1.70 1.93 
Abrreviations : Ll - Level 1; L2 - Level 2; L3 - Level 3; L4 - Level 4 
;L5+ - Level 5 and higher; EL - Elaborations; MAC - Macrostatements. 
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Table 5 
Correlations of Occasion of Measurement 
With Text Recall 
Subject Total Level 1 	Level 2 	Level 3 	Level 4 	Level 
P01 .43 -.12 .38 .38 .35 .15 
P02 .12 .00 .12 .08 .05 .15 
P03 -.61 -.22 -.57 -.56 -.38 -.31 
PO4 .30 -.18 .25 .26 .29 .10 
P05 .05 -.01 .02 .06 .03 .04 
P06 -.32 .13 -.31 -.32 -.23 .01 
P07 -.06 -.05 -.02 -.04 .03 -.14 
5+ 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses: 
Increments to R2 







P01 .182** .357** .004 
P03 .370** .399** .002 
PO4 .093* .452** .008 
P05 .003 .600** .029* 
P06 .104* .590** .006 
P07 .004 .497** .003 
*p < .05 
t*p < 	.01 
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Table 7 
Initial Text Recall Performance (Story 26), 
Fitted Slopes, and Fitted Intercepts for 
Individual Regression Equations 
Story 26 	 Intercept 
z 	Ranka 	Estimate 	Rank 
Slope 
Estimate 
(x 103 ) 
Rank 
P01 	1.13 	3 0.36 2 1.7 1 
P03 	-1.42 	6 0.30 5 -2.0 6 
PO4 	3.50 	1 0.51 1 1.1 4 
205 	1.89 	2 0.35 3 1.4 2 
P06 	-0.65 	5 0.29 6 -1.9 5 
P07 	0.11 	4 0.34 4 1.2 3 
aRank order within the group (range = 1 to 6) 
Changes in Text Memory 
Figure Captions 
1. Plots of Text Recall over Occasion of Measurement for Each Subject 
2. Plot of Predicted (Panel A) and Residual (Panel B) Scores for Regression of 
Text Recall on Occasion and Story for Subject P01. 
49 
111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIIIIIIII unrn 	rn nir it I 




• 0 — 
P03 
1111r1IIIIrrirrir1111111111f111111111111111111111111111111111111rI111 	11111110 







   
      
 
• 0 — 
   
      
 
SO- 





V a. a. 












10 	 20 	 •0 	 •0 	 GO 	Go 	 To 	 GO 
Occasion  
r 	 HI II II W1111111111, 









IIHM1111111111 I 1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I ill 1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I lilt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 
10 	20 	30 	40 	50 	60 	70 	80 	90 
Occasion 
